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ABSTRACT 
The advent of Behavioural Finance smce the 1980s has led to the 
generation of a voluminous research output pertaining to the behavioural patterns 
of feedback trading and herding. Previously confined to the realm of popular 
literature, these patterns of trade have undergone meticulous investigation both in 
the analytical as well as the empirical dimension. However, it is interesting to note 
that very little to no attention has been devoted with regards to factors that may 
bear an impact upon their manifestation. As a result, there seems to be a relative 
lack of research with regards to the issue of what promotes or inhibits their 
presence and significance. The thesis present approaches feedback trading and 
herding in a way that addresses the latter considerations. 
Our research first delves into feedback trading through heterogeneous-
agents' modeling and demonstrates that the significance of feedback-style trading 
patterns increases with the diversity of investors' composition in a market. As the 
latter is an indication of the liberalization of a given market environment (since 
certain regulatory restrictions are capable of impeding the conduct of trade for 
various investor-types, especially the overseas ones), we conclude that more 
liberal market settings are conducive to the relatively more significant 
manifestation of feedback trading. Our research also provides evidence in favour 
of the impact of specific regulatory features (capital gains' taxation, short-sales. 
index futures) upon market-\vide herd behaviour across a variety of capital 
markl.'ts. Finally, we focus on the study of herding on behalf of institutional 
in\'~stors and \n~ sho\v how different market conditions as well as the underlying 
market structures are capable of impacting upon its significance. 
As a result, our thesis contributes to the existing literature on herding and 
feedback trading by studying the impact of a variety of factors upon their 
significance over time, thus covering an important research gap . 
... 
-' 
Acknowledgements 
(dY.\'A,wr fTOPIZETAJ EK TOyeEOY~ 
fTAATQ.\' 
The thesis present constitutes the outcome of a long, painstaking journey 
conducted throughout the world of Knowledge and Research and, with the help of 
God, has reached a conclusion. In this journey a number of people contributed, 
each and everyone in a unique way that helped move it forward. 
I would first and foremost like to thank my supervisors, Professors A. 
Antoniou and Phil Holmes for their continuous encouragement and patience 
during all those years in Durham. Their inspiration and motivating spirit proved 
invaluable, more so during periods when my research encountered "blind alleys" 
that seemed impossible to cross. Their constant will to listen to my concerns and 
reflect upon those constitutes evidence per se of their pedagogic approach towards 
research supervision and I consider myself very fortunate to have had them as 
supervIsors. 
I would like to thank two profoundly special friends of mine, Dr. Pedro 
Ferreira and Dr. Anamaria Nicolae, first and foremost for their friendship as well 
as for their continuous, multifaceted and unconditional support during the years of 
my study in the United Kingdom in general, and Durham in particular. 
I would like to thank all my colleagues and friends in Durham and 
els~\\'here for their help and encouragement throughout these y~ars. If I refrain 
from mentioning any names here. this is only because I would prefer not to omit 
someone by mistake. 
Special thanks also go to Tom Doan and Tom '\laycock at Estima for 
their invaluable assistance with the empirical part of my work; without their help. 
my work would have encountered serious setbacks. 
I now tum to perhaps the most valuable good a person is endowed \yith 
in his life, namely his parents. Their unlimited support and encouragement as 
well as their iron-clad belief in me enabled me to carryon this task towards the 
Orient of Research with greater Faith. Without them, this thesis would have been 
an impossibility. Thank you. 
5 
LIST OF CO:\,"TE~TS 
1. Introduction .......................................................... 11 
2. Literature Review ................................................... 21 
2.1 Introduction .................................................... 21 
2.2 Efficient Markets' Hypothesis and Behavioural Finance: 
an overview ........................................................... 2-+ 
2.3 Feedback Trading ............................................. 36 
2.3.1 Definition, Sources and Motivations ............... 36 
2.3 .1.a Behavioural grounds ................................. 37 
2.3.1.b Rational speculation ................................. 41 
2.3 .1.c Informational asymmetry .......................... .45 
2.3 .1.d Manipulation ......................................... .46 
2.3.2 Feedback Trading: Empirical Evidence ............ .49 
2.3.3 Evolutionary Finance and Feedback-effects ........ 52 
2.4 Herd Behaviour. .................................................. 58 
2.4.1 The Roots: Crowd Behaviour in History ............ 58 
2.4.2 Herd Behaviour in the Stock Market: Definitions, 
Sources and Motivations ..................................... 61 
2.4.3 Herding: Empirical Evidence ........................ 73 
2.5 Conclusion ........................................................ 78 
3. Threshold-Trading: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation of a Novel Type of Feedback-trading .......... 84 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................... 84 
3.2 Theoretical background .......................................... 87 
3.3 The Model ......................................................... 93 
3.3.1 The original model: Sentana and Wadhwani (1991) 
....................................................................... 93 
3.3.2 Threshold traders: extending Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) ................................................. 96 
3.4 Hypotheses ...................................................... 102 
3.5 Market-heterogeneity: which markets and why ............ 104 
3.6 Methodology and Data ......................................... 116 
3 .6.1 Methodology .......................................... 116 
3.6.2 Data .................................... ·· .. ··········· .. 126 
3 .6.3 Descriptive Statistics ................................. 127 
3.7 Results ............................................... ········· .... 128 
6 
3.7.1 Threshold trading: Discemibility and statistical 
significance ....................................................... 128 
3.7.2 Threshold trading and the differences in 
heterogeneity across markets ...................................... 133 
3.7.3 Threshold trading and intertemporal changes in 
market-heterogeneity ............................................... 136 
3.7.3.a First sub-period: limited overseas investors' 
participation ...................................................... 136 
3.7.3. b Second sub-period: increased overseas investors' 
participation ......................................................... 138 
3.7.4 Threshold trading during extreme market events ..... 142 
3.7.4.a Pre-crisis: 2/5/1995-1/7/1997 ...................... 145 
3.7.4.b In-crisis: 2/7/1997-31/12/1998 ................... 148 
3.7.4.c Post-crisis: 1/1/1999-31/12/2003 ................. 149 
3.8 Conclusion ...................................................... 153 
4 An Investigation of the Impact of Specific Regulatory 
Provisions upon Market-wide Herding ........................... 159 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................... 159 
4.2 Theoretical Background ....................................... 162 
4.2.1 Definitions and Sources of herding ................ 162 
4.2.2 Herding and relevant market-features ............. 166 
4.2.2.a Capital gains' taxation ............................. 166 
4.2.2.b Short-selling ......................................... 170 
4.2.2.c Index-futures' introduction ........................ 171 
4.3 Measuring herding: Hwang and Salmon (2004) ............ 173 
4.4 Hypotheses and our markets .................................. 177 
4.4.1 Sample-selection: Rationale ........................ 177 
4.4.2 Sample-selection: allocating the markets to the 
hypotheses ........................................................ 1 79 
4.5 Data and Methodology ......................................... 183 
4.5.1 Data ..................................................... 183 
4.5.2 Methodology ........................................... 18.+ 
4.5.3 Descriptive Statistics ................................. 185 
4.6 Results ............................................................ 186 
.+.6.1 Herding and capital gains' taxation ................ 186 
4.6.2 Herding and short-selling constraints .............. 191 
.+.6.3 Herding and the introduction of index-futures ... 195 
4.6'-+ Discussion ............................................. 199 
4.7 Conclusion ...................................................... 20 1 
4.8 Appendix ......................................................... 203 
7 
5 Institutional Herding Under Various Market Conditions: 
Evidence from Portugal .............................................. 206 
5.1 Introduction ...................................................... 106 
5.2 Theoretical Background ....................................... 210 
5.2.1 Institutional herding: Sources and Motivations ... 21 0 
5.2.2 Index-wide institutional herding .................... 213 
5.2.2.a Market-wide herding at the index-level ......... 21-+ 
5.2.2.b Trading volume ..................................... 115 
5.2.2.c Market volatility ..................................... 217 
5.2.2.d Market-index direction ............................ 219 
5.3 Measuring herding: Lakonishok et al (1992) ............... 221 
5.4 The market environment of our study: PortugaL ........... 225 
5.4.1 The Portuguese Stock Exchange: a short historical 
overview .......................................................... 225 
5.4.2 The Portuguese funds' industry ..................... 228 
5.5 Hypotheses ....................................................... 229 
5.6 Data and Methodology .......................................... 230 
5.6.1 Data ..................................................... 230 
5.6.2 Methodology .......................................... 232 
5.6.3 Descriptive Statistics ................................. 234 
5.6.3.a Index-wide institutional herding .................. 234-
5.6.3.b Index-wide market-herding ....................... 235 
5.7 Results-Discussion ............................................... 235 
5.7.1 Results .................................................. 235 
5.7.l.a Index-wide institutional herding and index-wide 
market-herding ...................................................... 238 
5.7.1 b Index-wide institutional herding and index-wide 
trading volume ...................................................... 242 
5.7.l.c Index-wide institutional herding and index-
volatility .......................................................... 246 
5.7.l.d Index-wide institutional herding and index-
direction .......................................................... 2..+9 
5.7.2 Discussion ......................................... ·.· .251 
58e I · '1':;':; . onc uslon .................................... ·················· ... -~ ~ 
6 Concluding Remarks .......................................... ·· ... 257 
Bibliography ......................................................... 262 
8 
List of Tables 
Table 3.1: Investors' composition for Hong Kong, S. Korea and 
Taiwan (% of market trading value) ..................................... 107 
Table 3.2: A summary of the heterogeneity-related regulatory features 
of Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan ................................ 113 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Hong Kong 20- and 200-days 
Simple Volume Ratios (2/5/1995-31/12/2003) ......................... 123 
Table 3.4: Sample statistics: daily index returns (2/5/1995 to 
31/12/2003) .................................................................. 128 
Table 3.5: Maximum likelihood estimates of the original Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) model ................................................... 129 
Table 3.6: Short volume ratio results (2/5/1995-31/12/2003) ......... 134 
Table 3.7: Long volume ratio results (2/5/1995-31/12/2003) ......... 135 
Table 3.8: Short volume ratio results (limited overseas investors' 
participation) ................................................................ 139 
Table 3.9: Long volume ratio results (limited overseas investors' 
participation) ................................................................ 140 
Table 3.10: Short volume ratio results (increased overseas investors' 
participation) ................................................................ 143 
Table 3.11: Long volume ratio results (increased overseas investors' 
participation) ................................................................ 144 
Table 3.12: Short volume ratio results (Pre-crisis) ..................... 146 
Table 3.13: Long volume ratio results (Pre-crisis) ..................... 147 
Table 3.14: Short volume ratio results (In-crisis) ...................... 150 
Table 3.15: Long volume ratio results (In-crisis) ....................... 151 
Table 3.l6: Short volume ratio results (Post-crisis) .................... 154 
Table 3.17: Long volume ratio results (Post-crisis) .................... 155 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for each market-index and each 
hypothesis .................................................................... 187 
Table 4.2: Results from the herding tests (Hwang and Salmon, 200-+): 
Hypothesis 1 ................................................................. 189 
Table -+.3: Results from the Wald-tests: Hypothesis 1 ................. 190 
Table 4.4: Results from the herding tests (Hwang and Salmon, 200-+): 
Hypothesis 2 ................................................................. 1 9-+ 
Table 4.5: Results from the herding tests (Hwang and Salmon, 200-+): 
Hypothesis 3 ................................................................. 200 
Table 5.1: Institutional herding literature on the premises of the 
Lakonishok et al (1992) measure ......................................... 226 
Table 5.2: Evolution of the Portuguese mutual funds' industry ...... 229 
Table 5.3: Descriptive properties of the 1997-2005 portfolio-holdings 
database ...................................................................... 236 
9 
Table 5.4: Properties of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard 
deviation of the betas for the Hwang and Salmon (2004) measure .. 236 
Table 5.5: Overall herding ................................................ 23 ~ 
Table 5.6: Herding results from the Hwang and Salmon (200-+) 
measure ....................................................................... 239 
Table 5.7: Index-wide institutional herding and index-wide market-
herding ........................................................................ 2-+-+ 
Table 5.8: Index-wide institutional herding and index-wide trading 
volume ........................................................................ 2-+5 
Table 5.9: Index-wide institutional herding and index-volatility ..... 248 
Table 5.10: Index-wide institutional herding and index-direction ... 252 
List of Figu res 
Figure 3.1: Hong Kong 20-days Simple Volume Ratio (2/5/1995-
31/12/2003) .................................................................. 121 
Figure 3.2: Hong Kong 200-days Simple Volume Ratio (2/5/1995-
31/12/2003) .................................................................. 122 
Figure 4.1: Herding towards the Hang Seng index (May 1981 - April 
1991) ............................................................................ 198 
Figure 5.1: Market-wide herding towards the PSI20 during the 1997-
2005 period .................................................................. 240 
10 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The 1980s witnessed the unfolding of certain inno'lations in the area of 
Finance, as researchers started to utilize concepts from extra-Finance fields (most 
notably, Psychology) in order to describe the behaviour of stock prices on the 
premises of various aspects of investor's behaviour. This culminated into the 
launch of a research strand that came to be known as Behavioural Finance, which 
involved the analytical modeling and empirical investigation of several 
behavioural dimensions regarding investment decision-making that, until then, 
remained mostly within the realm of the popular Finance literature. 
Perhaps the most typical example in this respect is the one related to 
phenomena of massive investor psychology, often coined through the umbrella-
term of "crowd behaviour". Popular Finance literature (Kindleberger, 1978; 
Soros, 1987; Galbraith, 1994; Mathiopoulos, 2000) tended to interpret these issues 
by invoking empirical axioms and observations regarding the human nature. 
Using those popular concepts as a motivational basis, Behavioural Finance 
developed two distinct notions to facilitate and systemize the research of such 
trading patterns; as a result, the terms "feedback trading" and "herdin~" were 
introduced. In rough terms, feedback trading refers to trading on the basis of 
historical prices, \\'hile herding to the alignment of one's behaviour to the 
hL'hadollr of others. 
1 1 
If herding and (positive) feedback trading preyail in a market, then there 
obviously exists the possibility of large price swings. If a significant number of 
investors practice positive feedback trading (i.e. buy when prices rise, sell when 
they fall), it is reasonable to assume that they are capable of exerting a certain 
pressure over prices that may lead to the development of trends (be they upwards 
or downwards). Similarly, if herding is widespread among investors, then it would 
also be expected to exert a certain pressure upon prices towards the direction of 
the herd. The above imply that both herding and feedback trading have the 
potential to push prices away from fundamentals. In view of this, \\-e contend that 
these two concepts raise issues of asset-pricing that are of direct interest to 
regulators and policymakers alike, as they are able to give rise to abrupt price 
movements, possibly of destabilizing proportions. They also constitute topics of 
considerable interest for the investment community, as their presence in the 
market has the potential of increasing risk (Barberis and Thaler. 2002) through the 
deviation of prices from fundamentals. 
Research on the topics of herding and feedback trading has been 
undertaken both at the analytical as well as the empirical level and, since the late 
1980s, has occupied a considerable portion of Finance-research. 
The issue of feedback trading was theoretically addressed initially by' De 
Long et al (1990) inspired by Soros' (1987) intuition of the evolution of trends in 
the marketplace and was later subject to a rather impressive array of empirical 
investigations across various market settings (Sentana and \\'adh\\-ani. 1992: 
Koutmos, 1997; Aguirre and Saidi. 1999; Koutmos and Saidi. 2001; Bohl and 
Reitz, 2004~ Antoniou et aI, 2005; Bohl and Reitz, 2006). The profitability of 
feedback trading strategies has been extensively examined in studies related to 
12 
either momentum or contrarian (e.g. De Bondt and Thaler. 1985: Bo\\man and 
Iverson, 1998; Mun et aI, 1999; Jegadeesh and Titman, ~001; Kang et al. 2002; 
Antoniou et al 2005a) trading. Technical analysis, as a special type of feedback 
trading, has also received notable attention, with a number of papers (e.g. 
Bessembinder and Chan, 1995; Ito, 1999; Ratner and Leal, 1999; \\"ong et aL 
2003; Ming et aI, 2000; Strozzi and Zaldfvar-Comenges, 2005) investigating the 
profitability of a variety of technical trading rules in several markets. 
Interdisciplinary, Finance-oriented research, emanating mostly from the wider 
area of Evolutionary Finance (Farmer, 2002; Farmer and Joshi, 2002; Westerhoff, 
2006) has also employed the notion of feedback trading in heterogeneous-agents' 
models in an effort to replicate certain properties of stock markets (such as, excess 
volatility, for example). 
Herding, on the other hand, has constituted an equally widely researched 
area. Analytical studies (e.g. Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et aL 1992) illustrate 
several theoretical possibilities for the manifestation of herd behaviour based upon 
professional, reputational or psychological considerations. Empirical research in 
this field has also been on the ascending, with a number of papers trying to 
measure herding using both aggregate data (Christie and Huang, 1995; Chang et 
aI, 2000; Gleason et aI, 2003; Caparelli et aI, 2004; Gleason et aI, 200-+; Hwang 
and Salmon, 2004; Demirer and Kutan, 2006) as well as microdata (Lakonishok et 
aL 1992: Grinblatt et aL 1996; \\'ermers, 1999; Choe et aL 1999; Kim and \\·ei, 
2002a; Kim and \Vei, 2002b; Gilmour and Smit, 2002: Voronko\a and Boh!. 
2005: Wylie, 2005). Most of the aboy\.? studies han~ tried to assess th~ presence l)f 
herding in yarious single-market settings as \\dl as identify its significance 
13 
conditional upon certain categorizations. like, for example, which industries or 
capitalization-groups or fund-categories entail higher herding leYe is. 
Even though the above brief summary on herding and feedback trading 
indicates the presence of a voluminous research regarding those concepts. it is 
interesting to note that very little attention has been devoted as to what promotes 
or inhibits them. Regarding feedback trading, the only study we are aware of that 
attempts to touch upon this research issue is the one by Antoniou et al (2005) who 
test for the impact of the introduction of index-futures upon the feedback trading 
of the underlying spot markets. As far as herding is concerned, the only studies 
that try to identify the impact of certain market conditions upon herding are the 
ones of Gilmour and Smit (2002) and Lobao and Serra (2006) for South African 
and Portuguese institutional traders respectively. 
In view of the aforementioned potential for wider public interest 
(regulators, policymakers, investors) surrounding these two patterns of trade, it is 
rather surprising to note that no extensive research effort has been undertaken thus 
far to investigate the impact of a variety of factors upon their manifestation. Thus, 
even though most research tends to concentrate upon the impact of these patterns 
upon the market, the inverse seems to have been largely overlooked both at the 
comparative (i.e. across markets) as well as at the individual (i.e. within a single 
market) level. 
Given the above, the mam research objecti\-e of our thesis relates to 
addressing thl.! impact of certain market factors upon herding and feedback 
trading. As there exists a multiplicity of factors that may promote or inhibit 
herding and feedback trading. we decided to examine the presence and 
significance of these two behavioural patterns using selected market factors. It is 
1.+ 
our understanding that the choice of factors in our research should not be 
arbitrary. but rather constitute a function of their relevance to the patterns under 
investigation. As a result, we elaborate here by noting that our research objectiye 
here is to address the impact upon herding and feedback trading of specific 
factors, whose relation to those two trading patterns is supported through 
relevant theoretical frameworks and existing empirical evidence. Consequently, 
our research aims at contributing to the empirical literature relative to those 
behavioural patterns by proposing a novel framework within which their presence 
can be assessed. 
In the interest of gaining deeper insight into the impact of different factors 
upon herding and feedback trading, we believe that it is beneficial to conduct our 
tests both at the single- as well as the inter-market level, so that we may be able to 
gauge this issue from a comparative viewpoint. To further our understanding of 
the issue, we contend that the utilization of alternative datatypes (aggregate data 
as well as microdata) is rather useful in this context. Our work further aims at 
transcending the empirical dimension of this issue by invoking the analytical 
dimension as well through the proposition of specific novel model-frameworks. 
By focusing upon which factors impact favorably or adversely upon 
hading and feedback trading, our research is of certain relevance to both market 
participants as well as policymakers alike. With regards to the former, such 
research is useful both in case one intends to adhere to those behavioural patterns 
as well as in case one wishes to formulate a strategy of exploiting them across 
different market settings \vith variable structures. From a policymaking point of 
vie\\', our research promotes the discussion over the impact of the regulatory 
environn1ent oyer herding and feedback trading, something that has neyer really 
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been addressed in the relevant literature. Given the treatment of those two by the 
popular literature as the culprits underlying abnormal market phenomena, their 
research on these premises helps delineate whether certain aspects of the market 
environment itself tend to "grandfather" their manifestation. 
Having stated our main research objectives and how we intend to pursue 
them, we will now provide a short presentation of the following chapters and how 
they relate to those objectives. 
Our thesis begins with a detailed outlining in Chapter 2 of the basic 
schools of thought that evolved as responses to the Efficient Markets' Hypothesis 
(Behavioural Finance, Evolutionary Finance), with our attention then 
concentrating upon herding and feedback trading both from a theoretical as well 
as an empirical point of view. Our discussion in Chapter 2 makes it explicitly 
clear that very little work has been carried out regarding the impact of various 
market features and conditions upon those patterns across various market-settings 
over time. 
To that end, our research first focuses on feedback trading, a novel type of 
which we are proposing in Chapter 3. We term that type "threshold-trader", as its 
demand function adheres to the feedback-type, yet becomes active anytime a 
particular threshold has been violated. We insert this type of "conditional" 
feedback trader within the model-setting proposed by Sentana and Wadhwani 
(1992); the latter is a bi-trader model accommodating "rational" and "feedback" 
traders and constitutes the dominant empirical framework for feedback trading 
16 
research 1• As a result of this expansion, the heterogeneity of the original model 
grows, thus including "rational", "feedback" and "threshold" traders. 
Given the above, we choose to test for the presence of this novel trader-type in 
market environments characterized by varying levels of investors' heterogeneity. 
We base the designation of heterogeneity on the premises of the participation 
levels of various investor-types in a market; more specifically, we consider the 
degree of heterogeneity of a market to be an increasing function of the 
participation levels of overseas traders, since it is these traders that are often 
subject to regulatory restrictions. The idea here is that the less restrictiyc a 
regulatory environment is, the wider the investors' participation will grow, thus 
expected to allow for more trading strategies to manifest in the market. If so, then 
our novel type of trader would be expected to manifest itself with greater 
significance in relatively liberal market environments, a fact confirmed by our 
empirical findings. Given, however, that regulatory frameworks are subject to 
change, thus inducing changes in the heterogeneity of the market, we test for the 
robustness of our findings during periods of "enhanced" and periods of "reduced" 
market-heterogeneity. Our results seem to suggest that changes in heterogeneity 
are capable of conferring some impact onto the manifestation of our novel trader-
type in relatively liberal market environments only. Finally, we also investigate 
whether the presence and significance of threshold-traders exhibits differential 
patterns during turbulent versus non-turbulent market conditions; results from our 
empirical tests appear to refute this hypothesis. 
I The J(Jllmring research on feedba, .. :k trading is bast!d 111'011 the Sentana and W.,Jhll ,III! (199:') 
model !i-amell'Ork: Koutmos, 1997, Aguirre and Saidi, 1999; Koutmos and Saidl, ]001,' .\ikulyak. 
]OO]:/Va!,mabe, :002; Bohl and Reit:, 200-1: Antoniou et ai, ]005, ,\lalyar, ]005, Bohl and Rei!::, 
]OUt> 
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We then proceed towards the investigation of herding in Chapter ~ with 
the intention of establishing whether specific market features are capable of 
promoting or inhibiting its significance across markets O\'er time. More 
specifically, we test for the significance of herding on the premises of the H\vang 
and Salmon (2004) framework across markets on the basis of: capital gains' 
taxation, short-sales' constraints and index-futures' introduction. We first 
acknowledge that the relation between capital gains' taxes and herding is an 
ambivalent one; in light of strong theoretical (and opposing) arguments regarding 
the nature of this relation, we test for the hypothesis of herding manifesting itself 
in significantly different fashions between markets that tax and markets that do 
not tax capital gains. Our results support our hypothesis, as they indicate that 
markets where capital gains are taxed tend to produce more persistent herding, 
which is mostly significantly higher, compared to markets with zero capital-gains' 
taxes. We then test for the hypothesis that short-sales' constraints would tend to 
promote herding, in line with the overpricing-rationale put forward by Miller 
(1977); evidence from markets prior to as well as following the wider introduction 
of short-sales provide little support for this hypothesis, as they indicate the 
absence of any impact of their introduction upon herding. Finally, we test for the 
hypothesis that the introduction of index-futures is capable of producing a 
significant impact upon herding levels; we base this hypothesis upon the 
conceptual affiliation between herding and positive feedback trading and recent 
(Antoniou et aI, 2005) findings according to which the introduction of inde\:-
futures depresses positive feedback trading in the underlying spot market. Results 
appear to generate a mixed picture, as the impact upon herding from the 
18 
introduction of index-futures does not appear to be uniformly significant across 
different markets. 
In Chapter 5, we study funds managers' herding on the basis of a novel 
empirical framework. First, we measure institutional herding exclusively at the 
level of the constituents of a market's index in order to gain an accurate picture of 
it at the index-level. Following that, we condition it upon index-properties 
associated with market conditions which are capable of bearing an impact upon 
institutional herding and which have received very little attention in the herding 
literature. More specifically, we focus upon the impact of: a) market-\vide 
herding, b) trading volume, c) market volatility and d) market-direction upon the 
herding of institutional investors. To the best of our knowledge, institutional 
herding has never been studied on these premises combined. Utilizing a unique 
institutional portfolio-holdings' database from the Portuguese Stock Exchange 
(Euronext Lisbon), we show that institutional herding at the level of the 
constituents of the market-index (PSI20) in Portugal is found to be significant 
irrespective of the market conditions used to test for it. We then illustrate how the 
highly concentrated structures of both the Portuguese market as well as the 
Portuguese funds' industry could be employed to explain our findings, smce 
according to Do et al (2006). herding is expected to be higher in more 
concentrated market settings. Interestingly enough, fund managers in Portugal are 
found to herd more during relatively non-intense market conditions (reflected here 
through lower levels of market-wide herding, volume and \"olatility as \\ell as 
non-extreme market returns), a fact reconciled with agency-based herding 
moti vations. 
19 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes our main fmdings and provides concluding 
remarks as well as propositions for future research on the issues addressed in this 
thesis. 
20 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The stock market is an environment where the interactions of various market 
participants as imprinted in their trading decisions determine the course of 
securities' prices. Each market operates within the premises of a certain regulatory 
framework which defines the rules of trading conduct and is implemented and 
supervised by the respective regulatory authorities (Goodhart et aI, 1998). 
Regulatory provisions are not expected to be identical across markets, as the latter 
differ in terms of development (Antoniou et aI, 1997a). As markets differ in their 
regulatory settings, they are also expected to exhibit differences in their 
microstructure, or else "the process and outcomes of exchanging assets under 
explicit trading rules" (O'Hara, 1997). These differences are bound to affect the 
trading conduct of investors on several levels: entry (whether, for example. 
foreigners are allowed to trade), mode (whether. for instance, traders are allowed 
to sell stocks short-and which ones) as well as treatment (whether, for example. 
capital gains or dividends are subject to taxation). As a result, the regulatory 
environment under which a market operates is bound to affect the participation of 
investors, thus indirectly impacting upon the formation of securities' pric~:;. 
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The crux underlying much of research in Finance relates to the establislunent 
of a framework of price-behaviour. If the latter can be accurately infeITed~ then 
there exists the question as to whether prices can be predicted. in order to de\ise 
strategies that can yield profits. However, as mentioned aboye, the e\'olution of 
prices cannot be separated from the evolutionary development of the market and 
its effect upon its participants. As a result, prices are not the byproduct of an 
abstract process but are subject to the influence of intertemporal changes in 
market structure and participation (Shiller, 1984). 
Although the changes in market structures can easily be gauged, it is harder to 
assert their impact upon the behaviour of traders. Even though Finance 
researchers have attempted to classify traders based upon various premises (e.g. 
"informed"/"uninformed", "rational"l"noise"). the reality of the marketplace may 
actually reflect more complex dynamics (Arthur, 1994). Such complexity is 
capable of "enriching" investors' heterogeneity through the constant generation of 
evolving trading patterns, which in tum, are bound to feed back into securities' 
prices (Farmer, 2002). 
Recent research in the fields of Behavioural (Barberis et aI, 1998; Daniel et aI, 
1998) and Evolutionary (Farmer, 2002) Finance has attempted to produce 
conceptual frameworks for the formalization, identification and interpretation of 
various trading patterns using tools from extra-Finance disciplines. such as 
Psychology and Biology. The \vider availability of micro-databases has facilitated 
the in-depth examination of such patterns, more so since they often invol\e data-
frequencies that reach down to the minute-level (Griffin et aL 2003). 
:\n important issue here concerns the impact of rele\'ant market f~atures and 
conditions upon those behayioural patterns. As our previous discussion has 
'1'1 
suggested, stock markets are evolving "ecosystems", where trading stratec:ies are 
.... .... 
subject to the influence of varying circumstances; consequently. we lvould expect 
different features and conditions of the market environment to bear differential 
effects upon the manifestation of behavioural trading patterns. To the best of our 
knowledge, such an issue has received limited attention in the relevant Finance 
literature and it is this relatively unexplored area that our work focuses upon. 
Two forms of behaviourally motivated trading patterns that haye been 
extensively researched both empirically as well as analytically in Finance are 
feedback trading and herding. These two patterns have attracted substantial 
research attention due to the fact that they are capable of producing collective 
behavioural dynamics (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001) with potentially 
destabilizing impacts upon securities' prices (Lakonishok et aI, 1992; Wermers, 
1999), more so in view of their treatment by the popular Finance literature (Soros, 
1987; Galbraith, 1994). Much like with other behavioural patterns. herding and 
feedback trading have been the subject of very sporadic ad hoc research on the 
premises of differential market-features and conditions. 
Our discussion in the present chapter shall first concentrate on a parallel 
illustration of the basic tenets of the two most influential lines of research in 
modern Finance, namely the "rational" and the "behavioural" one and explain 
how the latter endeavours to capture the underlying complexity in the 
marketplace. The behavioural "camp" in Finance has come to be associated with 
models reflective of psychological considerations, which are capable of 
rationalizing seycral behayioural trading patterns (Barberis and Thaler. 2002); 
research into the latter has also been at the forefront of recent interJisciplinary 
resL'arch in finance. generally kno\\TI as Eyolutionary Finance. \vhich \\'ill be 
delineated in some detail as well. Following that, v;e shall then direct our focus 
towards the presentation of feedback trading and herding. As our pr;;,vious 
discussion has indicated, these behaviourally induced trading patterns ar~ capable 
of generating interesting dynamics in the stock market context, thus enhancing the 
complexity of the latter. Since the impact of differential market-features and 
conditions upon the behaviour of these two patterns has not been studied in depth, 
a study towards that direction would provide us with useful insight into their 
properties. In view of that, we shall examine these two patterns in detaiL with 
regards to their theoretical foundations and empirical evidence. 
2.2 Efficient Markets' Hypothesis and Behavioural Finance: an 
. 
overvIew 
The term "market efficiency" was first coined in an unpublished work by 
Harry Roberts (1967), with the seminal study on the area of efficient markets 
systemizing the theory of the Efficient Markets' Hypothesis (EMH, hereafter) 
published by Fama (1970). What the EMH essentially posits is that prices fully 
reflect all relevant information at any point in time over time and that the rate of 
incorporation of information into prices is instantaneous. In the EMH-world, 
prices are taken to follow the arrival of news, whose arrival rate, in tum. is 
considered to be random: thus, prices are assumed to adhere to a random walk. 
The latter remov~s the potential for return predictability. thus further ensuring that 
no investor is able to enjoy abnormal returns through market timing. Investors are 
assumed to be of a "rational" nature. the latter associated \\'ith the appropriate and 
correct rec~ption, processing and interpretation of infonl1ation. Put it this \\ ay. 
traders are assumed to be able to accurately assess any piece of news releyant to a 
stock. What is more, this theory portrays investors as relatively homoaeneous in 
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their expectations, with each one of them maximizing their subjective expected 
utility and bearing consistent (i.e. "correcf') beliefs as to the distribution of the 
factors affecting returns (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). 
As Fama (1970.1991) suggested, the issue of market efficiency is not just 
confined to the question of information-incorporation alone. Claiming that prices 
are efficient or not is one thing; establishing the "correct" prices is another. 
Hence, the point needed to be addressed as well is how a stock's price can be 
estimated, or else what the appropriate asset-pricing model might be. This dual 
causality was termed by Fama as the joint-hypothesis problem. The rationale here 
is quite straightforward: if information is fully reflected in stock prices, then the 
latter are deemed to be "efficient". Nevertheless, to be able to assert whether the 
current price is in line with its "proper" one, it is necessary to have a model that 
will measure this correctly. 
It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the EMH constitutes a rather 
absolute depiction of the real world. First of all, it is difficult to reconcile this 
purported rationality with reality, since people differ in terms of background, 
perception, judgement and financial resources. Being overtly rational is something 
that is hard to encounter in the market, let alone in life itself. In the end of the day. 
the term "rational" by itself is subject to various interpretations and may manifest 
itself in various \\"avs. 
Also, whether all inYestors trade upon the arriyal of new information or 
not is doubtful. Some may see the information and trade immediately, others may 
stand by in anticipation of more information, others may trade to the opposite 
direction from what the information may imply and others might not e\~n trade at 
all. What's mbre, it might be the case that an investor submits an order for reasons 
other than information; they could, for instance, be liquidity traders, in which case 
their need for cash is not directly affiliated with the information t1ow. As Fama 
(1970) and Ross et al (1999), though, acknowledge, not all traders have to agree 
upon the interpretation of a certain piece of information or respond uniformly to 
it, as long as those that do, trade in line with the information's content. 
Fama's seminal paper triggered a large wave of research that follo\ved 
various pathways during the 1980s and 1990s; by 1991, F ama had to concede that 
his 1970-findings had to be partially revised, in particular, the predictability of 
returns over short (daily and weekly) horizons, in view of more sophisticated 
computational methods and databases. 
The basic tenet of the EMH that came under fire during the subsequent 
decades was the one pertaining to investors' rationality. This is attributed to the 
strand of research that came to be known as behavioural finance, which 
approached this issue through the utilization of concepts related to psychological 
motivations for trading. What behavioural finance essentially proposed is that 
investors have to be viewed as less-than-perf~ctly rational, subject to limitations 
and biases in both their perception and judgement (Hirshleifer. 2001). Hence, 
people may not all observe the relevant information to its entirety or even if they 
do they may perceive it differently, process it differently and, contingent upon it, 
reach different decisions using heuristics. or else, tools for the simplifi~d 
processing of complex problems. Heuristics are actually quite sizeable in numbers 
and their cffcct ovcr individuals' decision-making cannot rcadih be e:;timat~d: 
~ . 
ho\\"c\'cr. thcir presence has been experimentally confirmed as se\'cral studies 
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illustrate (Tykocinski et aI, 2004; Lo et aI, 2005). Therefore, the behavioral 
approach suggests complexity in the market context, with decision-making being 
subject to factors beyond traditional rationality and with the obvious outcome 
being that the market starts to appear heterogeneous in content. Behavioral 
finance captures this heterogeneity by suggesting that investors' beliefs, 
expectations and processing abilities are different. Due to those differences, the 
response of traders to news and/or events is not expected to be symmetric; indeed, 
investors may react excessively ("overreact") or with a delay CunderreacC). This 
purportedly biased response may in tum result in mispricing, where the actual 
return of a stock deviates from its fundamental one. Such over- and underreaction 
patterns have constituted the C0merstone of much of the research undertaken by 
behaviorists, in an attempt to show that prices are prone to certain patterns 
following given events and that they may be profitably exploited by those who are 
aware of them. 
A rather large portion of research in behavioural Finance has been devoted 
to the study of "contrarian" and "momentum" strategies aiming at exploiting the 
purported over/underreaction patterns across markets. A number of studies (De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Bowman and Iverson, 1998; Mun et aI, 1999; Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 2001; Kang et aI, 2002; Antoniou et al 2005a) have investigated 
whether such strategies can be profitable in a variety of market settings and 
whether the observed profits can be attributed to investors' over/underreaction. 
Results frum such research seem to affirm the potential for profitability from the 
implementation of such trading strategies. 
An impressiYe array of research into the documented "anomalies" h;ls 
been de\'oted to the study of "seasonalities", the latter referring to empirically 
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observed patterns of prices during specific temporal periods. These may include 
specific: a) months, such as the "January-effect" (Lucey and Whelan, 2004), the 
"September-effect" (Reutter et aI, 2002) and the "Mark-Twain-effect"( Balaban . 
1995); b) days of the week such as the "twist-of-the-Monday-effect" (Leal and 
Madureira, 2001), the "day-of-the-week" effect (Kiymaz and Berument, 2001) 
and the "holiday-effect" (Lau and McInish, 2002); c) other subdivisions of the 
year, such as the "semi-monthly-effect" (Balaban and Bulu, 1996). It follows that 
a trader in possession of the knowledge of those patterns may choose to employ 
them to generate profits that others could not. This, however, could run counter to 
the spirit of the EMH, which essentially claims that such patterns do not exist 
(Fama, 1970) and that even if they do, they cannot be profitably exploited due to 
transaction-costs (Fama, 1991). Coutts and Sheikh (2002) document the absence 
of elsewhere reported anomalies (weekend-, January- and Pre-Holiday-effect) in 
the All Gold Index of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange between 1987 and 1997, 
which they attribute to microstructure features of the South African market. 
Gregoriou et al (2004) report evidence of the Monday-effect for the FTSE 100 
over an II-year period (1986-1997) and find that this purported anomaly seems to 
wane off when transaction costs (proxied by the bid-ask spread) are taken into 
account. 
An anomaly that has been very often cited is the size-effect. The latter 
refers to abnormal returns observed for small capitalization stocks and has 
surfaced in a series of research studies. For example, the size-effect seems to be 
associated with herding (Lakonishok et aI, 1992; Wermers, 1999), analysts' 
forecasts (Kiymaz, 2002), technical analysis (Antoniou et al, 1997b), IPOs 
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(Kiymaz, 2000), price-limits (Kim and Limpaphayom. 2000) and infonned 
trading (Easley et aL 1996). 
However, even though behavioural finance has put forward a series of 
psychological explanations to account for certain perceived patterns in price-
behaviour, it has yet to come up with a unified model of price-fonnation 
(Hirshleifer, 2001; Brav and Heaton, 2002). As Fama (1970) has pointed out. 
every test of market efficiency must be accompanied by the test of a relevant 
asset-pricing model ("joint-hypotheses" problem). To be able to tell vvhether the 
price of a security at any point in time equals its fundamental value contingent 
upon the amount of information available, one has to use the appropriate discount 
rate for its expected cash flows, which in tum requires an appropriate discount 
model. The problem with behavioral finance is that no such model has been put 
forward so far, whilst many of the inefficiencies it claims to have unveiled have 
been empirically questioned. 
What is more, most behavioural research tests the impact of a bias or two 
(Barberis et al 1998; Daniel et aI, 2001) over traders' behaviour while ignoring 
other biases, thus leaving the possibility of alternative explanations open. Since 
the number of possible biases is unknown, it is hard to: a) assess the impact of 
each one over each trader separately and all of them as a whole and b) assess the 
impact of the possible interaction of those biases upon investors' behaviour. In 
short, behavioural finance seems to amplify the very ambiguity it is endeavouring 
to explain, since the vastness of psychological biases renders their study less than 
perfectly feasible and their applicability questionable. In his main criticism 
against the hehaviorists, Fama (1998) stresses the fact that the majority of the 
reported anomalies appear to be figments of methodological tlavvs, including 
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sample biases and return metrics, while agam (as in his 1991-paper) he 
emphasizes that the size-effect is to account for a number of those. Hence. he 
posits that the purported price-patterns around certain events are not as significant 
as the behaviorists initially proposed. 
The main contribution, however, on behalf of the behavioural Finance is 
the study of the nature, role and impact of traders that do not necessarily adhere to 
purely rational patterns. In Finance, researchers have tenned these less-than-
perfectly rational traders as "noise traders", the implication here being that they do 
not trade on information but rather on "noise'~; the latter is taken to include 
anything that is not relevant to the fundamental value of a stock. If noise trading 
assumes a certain size in the market, then it is bound to bear an impact on returns. 
possibly leading them to deviate from their fundamental value. Thus, noise traders 
are capable of inducing mispricing (De Long et aI, 1990), since they are not 
adhering to the EMH-postulates and the accompanying risk in such cases is 
known as "noise trader risk" (Barberis and Thaler, 2002). 
The latter constitutes a tangible obstacle to arbitrage, since the presumed 
presence of noise traders is expected to render arbitrage costly. Assume stocks A 
and B being two perfect substitutes and assume that stock A's price is falling due 
to noise trading. Then the rational investor may opt for going short on stock B 
(rational arbitrage) in order to alleviate the effects of the price fall. In the presence 
of noise traders, ho\vever, it might be the case that the price continues its fall and 
that the substitute they have gone short on may not suffice to protect them from 
the degree of this fall. Hence, perfect substitutes (assuming that they exist) m;}} 
not be particularly useful for the rational in\'estor in case noise traders h;}ve an 
amplified presence in the market. The latter implies the existence of "'limits" to 
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arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and suggests that under less-than-pert~ctly 
rational circumstances, arbitrage might not be possible and, if prolonged, may also 
prove costly. Barberis and Thaler (2002) also mention a number of other types of 
risk that come hand in hand with noise trader risk, namely horizon risk (when 
transaction costs eliminate profits due to the persistence of mispricing) and 
synchronization risk (when the mispricing is so large that reqUIres the 
participation of a sufficient number of arbitrageurs to counter it). 
Noise traders are thus associated with uncertainty in the market even 
though one might expect them to be the source of profit for rational traders 
(Wang, 2002). The problem here is that rational traders can only assume a limited 
amount of risk-exposure; hence, if the market grows riskier than their status can 
possibly accept, they may well decide to unload their positions. Kyle and Wang 
(1997), for instance, find that in an imperfectly competitive securities' market, 
irrational (in the sense of overconfident) traders may be able to "intimidate" their 
competing informed counterparts. An alternative scenario, however, might 
involve rational investors jumping onto the bandwagon of the trend in order to 
take advantage of the purported mispricing (De Long et aI, 1990; Andergassen, 
2003). 
An assumption tested by many authors IS that nOIse trading 
is more pronounced in developing markets, which are only beginning to operate 
and \VhOse relative regulatory framework is either absent or incompkte. In the 
presence of regulatory loopholes, we may expect to come across advt?rse 
phenomena, such as manipulation (Allen and Gale, 1992: iv1ei et aI, 2004), 
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rumour-mongering2 (Van Bommel, 2003), Ponzi-games (Goodhart et al, 1998; 
Sadiraj et Schram, 1998) and insider trading. It follows that there is more 
ambiguity surrounding those markets in terms of information quality, a fact 
compromising the efficiency of these markets. The deficiencies witnessed in 
emerging markets are frequently compounded by the fact that the initial 
regulatory framework may include specific provisions pertaining to the rules of 
investors' participation in the market. These could include restrictions relative to 
the amount of foreign capital invested, the foreign-shareholding percentage 
allowed, or the stocks available to non-indigenous investors. Such a situation can 
deter foreigners from entering the market, thus indirectly "grandfathering" limited 
participation with all adverse effects accruing, e.g. "local" insider trading, easier 
control of the market by a few indigenous informed traders at the expense of the 
"uninformed" ones et al. The prohibition of certain trading practices, such as, for 
example, short-selling, may also lead to distortions of the price-formation process 
and facilitate mispricing (Miller, 1977). 
However, as Antoniou et al (1997a) demonstrate in the case of Turkey, an 
emerging market is not destined to remain in that status forever. As emerging 
capital markets undergo a process of liberalization, previous barriers to entry or 
restrictions to trading may be loosened or abolished, thus allowing for increased 
(especially overseas) investors' participation. Such a development allows for the 
local pool of information to grow, as the increase in the flow of trades from more 
traders will incorporate their information, which may eventually lead to greater 
1 The importance attributed to rumours can also be gauged through the Rumour and Rumour 
Mongering Prohibition and Punishment Law of the State of Zam/ara in Nigeria. According to that 
Law, "anybody caught making statements or assertions of doubtful accuracy" or giving reports 
that could not be "instantly verified", would be committing an "arrestable offence, punishable 
immediately with 40 strokes of the cane". It is worth noting, however, that the above Law was not 
applicable to journalists-and politicians (Source: http://wwwfoolscap-media.com). 
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informational efficiency. Similar results are provided by Holmes and \Vong 
(2001) relative to the volatility of prices in Asian markets prior to and after their 
liberalization process and by Balbina and Martins (2002) for seasonal anomalies 
prior to and after the upgrading of the Portuguese market to ··developed··. 
We have thus far outlined the fundamental tenets of the two major lines 
regarding research in the behaviour of stock returns, namely the EMH and 
behavioural finance. However, behavioural finance is not the sole strand of 
research countering the lines of the EMH. Recent interdisciplinary studies 
(Farmer and Lo, 1999) have gIven rise to what has come to be known as 
"evolutionary finance"; the latter constitutes a stream of research that 
accommodates vanous schools of thought (such as agent-based modeling and 
econophysics) and advocates viewing the market as 'an ecosystem where many 
different "species" interact with each other through their trading strategies. Hence, 
in evolutionary finance, agents with various strategies behave like species in 
nature, i.e. they compete for their survival in the marketplace (Arthur, 1997; 
Arthur, 1999. Arthur, 2000a; Arthur, 2000b; Farmer, 2001; Farmer. 2002; Farmer 
and Joshi, ~002, Mauboussin, 2002). To achieve that, they have to ensure that 
their trading tactics are continuously adapted in view of the ever-changing 
circumstances. 
In the "evolutionary" framework, the market is characterized by 
complexity. thus rendering the rational processing of information difficult. To 
counter this problem, investors may choose to resort to "inductivc reasoning" 
(:\rthur, 1994). The latter is relevant to the employment of "heuristics" \\"c spoke 
of before and impli~s that each investor devises a number of patterns in his mind 
when trading. \\hich are subject to continuous assessment. Thus, following ~ach 
trade, he evaluates their profitability and updates them accordingly (maintain the 
successful ones, discard the unsuccessful ones, modify others and introduce 
perhaps a few new ones). This process is assumed to be continuous, so that each 
investor in the end is seen as an ever-evolving behavioral entity in a pool of other 
such. Hence, the world of the stock market is not just "complex" (due to 
investors' heterogeneity), but also "evolutionary", given the eyolution of new 
market outcomes following the intertemporal syntheses of the various strategies of 
interactively trading agents. Each new situation leads to adaptation, new feedback, 
new processing, new decisions, new investment, new prices and again new 
adaptation, with the cycle simply repeating itself while generating new outcomes. 
Mauboussin (2002) has taken one step ahead to suggest that this interactive 
heterogeneity in the stock market reflects the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith. 
As Farmer (2001) has suggested, the field of evolutionary finance (and the 
affiliate one of agent-based modeling) is still in their infancy-stage. However, the 
fact remains that these schools of thought have stimulated research, especially 
from scientists beyond the Finance-field, such as Mathematics, Physics and 
Biology; the outcome so far has been an array of models that attempt to describe 
market outcomes in a novel way. This area has evolved into a rather productive 
research field with a series of scholars developing quantitative models based upon 
extra-Finance concepts designed to capture and describe the evolution of certain 
market phenomena. The latter include return-predictability (Strozzi and Zaldivar-
Comenges. 2005). bubbles and crashes (Lux, 1995; Johansen and Sornette, 2000; 
~lansilla, 2001; Focardi et al; 2002). nonlinearities and excess volatility (Lux and 
i\ 1archesi. 1998; lori. 2000: Matassini and Franci. 200 L Gorski et at 2002; lori, 
2002; Strozzi et al. 2002; Kyrtsou and Terraza. 2002; 2003a; 200)b; 2004; 
Belaire-Franch, 2004; Cross et aI, 2004) and herding (Cont and Bouchaud, ~ooo: 
Eguiluz and Zimmermann, 2000; Xie et aI, 2002; Rodgers and Zheng. 2002: 
Wagner, 2003). Thus, evolutionary Finance has started to assume a frontline 
position in Finance research, more so in view of advanced quantitative techniques 
that allow novel insights into price-behaviour. However, much like what has been 
noted above about behavioural Finance, the field of evolutionary Finance has not 
yet managed to agree upon a single model to describe price-formation 
(Hirshleifer, 2001). Nevertheless, its contribution rests upon the fact that it has 
stimulated non-Finance researchers to investigate financial issues through their 
very scientific premises, thus opening up new pathways for existing Finance-
research. 
Our discussion has, therefore, presented the basic arguments surrounding 
securities' return-behaviour as delineated both by the Efficient Markets' 
Hypothesis and behavioural Finance. As the above discussion indicates, there 
appears to exist complexity in the marketplace, which may manifest itself in 
multiple fashions. The latter, as we have seen, have been investigated from both 
socio-psychological (behavioural Finance) as well as evolutionary angles (agent-
based modeling). The introduction of extra-Finance concepts into Finance (e.g. 
psychology, biology) has provided us vvith new insights into the behaviour of 
prices by endowing us with an arsenal of novel approaches and interpretations. 
These advances in financial research, coupled with the advancement in financial 
databases. have rendered it possible to identify spl.?cific patterns of trading 
behaviour that previously existed in the realm of analytical modeling and test for 
them empirically. 
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Our research aims at studying two such types of trading behaviour, namely 
feedback trading and herding. The former pertains to investors trading on the 
basis of historical prices, while the latter is founded upon investors' interactive 
imitation. These behavioural patterns have been investigated rather extensively in 
the Finance literature (with findings emanating from both the "behayioural" as 
well as the "evolutionary" strands) and we shall have a chance to \vitness a more 
detailed presentation of them in the following sections. 
2.3 Feedback Trading 
2.3.1 Definition, Sources and Motivations 
The concept of feedback trading relates to investors extrapolating from 
past price patterns (actual or perceived ones). If investors trade in the direction of 
those patterns, they are taken to be positive feedback trading; conversely, if they 
trade to the opposite direction, they are coined as "contrarians" (negative feedback 
traders). Whether feedback trading is positive or negative, its very foundations lie 
in the perception that prices maintain some sort of inertia in the market (Farmer, 
2002), in the sense that they tend to produce directional patterns (trends) for 
certain periods of time. This very perception may be rooted in a variety of 
considerations, as \ve shall soon denote. Suffice to say for the moment, that, 
although feedback trading is price-based, then; IS little agreement as to its 
practice: people do not use past prices the same way. The above also indicates th3t 
irrespective of its mode. feedback trading per 51.' appears to nm counter to the 
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efficient markets' hypothesis. since its practice is based upon the recognition and 
possible exploitation of percei\'ed price patterns. 
We shall now tum to the main sources and motivations underlying the 
concept and practice of feedback trading. 
2.3.1a Behavioural grounds 
As has been noted before, investors have been found to be prone to 
certain biases, i.e. judgemental errors that may impede the accurate processing of 
the received information. In short, they may witness signals in the market, yet fail 
to correctly interpret them. Sometimes, this is due to the nature of things that may 
promote uncertainty by itself; a single explanation may not be available, or the 
whole picture may be hard to understand (e.g. because of lack of special 
knowledge). Alternatively, this might be because of the fact that each person sees 
things under his own angle and tries to interpret them in a manner that would suit 
his purpose, whatever that might be. Feedback trading has the tendency to 
simplify things by narrowing decision-making to the study of historical price-
behaviour. Thus, a feedback trader, need look no further than past prices to 
conduct his trades. 
Feedback trading IS also motivated through data-availability, SInce 
historical data on prices are easy to find in the financial press (see Huddart et a1. 
2002), while more sophisticated data are harder to obtain. Further to that. the 
simplified analysis of such data (as carried out mostly by technical analysts in the 
press) facilitates the communication of these ··technical heuristics" t~) a wider 
audienc~. \\'hich is perhaps not typified by a sufficient educational background or 
in\'~stment experience. I-Ience. if an investor is unable to perform any other form 
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of securities' analysis, searching for patterns through technical analysis may serve 
as some kind of substitute to this end and constitutes a primary justification of 
feedback trading. This is very relevant to what we mentioned previously about 
inductive reasoning, as resorting to feedback-patterns can prove a potentially 
useful (and "easy-to-use") tool in a complex market environment. 
We shall now deal with some of the biases that have been documented so 
far in the behavioural Finance literature in order to show how these mi aht be 
::: 
affiliate to feedback trading. 
As Barberis et al (1998) showed feedback trading can be reinforced 
through the joint presence of two biases, namely, the representativeness heuristic 
and the conservatism-bias. In their model, they assume that there exists a single 
source of information, namely earnings' announcements, which are reported every 
period; earnings are presumed here to follow a random walk. The authors also 
assume that there exists a "representative" investor, who perceives earnings as 
subscribing to either of the following "regimes": mean-reverting or trending. The 
investor's judgement as to which regime earnings belong in each period is taken 
to be a function of the exact previous period's earnings' announcement. As a 
result, this conjectural investor-type trades on the basis of perceived earnings' 
trends. 
If the earnings' announcement for period t is co-directional to the 
earnings' announcement for period t-l (i.e. is of the same direction as in period t-
1), then this is taken to signify a continuation of the past period's earnings' trend, 
thus leading the investor to posit that the earnings are under the trending regime. 
If so. then Barberis ct al (1998) argue that the investor is under the intluence of 
the rt!prt!senlalivf!nt!ss heuristic. which refers to the indi\idual drawing 
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conclusions about a general population by overweighting a sample of recent 
observations and considering it as representative of its properties. The 
representativeness heuristic can, thus lead investors towards chasing (actual or 
hypothetical) trends following a series of directional price-movements and as such 
can be viewed as a factor facilitating "price-overreaction". 
Alternatively, if the earnings' announcement for period t is counter-
directional to the earnings' announcement for period t-1 (i.e. of the opposite 
direction compared to period t-1), then this is taken to signify a sign of reversal of 
the past period's earnings' trend, thus leading the investor to posit that the 
earnings are under the mean-reverting regime. However, as Barberis et al (1998) 
argue, the investor may not respond instantly to the arrival of counter-directional 
signals, in anticipation of their continuation; in other words, given the 
representativeness heuristic, the investor would expect more than a single 
antithetical signal to change his perception as to the earnings' regime. The authors 
ascribe this to the influence of the conservatism bias, which refers to the slow 
updating of beliefs in light of new evidence. The conservatism bias can, thus lead 
investors towards delayed responses to newly arriving signals and as such can be 
viewed as a factor facilitating "price-underreaction". 
Thus, Barberis et al (1998) illustrate how an investor m~y practice 
feedback trading in the presence of the interplay between the representativeness 
heuristic and the conservatism bias. If recent evidence makes one believe that a 
stock is moving to\vards a certain direction without taking anything else into 
account, then obviously one narrows the problem down to something that is 
convenient for him (or his judgement), either because it is percepti\'ely appealing 
to him (easier to understand) or bec~lUse he does not have the time or the ability to 
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process more information. If this price-performance persists, then he may as \\-e II 
assume that a trend is, indeed, at works and this may well suit his purpose for the 
very same perceptive reasons. The Barberis et al (1998) model seems to provide 
us with an initial theoretical paradigm of feedback trading, more specifically 
positive feedback trading, as the biases to which the "representative" investor 
adheres suggest trading towards the direction of the trend. 
Overconfidence (Odean, 1998) as a bias is also f,:levant with respect to 
positive feedback trading; if one were to follow a certain pattern of trading and 
events were to confirm its credibility, then one would have every reason to feel 
overtly "proud" as to the fact that his "mode" of trading is the "right" one. 
Suppose one observes a price-rise of a stock and suppose that this continues for 
some time. A positive feedback trader would be expected to buy the stock in 
anticipation of a further rise in its price. Let us now assume that this is indeed the 
case and that the price of the stock increases even more. By now, our hypothetical 
investor has a series of reasons to experience some euphoria. First of alL he 
bought in view of the price-rise, hence, he may consider himself as possessing 
good foresight ("self-attribution" bias; see Barberis and Thaler, 2002). thus 
overestimating his actual stock-picking abilities. Secondly, if he sees the price 
continuing its ascending route, he may view this as a sign that other people are 
buying as well, hence the stock must be "good". This is reminiscent of an old 
adage according to which "people buy because prices go up and prices go up 
because people buy" (Mathiopoulos, 2000). As a result. this may lead him to 
believe (ex post) that he had somehow managed to predict this development 
before it c\-en occurred. The latter is known as "hindsight-bias" (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2002) and, if dominant. is expected to furnish him \\ith the belief that he is 
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able to predict the future as well-thus boosting his purported overconfidence. 
Thus, the overconfidence-bias can lead to more aggressive trading (Odean, 1998) 
and as such can reinforce existing positive feedback trading tendencies. 
Although the above behavioural explanations may seem more adjacent to 
the case of positive feedback trading, negative feedback trading can also be 
addressed behaviourally. Shefrin and Statman (1985) have shown that people may 
be l~ss reluctant to sell stocks that have recently performed well and hold onto 
those, whose performance has been poor, a behaviour which they have termed as 
the "disposition effect". Reasons here seem to vary. People may sell "winner" 
stocks in anticipation of mean-reversion and keep "'loser" stocks in anticipation of 
a price-rebound; they may also do so because it is more "painful" for them to 
realize losses than gains (Leal et aI, 2006). 
Thus, behavioural reasons may lead investors to adopt feedback trading as 
a tool for inv~stment purposes. However, as we shall see next, it may be the case 
that a trader uses feedback strategies in order to take advantage of those biases of 
other traders. 
2.3.1.b Rational speculation 
Feedback trading need not be restricted to "noise" traders who may be 
susceptible to behavioural biases, maintain less abilities/r:sources or use technical 
analysis. Rational traders may themselves employ trading rules based on historical 
prices if they feel they have to protect their positions against (or take advantage 
of) abrupt market movements: portfolio insurance (Luskin, 1988) and stop-loss 
orders (Osler. 2002) are relevant here. Such strategic choices on behalf of rational 
traders are founded upon the belief that noise traders might push prices away from 
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their fundamental value, thus leading to a mispricing of indefmite duration and 
magnitude (see Barberis and Thaler, 2002). 
We will first examine the case of rational speculators employing price-
based trading strategies based on the anticipated feedback trading of noise 
investors. De Long et al (1990) assume a model where rational speculators are 
assumed to know that information relative to a stock's fundamentals is to be 
announced some time in the future and, at present, they receive a signal 
representative of that information. If the content of this signal is indicative of a 
rise of the stock's price in the future, they decide to buy the stock now and sell it 
prior to the information going public (i.e. prior to the anticipated positive response 
of prices to it). However, in due course, they realize that a significant part of the 
investors' population is beginning to follow their trades as time goes by; thus, as 
the speculators start buying the stock, "noise" traders follow suit (they buy as 
well), thus engaging in positive feedback trading and prices begin to deviate from 
fundamentals. The prevalent consideration for the noise traders is to participate in 
what they foresee as a trend with the potential for profits, since the price exhibits 
positive signs persistently. When the speculators start observing this, they try to 
exploit it, initially by selling when the information expected is announced and 
then by going short on that stock in anticipation of a price-reversal. De Long et al 
(1990) contend that this behaviour of the speculators is actually pushing prices 
away from fundamentals, as they first help launch a trend, which they then try to 
exploit. Similar to this, Andergassen (2003) shows that rational speculators may 
prefer to lure noise traders into a trend-chase, before fundamentals become public 
knowledge. As a result, the above papers depict a special case of feedback trading: 
rational traders engage in "forward-looking" feedback trading by devising price-
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based trading rules based upon the anticipated response of noise traders to the 
announcement of fundamentals in the future. 
The above case is a formal identification of what George Soros (1987) 
termed "reflexivity" in the market, which implies the existence of a "reflexive" 
relationship between stock prices and fundamentals. Soros noted that the key to 
such a relationship is the "trend" in the market, which he decomposed into the 
"underlying trend" (what fundamentals suggest about the yalue of a stock) and the 
"prevailing bias" (whether investors' mood is tilted towards buying or selling). 
Thus, if fundamentals hint towards positive prospects for a stock. this will 
constitute the stock's "underlying trend"; however, for that to be reflected into 
stock prices, it is necessary to be "communicated" to the wider public (""cognitive 
function"). If investors are convinced about these prospects, the next step is to 
"participate" in them by actively directing their purchases towards that stock 
("participating function"). From then on, a self-reinforcing process sets off, 
where, the prospects of the stock (as determined by fundamentals) gradually 
become subject to the influence of stock prices, as more and more investors buy 
into that stock. Thus, in a certain sense, stock prices confirm (are "reflective" of) 
the fundamentals (after all, the assumption "vas that the prospects of the stock 
looked good) and feed back ("reflect") onto them (people's perceptions of the 
stock's fundamental value are now positively influenced by the continuous rise of 
the price itself), something that Soros termed as "market reciprocity" (Soros, 
1987). \Vith the "prevailing bias" being positiye (i.e. with people buying), the 
price rise is expected to accelerate up to the point where it can no longer 
accommodate such eH?r-rising expectations. Thus, Soros' description of his 
investment strategy constitutes an eloquent illustration of the analytical 
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presentation of De Long et al (1990), who admit using Soros' trading pattern as a 
motivation in their work. 
Hence, what De Long et al (1990) theoretically propose and Soros (1987) 
empirically illustrates is the possibility of "rational" traders trading on the pricc-
trend which they induced in the first place~ here, "rational" traders are taking 
advantage of their informational superiority as well as the anticipated behavioural 
response of their "feedback" counterparts. Thus, although rational speculators do 
not operate on the basis of a feedback-style function, they choose to follmv a 
price-based trading conduct, since their information indicates that it is "rationally" 
beneficial for them to do so. 
However, the pattern of rational traders may assume a feedback form itself 
if they choose to use their informational leverage to profit from mispricing. 
without having induced any trend in the first place. Farmer (2002) and Farmer and 
Joshi (2002) assume that there exist rational traders who are trading upon the 
fundamental value of a stock and who are, thus able to estimate the deviations of 
its price from fundamentals. If so, they may choose to take advantage of this 
mispncmg in order to enter/exit the market before the mispricing becomes 
excessive, by utilizing threshold-based trading rules. The latter involve trading on 
the "mispricing" up until the pre-determined thresholds indicate that it is 
profitable for them to do so. This can be associated \vith the employment of "stop-
loss" orders and portfolio insurance strategies and can be justified on the grounds 
of keeping the number of transactions (and the associated costs) to a minimum. 
2.3.1c Informational asymmetry 
Feedback trading can be taken to be a strategy of risk-aversion as it ma\" 
"-.. ' .. 
be employed on occasions when a trader is faced 'v\"ith an-actual or perceived-
asymmetry of information in a market. This may be the case of an investor trading 
in a foreign market or in stocks for which he knows little. In either case, he miaht 
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choose this type of strategy if he senses himself being at an informational 
disadvantage. 
Brennan and Cao (1997) report substantial positive feedback trading on 
behalf of US funds when investing in both developed and emerging markets, a 
fact they attribute to the perceived asymmetry in information between them and 
their local counterparts. However, non-US investors seem to face little 
informational asymmetry, if at all, when trading in the US, which is evident from 
the differential trading strategies they utilize. Kim and Wei (2002a; 2002b) also 
report similar evidence for overseas traders in the Korean market while Yang 
(2002) documents negative feedback trading on behalf of foreign funds for the 
Tai wanese stock market. 
It is not easy to assert how realistic such an assumption might be for large 
institutional investors who maintain close ties to the markets in which they invest. 
It is perhaps difficult to imagine a large US fund, for instance, following the trend 
simply out of fear of the local investors and their purported "privileged" access to 
information. It would perhaps be more realistic to seek such trading 
considerations in cases of smaller institutions or even individual investors that 
reside overseas and who might be in such a cumbersome situation in terms of 
asymmetry (again this is a hypothesis pending proof). 
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Informational asymmetry can also be fuelled by the aforementioned size-
effect. Easley et al (1996) present a model showing that the probability of 
informed trading is larger for small capitalization stocks relative to larger ones. 
The rationale here seems to be the following: Smaller stocks often represent a 
predicament due to the limited coverage they enjoy. What's more, most 
information about them is of firm-specific nature, which only further compounds 
the ambiguity surrounding them. Given this nature of small capitalization stocks, 
any trade concerning those is bound to raise questions: since information about 
those stocks is mostly of idiosyncratic nature, then those trading must have access 
to it. Contrary to market-wide information, firm-specific information is more 
difficult to acquire, notwithstanding the fact that its quality might be more 
difficult to assess (it may well be a floating rumour designated to attract 
attention). Evidence (Lakonishok et aI, 1992; Wermers, 1999; Voronkova and 
Bohl, 2005) shows that fund managers are more prone to engaging in positive 
feedback trading when dealing with small-capitalization stocks, a phenomenon 
attributed to the aforementioned nature of those stocks. Since these stocks are less 
known, a fund manager might prefer to follow the trend with respect to those 
stocks rather than go-it-alone. 
2.3.1.d ManipUlation 
The term manipulation refers to the attempt by an individual or a group of 
individuals to influence the price of a stock to their benefit. It is an effort that 
~ntails the element of intent specifically directed at "fixing" a desirable market 
outcome. Fconomic sense suggests that. much like with any other commodity. this 
is possible through the influence of the demand/supply of the stock. Stock market 
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practice has so far provided us with a number of patterns of manipulative intent, 
such as "ghosting" (when two or more market makers engage in collusive 
conduct), "spoofing" (the placement of large orders through an Electronics 
Communication Network-ECN) and "scalping" (intraday trading leading to small 
gains). Manipulation has the potential to generate trend-chasing (positive 
feedback trading) and it is this issue that we shall now explore. 
Van Bommel (2003) refers to the practice of "pump and dump" relative to 
stocks, which is tantamount to what Allen and Gale (1992) call "information-
based manipulation". We shall present a simple version of a manipulative scheme 
of that sort. The rationale here is notably straight (Mathiopoulos, 2000; Kolmer, 
2001): an individual (or a group of individuals) pinpoints a stock, which for some 
reason has attracted little attention so far or is little known to the wider public. 
The latter might not always be the case, but is vital to the extent that it raises the 
levels of uncertainty surrounding that stock. The limited dispersion of the stock's 
shareholder-ownership is important, albeit not necessary; however, the smaller the 
dispersion, the easier it is for the price to be cornered (a small number of shares is 
more easily controllable compared to a large one). 
What these "manipulators" essentially do IS to start disseminating 
favorable news relative to that stock in order to fuel investors' demand. This could 
be arranged either through a number of financial analysts that agree to publish 
positive comments for the stock or through the dispersion of anonymous rumours 
in the marketplace. \Vhichever the combination might be, the important thing is 
that the stock is beginning to reflect a positive picture to the public. thus calling 
for its attention. \\l1ether the owner of the underlying company is party to this 
schem~ remains an open question. Presumably. his connivance (active-through 
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assisting the maintenance of the price at certain levels-or silent-by pretending 
ignorance to what is taking place) is quintessential to the success of the endeayor. 
In practice things are conjectured to follow this route: as soon as the price 
rises, people witness a price-continuation of an ascending nature. Some of them 
will opt for buying the stock, thus boosting its price even higher. As the argument 
often goes, more people will be tempted to follow suit, since the stock seems a 
profitable opportunity. As time goes by, more people buy the stock and its price 
rises even further. When the price reaches a certain "threshold'" (pre-determined 
or not), those behind the manipulative scheme may choose to sell. Their sales are 
presumed to exert a certain pressure on the stock's price, thus providing the 
impression to the others that a decline is starting to materialize; if so, they \vill 
choose to sell as well. This will eventually lead to the price's depression. As a 
result, information-based manipulation is based upon positive feedback trading, 
since its aim is to get people to follow the perceived "trend". 
Another type of manipulation that Allen and Gale (1992) have analysed is 
the so-called trade-based manipulation (see also Mei et aL 2004). According to 
this, an uninformed trader follows the trades of another trader whom he knows to 
be informed. Assuming that the informed trader sets the pace for the price of a 
stock, the trade-based counterpart of his, tries to infer the information he 
possesses by copying his trades. The case of trade-based manipulation may be 
encountered in circumstances where an investor reads in a bulletin about the 
trading intentions (or actual trades) of a well-known figure of the stock market (let 
us refer to George Soros again as an example) and tries to imitate him. If the 
trade-based manipulator is capable of attracting a critical mass of inyestors, then 
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such a situation can well lead to trend-chasing phenomena, like the ones described 
above regarding information-based manipulation. 
Thus, stock-price manipulation is a practice associated \vith the realization 
of trends in the market and as such is a factor affiliated with feedback trading. 
2.3.2 Feedback Trading: Empirical Evidence 
Empirical research on feedback trading can be classified into two categories, 
namely "time-series" and "microdata-based", contingent upon the type of data 
utilized in each case. 
In terms of time-series feedback trading research, one of the most influential 
papers that has set the pace for relevant research in this area is the one by Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992). The authors test for feedback trading on the Dow Jones 
index using daily data for the 1885-1988 period and document significant positive 
feedback trading, more so during periods of market declines, a fact which they 
attribute to the propensity to sell in order to avoid realizing larger losses when the 
market drops. Koutmos (1997) documents significant levels of positive feedback 
trading in his study of six developed capital markets for the 1986-1991 period; 
much like Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), positive feedback trading appears to be 
rising during market slumps. Using daily data for foreign-exchange markets 
during the 1987-1997 period, Aguirre and Saidi (1997) failed to come up with any 
clear feedback trading patterns across a sample of 18 developed and developing 
markets; actually, the majority of their results indicated that it is negative 
feedback trading that was found to be present in most cases, a fact they attributed 
to the pn?\'alence of large "rational" players in currency markets. Koutmos and 
Saidi (2001) report highly significant positive feedback trading across six Asian 
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markets during the 1990-1996 period and-again-verify the higher leycls of 
positive feedback trading when the market declines. Watanabe (2002) found 
significant positive feedback trading towards the TOPIX-index in Japan bet\-veen 
1976 and 1996; his results confirm the previous findings of positive feedback 
trading rising when the market declines, which he found to be mostly due to 
~ 
margin trading. Bohl and Reitz (2004; 2006) document statisticallv significant 
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positive feedback trading in the German market on the premises of a variety of 
indices (C-DAX, DAX30, NEMAX50, NEMAX ALL SHARE) during the 1998-
2002 period. Bohl and Siklos (2004) found significant positiye feedback trading 
across both developed as well as developing markets for the 1994-2003 period, 
while Bohl and Siklos (2005) document higher positive feedback trading levels in 
the US during market crashes between 1915 and 2004. Finally, Antoniou et al 
(2005) found that the introduction of index-futures in developed markets has led 
to a reduction of the impact of positive feedback trading in the underlying spot 
markets. 
Feedback trading research on the premises of microdata dates back to the 
study by Lakonishok et al (1992) who first estimated feedback trading based upon 
funds' accounts. Using data on 769 pension funds' accounts in the US for the 
1985-1989 period, the authors documented low levels of positive feedback 
trading, whose significance was mostly concentrated among small stocks. 
Grinblatt et al (1996) reported significant, yet not particularly large positive 
feedback trading on behalf of 274 funds in the US during the 1974-1984 period. 
while \Vermers (1999) found higher levels of positive feedback trading among 
gro\\1h-funds in the US during the 1975-1994 period. Jones et al (1999) report 
highly significant positi\-e feedback trading on behalf of llS institutional traders 
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between 1984 and 1993. Kim and Wei (2002b) documented higher le\-els of 
positive feedback trading in the Korean market following the outbreak of the 
Asian Crisis, irrespective of the type of investor (individual'institutionaL 
indigenous/overseas). Kim and Wei (2002b) produced results indicating that 
overseas institutional investors in the Korean market around the Asian Crisis did 
not exhibit uniformity in the significance of their positiye feedback trading; 
offshore funds were found to engage in insignificant trend-chasing compared to 
their US and UK counterparts. Finally, Voronkova and Bohl (2005) find 
significant, size-related positive feedback trading on behalf of Polish pension 
funds during the 1999-2002 period. Finally, Do et al (2006) reported high levels 
of positive feedback trading among overseas institutional investors in Finland 
between 1995 and 2004. 
Thus, the above findings indicate that positive feedback trading is expected to 
be more pronounced during periods of declining markets, a fact that must be 
attributed to the propensity of investors to leave the market as soon as possible so 
as to minimize their losses. Given however, the leverage of institutional traders in 
capital markets (Wermers, 1999), this finding may be linked to their 
aforementioned tendency towards employing positive feedback trading strategies, 
such as portfolio insurance (Luskin, 1988) in order to protect themselves from 
realizing large losses during market slumps (an argument that many studies in the 
field have put forward). Interestingly enough, a number of studies (Lakonishok et 
aI, 1992; \\'emlers. 1999: Antoniou et aI, 2005) find that positi\'\:~ feedback trading 
need not necessarily be destabilizing and may actually improve market efficiency 
hy accelerating the incorporation of information into securities' prices. \10reo\er. 
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the above empirical evidence also seems to indicate that positive feedback trading 
is significant across capital markets irrespective of their stage of maturity. 
2.3.3 Evolutionary Finance and Feedback-effects 
Evolutionary Finance has provided us with several examples (Fanner, 2002; 
Farmer and Joshi, 2002) of feedback-effects in a market, when rational traders 
interact with their feedback counterparts. The basis of such feedback-effects with 
possible applications in the field of feedback trading are often models of 
interactive species, whose coexistence in nature may assume a variety of forms 
(Edelstein-Keshet, 1987): "neutralism" (one species does not affect the population 
of the other), "mutualism" (both populations exhibit a faster simultaneous 
growth), "symbiosis" (one species is necessary for the survival of the other), 
"competition" (two species share a common factor which is in limited supply), 
"commensalism" (one species benefits but not the other), "amensalism" (one 
species suffers from this coexistence) and "cannibalism" (when one species, in the 
absence of the other, resorts to consuming its own members). 
We shall now present the model of Lotka-Volterra (1926), which emanates 
from population ecology and is reflective of a certain type of feedback-based 
heterogeneity in nature. The Lotka-Volterra model was developed separately by 
the actuarial scientist Alfred Lotka and the mathematician Vito Volterra 
(alongside the ecologist Umberto D' Ancona they \yere studying the ecology of 
fish in the Adriatic Sea) in the mid-1920s. We feel obliged to note here that the 
following presentation represents the oYersimplified yersion of the model. \\·hich 
has so far been subject to a rather notable amount of modifications in Economics 
and Fin3ncc. 
The Lotka-Volterra model assumes a constrained environment, in \vhich there 
are only two species, which compete with each other for resources. habitat or 
territory. The principle of competitive exclusion applies here. namely that the 
strongest prevails, while the weaker is forced to extinction. The "prize" for the 
most efficient species is a rise in its population ranks. The Lotka-Volterra model 
can be extended to include more than two species; what follows here constitutes 
the two-species (simplified, as we mentioned previously) version of the model. 
The Lotka-Volterra model was based initially on the following 
assumptions: 
1) There are only two populations (species), namely the Predators and the 
Prey 
2) The Prey constitute the only source of food for the Predators 
3) The Prey enjoys unlimited food supply from nature and face only one 
threat, i.e. the Predators 
4) Predators and Prey meet each other in nature, their encounters being 
random 
5) Their interactions are jointly proportional to their respective population 
SIzes 
6) There is a single homogeneous ecosystem, e.g. a patch of land 
Let P denote the predators' population and V the prey' s. Then according to the 
Lotka-Volterra modeL the population growth rate for each is given by: 
53 
dPldt = -cp + aPV 
dVldt = bV - hPV 
where the constants a, b, c and h are positive. 
(1) 
(2) 
In equation (1) we note the following: assuming complete absence of prey, the 
predators' population would decline llt a (mortality) rate c. Given the negative 
effect of the prey's absence upon the predators' population, the sign preceding it 
is negative as well; hence, -cPo As soon as the prey evolve, it is only reasonable 
to contend that the predators will start encountering them at a higher frequency. 
How this encountering process will take place is not explicitly denoted; it could 
be random (individual predators hunting on their own) or not (when predators 
herd-"collude"-to hunt their prey more efficiently, e.g. to ensure its tracking and 
capture). Whatever the case, the predators start "attacking" and consuming prey, 
and this leads to an increase in their numbers. This increase is proportional to the 
size of both populations and is portrayed here through the constant a. 
The "a" has been found to bear different interpretations from those 
preoccupying themselves with the practical aspect of the model (e.g. population 
ecology). Sharov (http://www.gypsvrnoth.ento.vt.edul-sharovrpopEco!/popecol.htmi) claims 
that it is the reproduction rate of predators per single prey consumed, Beals 
(http://www.tiem.utk.edu/-mbea]s/predator-prey.htmI) posits that it equals the product of 
the "attack rate" times the "conversion efficiency" (of food into offspring), \vith 
McKel vey (http:! \\'\\ w .sto!af.edulpeopldmckelvey'envision.dir/!otka-volt.html) proposmg 
that it equals the product of the "death rate~' of prey per encounter with the 
predators times the "conversion efficiency". Given the positive impact of "0" over 
the predators' popUlation, the sign preceding it is positive: hence. +aP r". 
In equation (2) we note the following: assuming complete absence of 
predators, the prey' population would rise exponentially at a rate b. Given th~ 
positive effect of the predators' absence, the sign preceding it is positive; hence. 
+ b V. In the presence of predators, the prey is under attack and their ranks suffer 
losses pending captivity. The prey's numbers decline at a rate given by the 
constant "'h" , hence the negative slgn (-hPV). Beals 
(http://www.tiem.utk.edu/~mbeals/predator-prey.htmI) claims that h should portray the 
attack rate of the predators we mentioned previously, while Sharov 
(http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.eduJ~sharovlPopEcol/popecol.htmI) calls it "predation rate 
coefficient" . 
It is interesting to note that the interaction of both populations is assumed 
to be jointly proportional to their respective sizes; thus, both the increase and the 
decrease constants (a, h) in the equations are multiplied by pv. 
Equations (1) and (2) can also be transformed as follows: 
(dP/dt)/P = -c + a V (3) 
(dV/dt)/V = b - hP (-I) 
where (3) and (4) provide us with the instantaneous population gro\V1h rate for the 
predators and the prey respectively. 
The relationship between the predators and the prey seems to follo\\' a cyclical 
mode-at least according to the incumbent model. There is a number of prey in the 
beainnina upon which the predators start pre\ing; assuming a constant rise in the o 0 . "-
prey's population, this preying rate gradually increases. In \'ic\\ of the latter, the 
predators' population rises (they are able to give birth to ne\\' predators) and from 
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a certain point onwards, this leads to the decline of the prey population's growth. 
This development is detrimental for the predators' numbers, which are then 
showing signs of decline as well. Given this, the prey has a chance to recover 
from the initial offensive and rise again numerically; hence, the cycle starts all 
over again (oscillation), with the two populations fluctuating together. 
We should also stress here that what we have illustrated thus far is the Lotka-
Volterra model under the assumption of predatory conduct, i.e. with one species 
aiming at. eliminating the other. Notice also the right-hand side of both equations 
(1) and (2), where we observe the term PV indicating the encounter rate of the 
two, which stems from the law of mass action; according to the latter, the rate of 
molecular collisions of two chemical species in a diluted gas or solution is 
proportional to the product of the two concentrations (see Edelstein-Keshet, 
1987). 
The Lotka-Volterra model for competitive conduct, Le. for the case where one 
of the two species does not aim at eliminating the other is based on the Verhulst 
logistic growth equation. According to this (Edelstein-Keshet, 1987): 
dxldt = r x [1 - (xIL)] (5) 
where r is the exponential growth rate of the population of species x inhabiting a 
given environment, L is the carrying capacity of that environment (Le. "the 
amount of resources expressed in the number of organisms that can be supported 
by these resources,,3) and the [1- xlL] is the intrinsic growth rate of the 
population. Hence, in a bi-species setting we have (Edelstein-Keshet, 1987): 
J See Sharov: http://www.gypsymoth.ento. vt. edllJ-sharov/PopEcoll/ec5//ogist. hIm!. 
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dPldt = (Cp)P [(Kp- P - aV) I Kp) (6) 
dVldt = (Cv)V [(Kv- V - bP) I Kv) 
where Cp, Cv are the specific (exponential) growth rates of each category of 
species, Kp, Kv, are the carrying capacities of the environment for each and a (b) 
represents the population decline caused by the activity of V (P) over P (V). 
Population ecology has generated a number of models capable of 
capturing a variety of interactions in the Lotka-Volterra spirit, apart from the 
predator-prey; these include host-parasitoid (Thomson, 1922; Nicholson and 
Bailey, 1935; Rogers, 1972) host-pathogen (Anderson and May, 1980; 1981) 
models (see Sharov: http://www.gvpsvrnoth.ento.vt.edu/-sharovlPopEcol!popecol.htrnl) as 
well as predator-antipredator models (Sih, 1992). 
For more details, see Edelstein-Keshet (1987), as well as the online lecture 
notes of A. Sharov at (http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/-sharov/PopEcollpopecol.html). 
The presentation "of the Lotka-Volterra model in the present context served 
two purposes. First of alL it provided us with an opportunity to \vitness how the 
issue of heterogeneous agents' interaction is pursued in areas outside finance. 
Secondly. the predators in the Lotka-Volterra setting are reminiscent of feedback 
traders, since their conduct is prey-based and as we have already seen. such an 
interaction gin~s rise to oscillatory movements of the predator-prey populations. 
Thus, the Lotka-Volterra model is capable of reflecting phenomena that can be 
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associated to the Finance-context; this has also been sho\\-n throuah the 
e 
employment of this model by Solomon (whose extensive \vor~~ can be found at 
http://shum.cc.huii.ac.ill~sorin/mv-papers.htmI), Farmer (2002) and Sprott (2004). since it 
has been found to be successful at capturing empirical market non-linearities (e.g. 
excess volatility). Although Hirshleifer (2001) questioned whether extra-Finance 
models could be applicable to Finance, our presentation of the Lotka-Volterra 
model (coupled with the review of the Evolutionary Finance literature previously) 
reveals that they provide us with useful concepts for further grounding of our 
Finance research and orientation towards novel directions. 
2.4 Herd Behaviour 
2.4.1 The Roots: Crowd Behaviour in History 
The concept of herd behaviour in the stock market context should not be 
viewed as a stand-alone case of collective mentality. Historically, herd-instincts 
have been documented since the early times when humans started to organize 
themselves in social entities, as the latter facilitated their daily interaction. Before 
moving on to describing herding in the market context, we consider it appropriate 
to present the socio-psychological dimension of crowd behaviour. Historically. 
crowd behaviour ha~ been delineated through the employment of empirical 
frameworks related to social and political phenomena over time in an attempt to 
depict the impact of collective psychology up~m s,?cial dynamics. 
Issues related to crowd behaviour are often cited in the Bibk: relevant 
citations can be found in the "Exodus"'\ "Book of John"5,"Book (.1f 
./ " ... Do not/ol/OII' the crOllJ in doing wrong "-(Exodus. :;3.:;). 
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Matthew,,6,"Book of Mark,,7 and the "Acts"s. Ancient Greek philosophers9 tended 
to regard the crowd as a negative entity that merited avoidance, with the impact of 
the crowd most excessively felt in ancient Athens, where the demagogues often 
tried to manipulate public opinion to their benefit 10. Ancient Rome also 
experienced the impact of the crowd, more so during public ceremomes 
(Colloseum) or extreme events (the burning of Rome during Nero's reign). The 
mobilizing nature of the crowd was felt in more recent centuries in the 
undertaking of political movements. 11 
5 " •.. But this mob that knows nothing of the law-there is a curse on them. "-(John, 7:49) 
6 " ... But the chief priests and the elders persuaded the crowd to ask for Barabbas and to have 
Jesus executed. "-(Matthew, 27:20) 
7 " ••• Wanting to satisfy the crowd, Pilate released Barabbas to them. "-(Mark, 15: 15) 
8 " ... they rounded up some bad characters from the marketplace, formed a mob and started a riot 
in the city. They rushed to Jason's house in search of Paul and Silas in order to bring them out to 
the crowd. "-(Acts, 17:5) 
9 Socrates maintained that the solution of every issue should be assigned to the "experts" rather 
than the "majority" (Plato: "Alkiviades" 135 A). His student, Alkiviades became one of the most 
interesting figures as a statesman in Athens for being able to play around popular sentiment; his 
opinion of the latter can be viewed in a relevant dialogue with Pericleus (Plutarchus: 
"Alkiviades" 7). Alkiviades was under the custody of Pericleus in accordance with his father's 
will (Clenius) who was killed in battle (447 B.C.) and was educated by Socrates. Once, when 
asking to see Pericleus, he was told that this was not possible, as Pericleus was working on a 
speech in order to give account for certain actions of his before the public in Athens. Having 
heard that, Alkiviades commented that Pericleus had better consider a way to refrain from giving 
account to the public. Other philosophers (see, for example, Aristotles (Eudimeia Ethics A, 
1214: 35), Euripidis ("Orestis" 772-3, "Ekavi" 608) Heracletus (Fragmenta 49) and Plato 
(Nomoi, r, 690:B)) in ancient Athens also shared "eclectic" (i.e. anti-crowd) views, as public 
opinion in the city was frequently dominated by demagogues; very often, philosophers sharing 
such views were libelled as "enemies of the people" by demagogues and faced execution. For 
more on the above, see Natsoulis,T. (1999). 
10 It was commonplace in ancient Athens for demagogues to direct the crowd's anger against their 
personal opponents with the accusation of anti-democratic conduct. Interestingly enough, those 
persecuted this way had previously been glorified by the crowd in public for their services to 
Athens. Examples here include the cases of Alkiviades (Plutarchus: "Alkiviades "), Themistocles 
(Plutarchus: Themistocles), Kimon (Plutarchus: Kimon) and Miltiades (Herodot: "History ", 6, 
136). 
II Le Bon has provided us with a rather eloquent picture of the crowd-behaviour during the 
French Revolution (1789) as well afterwards in France in his works cited above. Lenin (1902) in 
his work .. What is to be done?" described the means of luring the masses to the objectives of the 
Communists, using both "Propaganda" and "Agitatia" (Agitation); in brief, theformer appealed 
at the cognitive and the latter at the emotive part of the human psychic. In addition to the above, 
Lebesis (J 941) provides theoretical as well as empirical justification to the formation of what he 
calls "revolutionary mass ". 
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Perhaps, the best-known researcher in the field of crowd-behaviour was 
the French anthropologist G. Le Bon (1895; 1910; 1912) who delved extensively 
into human behaviour during the post-Revolution political conflicts in France as 
well as abroad. The main tenets of Le Bon's "crowd theory" were that crowds 
were of finite temporal duration; they were dominated by the world of emotions; 
they tended towards extremes; they lacked any sense of collective responsibility; 
they turned anyone of their members from an individual of his own will to an 
instrument of their deliberations. Le Bon argued in broad lines that the evolution 
of a crowd is the byproduct of the combination of two sequential forces, namely 
"suggestion" and "contagion". In rough terms, the former pertains to the exposure 
of an individual towards a given belief, while the latter refers to the active 
alignment of the individual's behaviour to the behaviour suggested by that belief. 
The success of "suggestion" here is a function of the belief s vagueness; the 
vaguer it is, the more subject it can become to various interpretations by different 
people. Simply put, it constitutes a belief of clear presence and unclear detail and 
it is the latter that impedes rational thinking (information surrounding it is 
incomplete) with the potential of driving people into action towards a certain 
direction. At this point, "contagion" comes into play; the more people subscribe to 
this idea, the more intense becomes the "social pressure" towards others to follow 
it, either "passively" (through the sidelining of objections) or "actively" (through 
agitation, i.e. active participation in the spirit of the idea). 
Le Bon's theories may be viewed as out-of-date as they refer to 
sociopolitical structures dating well over a century ago. Indeed, most of Le Bon's 
works date back to the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th• 
However, the strength of Le Bon's theories stems from the fact that they are 
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empirical in nature, i.e. they are based upon the observation of behaviours and 
events and is not the byproduct of some abstract thinking. It is interesting to note 
that many researchers in Finance include Le Bon in their studies of herd 
behaviour (De Bondt and Teh, 1997; Lynch, 2000). 
Thus, the issue of herd behaviour in the market-context traces its roots 
deep in the historical evolution of human societies and goes, as we shall shortly 
describe, hand in hand with the psychology of the human being. 
2.4.2 Herd Behaviour in the Stock Market: Definitions, Sources 
and Motivations 
Let us now go back to the concept of investors' interaction. If 
heterogeneous traders were present in the market, then we would expect them to 
normally diverge in their trading patterns given the aforementioned complexity. It 
might be the case, however, that despite their heterogeneity, it is convergence that 
finally prevails. How this convergence is attained is a rather thorny issue, which 
also is not subject to one-sided explanations; one interpretation that has been put 
forward in the literature is related to herd behaviour. 
Any theorizing with respect to herd behaviour is bound to stumble upon 
popular beliefs12 relative to the issue; herd instincts have often been cited as the 
impetus underlying abnormally volatile market returns (Kindleberger, 1978; 
Galbraith, 1994), the latter being reminiscent of Keynes' remarks about "animal 
instincts" in the stock market (Keynes, 1936). Popular beliefs aside, however, we 
12 James Dines (author of "How Investors can Make Money Using Mass Psychology") argued on 
CNN Money about investors • wolfpack-sentiment when dealing with evolving trends in the market. 
Kenneth Chang (ABC News) also spoke o/trend-chasing mentalities in the market based upon the 
research by Lux and Marchesi (J 999). 
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shall try to focus on the academic debate on the topic; to that extent. we will try to 
pursue a conceptually clear line of argument so as to mitigate against potential 
misunderstandings. 
Herd behavior requires participation, by definition. Herds are not fonned 
abstractly; they presuppose the presence of individuals who behave in a way that 
promotes the cohesion of the herd. Whether herds form by themselves or through 
external influences is a question with rather far-reaching implications. Indeed, the 
line between the two might be difficult to discern, more so, since this would 
directly involve policy implications. For the moment, suffice to say that herds are 
based on the participation of individuals, more specifically investors. in the case 
of stock markets. 
The stock market, as of itself, constitutes a mechanism that encourages 
social participation through the provision of the opportunity of realizing higher 
expected returns. Whether this proves to be the case or not is another matter; one 
need only add here that people tend to invest in securities in anticipation of future 
gains that could not easily have been realized through other types of investment of 
less risky nature (e.g. government bonds). Therefore, it would perhaps be 
reasonable enough to claim that the stock market appeals to the "economic 
motive" of the human psychic. 
Investors, much like, every human being, do not live in isolation; on the 
contrary. they dwell in societies among other people with whom th~y interact. The 
mode of th~ir interactions may manifest itself in various ways: hO\\i:?\er. it ah\"ays 
assumes a common denominator: observation. It may be that people like \\"hat 
they observe. i.e. they experience an agreement \\'ith it and it may be that they do 
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not. If they agree with the course of action suggested by the observation, they may 
choose to follow it, whilst if they disagree with it they may choose to abstain from 
it or choose an alternative route. In the former case one might speak of 
"convergence", while in the latter of "divergence" (of actions or opinions). 
Therefore, convergence of opinions combined with convergence in trades 
following interactive conditions lead to what is knO\\TI as herd behavior. 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) have defined herding as a "behavioural similarity" 
stemming from the interactive observations of individuals. In the stock market 
context, one might be bold enough as to classify these observations into two 
categories, namely Actions and Payoffs. Hence, people observe/hear/read about 
the stock selection of other people or, what is more they may also get to find out 
about the outcome of such selections (whether somebody made a profit or a loss). 
In strict terms, it is this interactive process among investors that generates 
herding; therefore, herding in a strict sense cannot exist in the absence of 
interactive observation. 
In the presence of herding, we expect to notice investors' trades to 
converge as we just said. Convergence, though, is not uniform across time; 
indeed, we do not expect herding to materialize ad infinitum. The reason is that 
those willing to participate in the herd, as this is perceived, are not infinite in 
numbers. Hence, their ranks may not offer the respective demand-size necessary 
for the price-ascension and sustainability of its underlying trend; alternatively. 
adverse circumstances may lead part of their dynamics not to be realized (e.g. an 
economic do\'"nturn might deter those \vho would othenvise trade from doing so). 
\\ nat is more, a herd can materialize in any stuck. industry or mark~t: hence, 
herds do not exhibit preferential patterns. 
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Herding may involve intent (intentional herding) or it may not (spurious 
herding); this categorization plays a quintessential role in the deciphering of its 
presence in the market context (Bikhchandani and Sharma, ::001). 
The case for intentional herding is a rather complicated one: what it posits 
IS that people consciously follow each other's trades. In short, their trades 
converge due to the influence of imitation. Under such circumstances, we expect 
investors to discard their private information and use the actions (trades) of their 
peers as informative signals. However, the notion of intent here is quite 
problematic. Intent per se is an abstract term and as such is hard to enumerate or 
quantify. A stock market accommodates millions of investors and it is obviously 
impossible to control for each one's intent at any point in time. This issue has also 
been at the forefront of specific issues in economics (see Utton. 1995), namely 
those dealing with collusion and predatory pricing and we shall attempt to briefly 
describe the underlying rationale there so as to understand the impossibility of the 
establishment of intent in finance. 
Collusion pertains to the specific business conduct followed by firms when 
they operate in concert and can been distinguished into tacit and explicit. Explicit 
collusion is the case of the cartels: an oral or written agreement binds all firms in a 
market towards cooperative behaviour; cartels normally appear in markets \"here 
the number of firms is small ( oligopolies). Tacit collusion occurs \vhen there are a 
fe\\" firms in a market, with each one monitoring each other's pricing policy and 
adjusting their respective prices accordingly. This is also knO\vTI as "parallel 
pricing" and may provide the impression that some conni\'ance is at \\"orks. The 
fact that both forms of collusion may materialize in markets ,,"ith high le\'ds of 
concentration renders their distinction often problematic. A.s the lIS antitrust 
legislation proposes, a price-plus approach is to be employed when the issue is 
surrounded by substantial ambiguity; price-plus here implies that intent, other 
than collusive pricing alone, must also be established. 
Similar considerations apply to predatory pricing, namely the pncmg 
adopted by a firm with the intention of eliminating incumbent competitors and 
deterring potential ones from entering. However, if a firm is technologically 
advanced, it may reach levels of efficiency that allow it to place a very low price 
for its products, i.e. engage in competitive pricing. Again here, the US antitrust 
framework calls for the investigation of intent in order to decide upon the 
imposition of penalties or not, without restricting itself to the establishment of 
predatory pricing per se. 
However, intent in such cases is obviously a matter of subjective content 
and refers to the discretion of the relevant authorities to decide whether it actually 
exists or not. If that is the case with well-defined targets (a limited number of 
corporations), then it is apparently impossible to assert the presence of intent in 
the ranks of a population of millions of investors, indigenous and overseas. 
What's more, the case for intent seems to be of interest in economics due 
to its policy implications. If a company practices predatory pricing, then this 
obviously merits regulatory intervention to prevent competition from being 
curtailed; similar considerations apply in the case of collusion. Hov;ever, financial 
regulation would probably not preoccupy itself with the existence or not of intent 
in investors' decision-making. After alL intent is a private issue that mayor may 
not be associated with an individual's background as well as other factors. Indeed, 
it could not be considered as reasonable-let alone feasible-to accuse an individual 
in\'l.~stor fl)f trading according to a specific pattern intentionally. Intent is taken 
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into account when the outcome of the market is compromised or influenced, such 
as in the case of manipulation, not when an investor trades on the basis of a 
conjectural cognitive bias. Hence, the matter of intent in the herdina literature 
t:> 
falls more into the sphere of theoretical intuition rather than practical application. 
Rationalizing imitation is thus, not always possible. It is \\"orth, however, 
trying to provide some explanations related to its motives. First of all, one should 
refer to the conformity bias, namely the condition under which people feel more 
convenient when doing what others do. This tendency towards conformity 
(Hirshleifer, 2001) may well be related to the interaction of people. as they 
communicate with one another. Communication may be explicit (e.g. when 
people are conversing - see Shiller, 1995), yet It may also be tacit (when people 
observe others' choices, e.g. in fashion - see Bikhchandani et aI, 1992). One 
might also ascribe this propensity towards imitation to certain behavioural biases, 
such as the representativeness heuristic, limited attention, the false consensus 
effect, the curse of knowledge and the home bias, in line with the discussion in 
Hirshleifer (2001) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). 
However, copying the decisions of others may well be the result of other. 
more subtle, considerations. A trader who possesses no private information or 
perceives others as better-informed may choose to free-ride on the informational 
content of others' actions, thus resolving his informational handicap. Similarly, a 
trader who maintains an inadequate capacity for information processing may also 
be prompted to follow his peers, if he considers their relevant capacity superior to 
his. Assuming the prevalence of such considerations, it is perhaps reasonable to 
contend that these are bound to lead to negative informational externalities. If 
traders mimic each other and do not trade on the basis of their O\\"Il information, 
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then the latter will not be revealed and incorporated in the public information 
pool, thus leading that pool to grow poorer. This may lead to temporary blockages 
of information or to its slower aggregation (see the discussion in Hirshleifer and 
Teoh (2003) for more theoretical grounding on the subject). Thus, the anticipation 
of payoff externalities in terms of information may constitute a valid justification 
in favour of intentional herding (Devenow and Welch, 1996). 
A relevant case here involves informational cascades. where market 
participants may ignore their private information and follow the actions of others, 
when they consider the information conveyed by others' actions to provide a 
useful set of information on its own (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et aI, 1992). If 
so this is also expected to lead to a poorer aggregation of information in the 
marketplace, as the private information of "cascading" investors is not revealed to 
others (since it is suppressed). This is expected to be particularly strong in cases 
where the available options to follow are limited, since, if the latter holds, the 
behavioural responses possible will be limited as well, thus enhancing the 
potential for converging to one of them (Devenow and Welch, 1996). 
However, investors may decide to imitate others based upon more material 
considerations. A series of studies (see Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003 for a reviev.) 
claims that investment professionals (e.g. fund managers) may in fact engage in 
herding among themselves due to professional reasons. Career-related concerns 
seem to constitute an interesting area of research when it comes to assessing the 
impact of managers' herd behavior. The basic question here relates to agency 
problems as fund managers are essentially in the employment of investment 
companies and. as such, are subject to principal-agent considerations. As their 
performance is evaluated periodically on a relative basis. i.e. versus the 
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perfonnance of their peers, mostly those with similar (e.g. stocks, bonds, money-
market, industry, foreign marketls et al) specializations (Ross et aL 1999), this 
creates a perceived "benchmark" upon which they may attempt to herd. 
Since some investment professionals may be more able (let them be 
denoted as "good") and others less able ("bad", hereafter), the issue of their 
relative perfonnance evaluation can tum into a predicament as Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990) show. In their study, the evaluation of the professionals' ability on a 
relative basis is bound to render imitation tempting, if this is going to induce 
"jamming" to the evaluation-process. "Bad" (i.e. less able) managers ha\c~ an 
obvious incentive to copy the actions of their "good" (more able) peers, if this will 
help them appear as "better" professionals. "Good" managers, on the other hand, 
may choose to follow the investment-decisions of the majority of their peers, even 
if these are sub-optimal; this may be the case, if the risk from a potential failure is 
perceived as higher compared to the benefits accruing from a potential success by 
"going-it-alone". Thus, the issue of separating "luck from skill", namely telling 
the "good" managers from the "bad" ones, as Lakonishok et al (1992) argue, 
becomes harder to establish in this context. 
Here is how the "jamming" might work. Assuming that positive 
circumstances materialize in the market, then from a confonnity point of view 
every manager would like to perfonn welL as a potential negative perfonnance 
might cast a stigma over his perceived ability. Also, if everyone pcrfonns well in 
a euphoric market. a negative perfonnance is not desirable as it makes a manat'I..'f 
"stand out from the crowd". Thus, "bad" professionals \vill presumably be 
inclined to "herd" on the actions of their "good"' peers. so that everyone gives the 
impression of being "good"'. Conversely. if adverse circumstances materialize. it 
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is hard to tell who is good (the "bad" ones will have performed bad any\\·ay~ while 
the "good" ones will have probably performed worse than expected). It follows 
that fund managers have an incentive to herd in both cases. 
Reputational considerations are relevant to the aforementioned aaenC\-
e> • 
concerns, as they may also encourage fund managers to herd. A professional who 
enjoys a strong reputation in his capacity has an incentive to imitate others in 
order to preserve his reputation (Graham, 1999); this can be the case if the damage 
to his reputation by a potential failure outweighs the expected benefits from a 
potential success. If we assume that the well-reputed professionals are also the 
better-able ones (as it is hard to imagine how one's reputation would have grown 
in the absence of a distinctive ability). this may help explain the herding 
tendencies denoted previously with regards to the issue of ability. Managers \\"ith 
a weak reputation, however, may also resort to herding as a means of free-riding 
(Trueman, 1994) on the reputation of better-reputed colleagues (reputational 
externality). 
Another factor that may tacitly promote herding instincts among 
investment professionals (be they fund managers or financial analysts) is relative 
homogeneity. Investment professionals constitute a group of more or less similar 
traits: they share a similar educational background, are exposed to similar 
information signals, may tend towards interpreting them similarly (due to 
background-similarities or peer-mimicking) and are subject to a similar 
framework of professional conduct (e.g. compensation schemes, notions of 
prudence and fiduciary duty (De Bondt and Teh. 1997). If so. fund managers may 
tend to exhibit similarities in their trading conduct, by maintaining, for example, 
similar structures of their portfolio-holdings (the case of fund managers selectin~ 
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stocks picked up by many of their peers-see Lakonishok et aL 1992) or adhering 
to the line of the "opinion leaders" or the perceived majority (as may \\-ell be the 
case with financial analysts-see, e.g. Graham, 1999 and Welch, 2000). 
Market manipulation may also promote herding, as the actions of a group 
of informed traders may create the impression of a profitable opportunity, thus 
luring others into it (Van Bommel, 2003). The mechanism involved in 3uch cases 
may well lead to the manifestation of herding phenomena, as Mathiopoulos 
(2000) for example, has described and can also be associated with positive 
feedback trading, where individuals engage in trend-chasing induced by rational 
speculators (De Long et aI, 1990; Andergassen, 2003). 
Contrary to intentional herding, "spurious" herding seems to be more 
complicated in nature. What it essentially posits is that investors trade to the same 
direction for reasons other than imitation. Spurious herding involves a similarity 
in responses to similar decision problems following commonly observed signals 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001) and needs to be distinguished from the 
expressions of "intentional" herding depicted thus far. If a change in fundamentals 
(e.g. a drop in deposit rates) materializes, this may well have the potential of 
inducing investors to behave in a parallel fashion (e.g. possibly invest more in 
stocks). However, as everything is relative in research, even this needs to be 
viewed with skepticism: indeed, some traders may intentionally follow others in 
this case, if they feel unable to appropriately decipher the content of the signal 
that has arrived at the market, or if they just feel like trading to the same direction 
as others do. 
Nevertheless, this type of "unintentional" herding may be mistaken for 
intentionaL a fact that has also heen ascribed by Hirshkifer and Teoh C~OO) to 
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the Simultaneous Causation Issue. The latter refers to the fallacy of misperceived 
herding due to conceptual errors. Herding, as we have just noted, requires 
interactive observation between traders. However, it might be the case that traders 
may behave in a herd-like fashion in the absence of interactive imitation. This 
might be true when something causes their trades to converge or when they 
respond in a rational manner to price movements; the next example might be 
enlightening in this respect. 
If group A is herding towards a stock, then group B may find it convenient 
to follow suit in order to exploit group A (or its trades), thus engaging in what one 
might term as rational speculation. The paper by De Long et al (1990) is 
particularly relevant here as the authors show how rational traders may choose to 
herd alongside a trend they have originally fostered and speculate on the 
purportedly uninformed positive feedback traders who will be lured into it. Here 
this comes very close to spurious herding, although herding is not explicitly 
mentioned throughout the paper. Spurious herding involves correlated trades and 
presupposes no interaction among traders (and, of course, no intent). Thus, in this 
case, a confluent rational response to a given price course could be deemed as 
herding. 
The Issues arIsmg from herding have obvious implications for market 
efficiency. As herd behaviour postulates, people's trades need not be motivated by 
information; investors may simply lack any information (or perhaps, more 
plausibly, the information necessary to decide upon whether to invest or not) or 
may hesitate to trade on the basis of their private information for a variety of 
reasons (due to difficulty in its processing or due to its bad quality). If so, then 
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investors may trade on the basis of others' trades, a situation at odds with the 
tenets of market efficiency. 
However, this is not the sole consideration here, as infonnation- or non-
information-based trading is only one issue; securities' pricing is another. Let us 
suppose for the sake of the argument, that information arrives at time t and that 
"rational" investors trade according to it. All else equal, one might expect prices 
to rapidly incorporate this information and adjust at the "efficient" levels; this 
would, though, constitute only one presumption. If a number of traders decide to 
condition their trades upon the trades of others, it might be reasonable to assume 
that the adjustment of prices to new information at time t might be viewed as the 
beginning of a given trend, however erroneous a perception of the kind might be. 
If the information is positive and (as expected) prices rise to reflect this good 
news, then it is possible that a set of traders might choose to buy that stock not in 
response to good news only but also in response to the response of others to it. 
Essentially, this is tantamount to what we mentioned previously about Soros' 
(1987) market "reflexivity". Although beyond the scope of our analysis, we may 
perhaps safely assume that a behaviour as such has the potential to generate price 
overreaction. Although rational arbitrageurs might be ready to counter this 
mispricing, the possible amplification of noise-traders' risk (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002) may render arbitrage a less attractive option. 
Of course somebody might argue that market efficiency may still apply in 
this case as the following example shows. Let us assume that a large trader invests 
in a stock for some reason and that this investment of his is advertised in the 
press. A rather possible outcome of this publicity is that his trades constitute now 
part of the public information pool that other traders can observe and may choose 
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to follow. The question here is whether trading on others investors' trades is in 
line with "rational" behaviour. In our opinion. no answer can be provided here 
without running the risk of arbitrary jUdgement. If we were, however, to cast aside 
issues of malevolent nature (namely that the "big' trader may be trying to lure 
smaller ones only to profit from them at a later stage), we might say that a 
situation like this does not necessarily compromise market efficiency. As long as 
prices reflect all information available, investing on the basis of information 
regarding the trades of others seems to be quite in line with the EMH. Of course 
whether this conditioning of trades is intentional (following a large trader due to 
imitation) or spurious (similarity of responses due to commonly observed signals. 
albeit with a time lag) remains yet to be established. 
2.4.3 Herding: Em pirical Evidence 
Research on herd behaviour, much like the one on feedback trading, has 
resorted to the employment of both aggregate data (i.e. returns) as \vell as 
microdata (i.e. investors' accounts) in order to estimate herding. 
The return-based herding literature has taken herding to be reflected into 
the cross-sectional dispersion of returns from the market average, the assumption 
being that a rise in herding would be imprinted into a decline of that dispersion. as 
n:tums \vould tend to conform to the markers perceived consensus. The seminal 
paper in this area ,vas the one by Christie and Huang (1995) who used daily 
(1962-1988) as well as monthly (1925-1988) data for the US market in order to 
test for herding at the industry-level during periods of market stress. The latter 
related to "extreme" returns, which were defined as lying two or three standard 
..., .... 
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deviations from the period's market-mean. Using a linear model framework, 
Christie and Huang (1995) documented the absence of herd behaviour in all 
industries tested, as the cross-sectional dispersion of stocks was found to be 
increasing irrespective of the "extreme" returns being positive or negati\'c;.~. 
Interestingly enough, the increase in dispersion was found to be more during 
"extreme up" versus "extreme down" market periods, indicating perhaps a greater 
uniformity of returns' dispersion during the latter. 
Chang et al (2000) modified the Christie and Huang (1995) model to 
incorporate the possibility of nonlinearities in the market as well as directional 
asymmetry, i.e. differing responses of herding in up- versus down-markets. Their 
results involved both developed (US, Hong Kong, Japan) as well as developing 
(South Korea, Taiwan) markets, with the presence of herding established, 
significantly so in the latter. Much like Christie and Huang (1995), their findings 
also indicated a higher rate of increase in the cross-sectional returns' dispersion 
during up- compared to down-markets for all markets examined. 
U sing data on thirteen commodity futures contracts traded on three 
European exchanges (London Futures and Options Exchange; International 
French Futures and Options Exchange: Agricultural Futures Market Amsterdam). 
Gleason et al (2003) documented the absence of herding during the 1990s (futures 
contracts of different commodities were tested for different subperiods) on the 
premises of the Christie and Huang (1995) model; contrary to Christie and Huang 
(1995) and Chang et al (2000), the cross-sectional dispersion of returns was found 
to be more uniform during "extreme up" periods as opposed to "exreme do\\-n" 
ones. 
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Gleason et al (2004) utilized a unique database of tick data for Exchange 
Traded Funds on the AMEX for the 1999-2002 period and, using the Christie and 
Huang (1995) and the Chang et al (2000) measures as well as a hybrid of the two. 
they documented the absence of herding during extreme markets movements. 
Again here, their findings also indicated a higher rate of increase in the cross-
sectional returns' dispersion during "extreme up"- versus "extreme down"-
markets. 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) tested for herding on the basis of the cross-
sectional dispersion of the factor-sensitivity of assets. According to their theory, 
when investors are influenced by behavioural biases, their perceptions of the risk-
return relationship of assets may be distorted. In the presence of herding towards 
the market consensus, it is possible that the betas of the stocks will deviate from 
their equilibrium values. Thus, the beta of a stock does not remain constant (as the 
conventional CAPM would posit), but changes with the fluctuations of investors' 
sentiment. As a result, the cross-sectional dispersion of the stocks' betas would 
also be expected to be smaller, i.e. the stocks' betas would tend towards the value 
of the market beta, namely unity. Their findings indicated the presence of 
significant herding in the US and South Korea during the 1993-2002 period, more 
so outside turbulent periods. 
Caparelli et al (2004) tested for herding on the premises of the CO~IIT-
index in Italy using the methodologies of Christie and Huang (1995), Chang et al 
(2000) and Hwang and Salmon (2004). although the results generated \\·en.~ 
mixed. Finally Demirer and Kutan (2006) tested for herding in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen markets between 1993 (1994 for Shenzhen) and 2001 using the Christie 
and Huang (1995) model and reported insignificant herding: in line with Christie 
and Huang (1995), Chang et al (2000) and Gleason et al C::~OO-+). the cross-
sectional returns' dispersion during "extreme up"-markets was higher compared 
to "extreme down" -markets. 
The empirical tests for herding using microdata date back to the seminal 
paper by Lakonishok et al (1992), which set the pace for research in this area. 
Lakonishok et al (1992) found insignificant herding among pension funds in the 
US during the 1985-1989 period, a finding corroborated also by Grinblatt et al 
(1996) for US mutual funds between 1974 and 1984. However, Lakonishok et al 
(1992) also produced results indicative of an inverse relationship between fund-
herding and stock-size; thus, funds herded more in smaller capitalization stocks. 
Similar results with regards to the size-effect were reported by Oehler (1998) for 
Gelman mutual funds during the 1988-1993 period and Wermers (1999) for US-
funds during the 1975-1994 period; actually, Wermers (1999) reported that the 
propensity towards herding was found to be higher among growth-oriented funds. 
South Korea is a market that has been extensively investigated for herding, 
more so in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis and the related impression of overseas 
investors being the culprits for the latter. Choe et al (1999) showed that foreign 
funds herded less during the Asian Crisis compared to the period before it, while 
Kim and Wei (2002b) found that herding on behalf of various investor-types 
(individual-institutional, indigenous-overseas) was higher following the outbreak 
of that Crisis. Kim and Wei (2002a) found that offshore funds herded less 
compared to their other foreign institutional counterparts around the Asian Crisis. 
Further results indicative of significant institutional herding \ver.: 
documented hy Jones et al (1999) for US institutional investors during the 1984-
1993 period. Gilmour and Smit (2002) for South African unit trusts bet\\·een 1991 
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and 1999, Olivares (2005) for Chilean penSIOn funds during the 1997-2001 
period, Voronkova and Bohl (2005) for Polish pension funds during the 1999-
2002 period and Lobao and Serra for Portuguese equity funds behveen 1998 and 
2000. Wylie (2005) documented insignificant herding for UK funds between 1986 
and 1993. Finally, Do et al (2006) found high herding levels in Finland among 
investors, most notably individual ones, between 1995 and 2004. 
Thus, as empirical evidence appears to indicate, herding exists in both 
emerging and developed markets and can be found to be significant in the 
behaviour of market participants, irrespective of their classification. 
Return-based herding models seem to point towards the absence of 
herding during extreme market periods, thus implying that turbulent periods 
discourage herding, perhaps due to the lack of a definitive market direction, as 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) postulate. 
Microdata-based models furnish us with results indicative of existing 
herding tendencies on behalf of institutional investors, more so in emerging 
capital markets. What is more, institutional herding seems to increase as the stock-
size declines, thus indicating a possible size-effect in the herding of mutual funds. 
Such findings regarding institutional herding (higher in emerging markets / small 
capitalization stocks) could be related to informational reasons. Both emerging 
markets as well as small-capitalization stocks are normally characterized by 
ambiguous informational environments. Emerging markets are expected to be 
more prone to informational inefficiencies (Antoniou et aI, 1997a) due to the 
incompleteness of the relevant regulatory framework reining their operations. 
Small stocks, on the other hand, tend to enjoy limited analysts' coverage 
(Hirshkifer, 2001), while the information pertaining to them is usually fim1-
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specific and more difficult to substantiate. In the presence of such informational 
uncertainty, it may be reasonable for fund managers to opt for following their 
peers instead of going-it-alone. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have delineated the two main schools of thought in Assd 
Pricing, namely the Rational one as imprinted through the Efficient rvlarkets' 
Hypothesis (Fama, 1970; 1991) and the Behavioural one. as reflected through the 
advances in the employment of psychology into Finance (Barberis and Thaler. 
2002). We documented the significant increase of research in the area of 
heterogeneous-agents' modelling on the premises of Behavioural Finance and 
discussed the expansion of such research in novel areas, most notably those of 
Evolutionary Finance. The heterogeneity of market agents, in tum, can be 
translated into the manifestation of a multitude of strategies, which is expected to 
further enhance the complexity of the market. Given that markets are subject to 
evolutionary dynamics, their structures are not expected to remain stationary over 
time. This implies that the manifestation of the various trading strategies in the 
marketplace is bound to be influenced by the changes in the latter. However, it is 
interesting to note that the impact of differential market features and conditions 
upon the manifestation of trading strategies has recei \'ed rather scant attention in 
Finance. 
\\'e assumed the behavioural patterns of herding and feedback trading, \\hose 
properties ha\'c constituted the subject of \'oluminous research, both anal:1ical as 
well as empirical in Finance, in order to study the impact of differential market 
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features and conditions upon their behaviour. These two patterns of trade 
constitute rather popular topics in Finance research, more so £iven their treatment 
, ~ 
by popular Finance literature as culprits regarding market abnonnalities (Soros, 
1987; Galbraith, 1994; Mathiopoulos, 2000). 
Regarding feedback trading, our research delved into both analytical as well as 
empirical work in the field. We noticed that feedback trading has been taken to be 
a proxy-pattern for noise trading, since, as we mentioned previously, it is 
impossible to designate a unifonn noise-trading pattern. Using this as a stepping 
stone, a variety of analytical and empirical papers has tried to picture tl1<:' 
significance and impact of feedback traders through model-settings where noise 
traders interact with fundamentals-driven investors. However, the above settings 
tend to overlook two issues. Firstly, rational investors may themselves choose to 
employ feedback-style trading rules as well, as has been implied both in analytical 
(De Long et aI, 1990; Fanner, 2002; Fanner and Joshi, 2002; Andergassen, 2003) 
as well as empirical works (Soros, 1987; Luskin, 1988; Antoniou et aI, 2005); 
therefore, feedback trading, irrespective of its expression, need not solely be 
confined to noise traders. Secondly, the bi-trader setting (rational versus feedback 
traders) in most relevant models appears to constitute a rather restrictive reflection 
of investors' heterogeneity in the marketplace. Finally, as has frequently been 
noted thus far, absent the aforementioned study by Antoniou et al (2005), there 
has been no other research on the impact of market factors upon feedback trading. 
To that t:nd, we decided to conduct our research on the premises of feedback 
trading based upon two pillars, an anal)1ical and an empirical one. 
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The analytical pillar relates to the utilization of the "rational-feedback" model 
proposed by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) and its extension through the 
insertion of a third trader-type, reflective of a novel trading pattern, into it. The 
sole purpose of this novel trader-type is to exploit feedback traders by taking 
advantage of the basis (and potential byproduct) of their trading conduct, i.e. the 
trend through the implementation of a specific strategy. The latter, as we shall 
illustrate in Chapter 3, involves engaging in feedback trading whenever a specific 
indicator produces a signal implying that it is beneficial for him to trade. Thus, 
this novel strategy is not "rational" in its strict sense (since it involves feedback 
trading), yet it also cannot be considered "uninformed", since it is based upon 
some information; such modes of "non-fundamental" speculation have been 
documented in a small number of analytical papers (see e.g. Allen and Gale, 1992; 
Madrigal, 1996), yet empirical work on the subject has never been carried out. 
Consequently, this novel trader-type of ours contributes to existing literature on 
heterogeneous agents, in general and feedback trading, in particular in two 
distinctive ways: first, by introducing and empirically testing for an novel 
feedback trading pattern and secondly by increasing the heterogeneity m an 
existing heterogeneous-agents' model through the inclusion of this trader-type 
into the latter. 
The second pillar engulfs the empirical component. As this novel trader-type 
is added to an existing bi-trader model-framework, it enhances the heterogeneity 
of the latter. As a result, it would be interesting to see whether its presence 
exhibits differences in its significance across market environments characterized 
by varying levels of investors' heterogeneity. We test for this using a sample of 
markets with different levels of heterogeneity, the latter proxied through the 
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participation levels of vanous investor-types. \\'e consider the degree of 
heterogeneity of a market being an increasing function of the participation levels 
of overseas traders, since the trades of foreigners are often subject to regulatory 
restrictions. As a result, the more restrictive the market environment is, the more 
barriers to trade foreigners are expected to face and the more reduced their 
participation levels will be, thus limiting the market's heterogeneity. Conversely, 
the less restrictions a market has in place, the easier it is for overseas investors to 
trade, thus boosting their trading levels and, concurrently, the heterogeneity of the 
market. The idea underlying our intuition here is that the less restrictive a 
regulatory environment is, the more participation it will attract by various 
categories of investors, thus expected to allow for the manifestation of a greater 
array of trading strategies. As a result, our novel type of trader would be expected 
to manifest itself more clearly in liberal market environments. Given that 
regulatory frameworks are subject to change, thus inducing changes in the 
heterogeneity of the market, the impact of those changes upon our proposed 
trader-type is examined across time; finally, 'vye investigate whether this trader-
type exhibits differences in its presence and significance during turbulent versus 
non-turbulent market conditions. 
As a result, the above investigation of feedback trading is conducted upon an 
ad hoc developed analytical framework aiming at addressing the issue of rvhether 
specific market factors (market heterogeneity, extreme versus non-extreme market 
conditions) impact upon the significance of feedback trading across different 
markets. 
Regarding herding, it constitutes a concept that has been studied extensi\'\.~ly, 
as the reyie\vs of Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) and Hirshleifer and Teoh 
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(2003) illustrate, on an analytical basis (Le. through models that attempt to picture 
various possible theoretical manifestations of it), as well as on an empirical one 
(using both aggregate13 as well as proprietary14 data). Our research has indicated 
that, much like with feedback trading, there appears to be rather limited attention 
towards the impact of specific market-features and conditions upon herding, both 
at the single- as well as the inter-market level (i.e. across markets). 
To that end, we tested for herding across various markets in Chapter 4 on the 
basis of several regulatory features (capital gains' taxes, short-selling constraints 
and index-futures' introduction) which are capable of affecting herding. Our 
intention here was to address the research issue of whether the presence or the 
absence of those features promoted or inhibited the significance of herding. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first research attempting to study herding on 
the basis of specific, herd-related market-features, in general and the 
aforementioned features, in particular. In view of the popular belief regarding the 
destabilizing potential of herding, we contend that the issues investigated here 
provide novel insights into features that may facilitate herding from a regulatory 
point of view, thus being of interest to the relevant authorities. 
Given the leverage of mutual funds in capital markets (Wermers, 1999) and 
the potential for destabilization-inducing herding on their behalf (Kim and Wei, 
2002b), we devoted Chapter 5 to the study of institutional herding. Using a unique 
database of institutional traders' holdings, we investigated the presence and 
significance of institutional herding exclusively at the level of the constituents of a 
market's index on the premises of specific features of that index reflective of 
JJ Mostly stock returns. 
J.I Such as investors' accounts and transaction data. 
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market conditions that have the potential of bearing an impact upon herding; 
these features included market-wide herding, trading volume, market volatility 
and market direction. Again here, the main issue examined is 'whether these herd-
related conditions are capable of conferring an impact upon institutional herding. 
Our exploration of the herding literature has indicated that an examination of 
herding, in general and institutional herding, in particular has never been 
undertaken before on the basis of such a framework. Researching institutional 
herding in this fashion raises issues of interest to regulators (if specific market 
conditions do impact upon institutional herding, then they may decide to curb 
such tendencies through the initiation of anti-herd incentives) as well as the wider 
investment community (since certain derivatives are based upon market indices-
e.g. index futures). 
Consequently, the investigation carried out in our research contributes to the 
Finance literature in several distinctive ways. First of all, we link two behavioural 
patterns of investors' heterogeneity with the underlying market environment in an 
effort to demonstrate the impact of specific features and conditions of the latter 
over those patterns over time both in a single market (Chapter 5) as well as across 
markets (Chapters 3 and 4). Our work contributes to the theoretical debate on 
those behavioural issues both at the analytical level (by devising ad hoc model-
settings: Chapter 3) and the empirical one (by examining those patterns on th~ 
basis of their relationship \vith specific market features and conditions; Chapters 
3, .f and 5). 
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Chapter 3 
Threshold-trading: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigation of a Novel Type of 
Feedback-trading 
3.1 Introduction 
Research in Finance has tended to portray market heterogeneity in the 
context of information-asymmetry, where market agents differ both with respect 
to the possession as well as the processing of information. Traditional market 
microstructure literature (see 0' Hara, 1997 for a detailed thematic overview) 
distinguishes often between traders who have access to information ("informed") 
and traders who have no access to information ("uninformed") and trade for 
reasons other than information (e.g. liquidity). Other researchers (see e.g. De 
Long et aI, 1990: Farmer, 2002; Farmer and Joshi, 2002; Andergassen, 2003) 
assume that informed rational speculators take advantage of their informational 
superiority ad hoc. i.e. in order to exploit the deviations of prices from 
fundamentals arising from the behavioral trading patterns of their "noise" 
counterparts. 
However. assuming that some traders are enjoying a supaior inform<ltional 
position \\"hile the rest are trading on "noise" is probably an inaccurate reflection 
84 
of investors' "biodiversity" in the marketplace. A series of papers (Allen and 
Gale, 1992; Madrigal, 1996; Mei et aI, 2004; Hamadi et al. 2005) ha\'e explored 
the possibility of uninformed investors' exploitation by traders who do not 
necessarily subscribe to the rational paradigm. These models purport that there are 
investors who might choose to exploit noise traders through some specific 
information pertaining to their trading conduct without any explicit 
knowledge/employment of fundamentals. 
To exploit noise traders' behaviour in such a way, however, it is necessary to 
specify their trading pattern. Given that "noise" itself is hard to elaborate. a 
number of heterogeneous-agents' studies have resorted to the association of noise 
trading with feedback trading (i.e. trading on the basis of past prices). 
Feedback traders per se are not necessarily uninformed or irrational (Antoniou 
et aI, 2005); however, trading on past prices can lead to perceptions of "price-
trending". If so, feedback traders can have an impact on price-behaviour, in the 
sense that they may lead to the launch of a new trend or the exacerbation of an 
existing one. A reasonable assumption here is that. one way to exploit feedback 
traders is to exploit the basis (and potential byproduct) of their trading conduct, 
i.e. the trend. 
\Ve explore the possibility of such non-fundamental, noise-exploiting 
behaviour by introducing a novel trader-type, whose purpose is to exploit the 
trend by implementing a specific strategy. The latter. as we shall later illustrate. 
involves trading on the trend following the violation of a certain threshold, hence 
WI? \\ill be referring to this trader-type as "threshold trader". This is tantamount to 
saying that this investor trades on the trend \\,henevl?r (according to his sp~cific 
strakgy) it is hl?neficial for him to do so. Although this trader-type does not 
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conform to the traditional rational, "fundamentalist" type, his trading pattern is 
founded upon the utilization of a specific informational signal (reflected through 
the violation of a threshold). As a result, he cannot be termed "uninformed" in the 
strict sense, since he is utilizing some information, albeit non-fundamental. 
A key distinguishing feature of our research relates to the empirical testing of 
the presence of this novel trader-type. As the research on non-fundamental 
trading/speculation has mostly involved analytical modeling, we considered it 
appropriate to test whether the existence of a trading conduct of the sort can be 
controlled for, by using real market-data. As a result, we do not only devise a 
hypothetical trader-type, but we also test for its presence empirically, across a 
number of capital markets. Our purpose is to study the "threshold" trader-type 
within different regulatory environments, in order to examine whether its presence 
is influenced by a market's heterogeneity. To proxy for the latter, we use data on 
the decomposition of a market's turnover by investor-type and consider the 
participation-levels of overseas traders as indicative of the degree of the market's 
heterogeneity. Since foreign traders are subject to differential treatment across 
markets contingent upon the degree of financial liberalization of each, the more 
"liberal" a market is, the higher the participation of foreigners is expected to be. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 includes a review 
of the literature pertaining to heterogeneous-agents' models relative to noise-
traders' exploitation. Section 3.3 presents the entire model-development of our 
concept, Section 3.4 delineates the hypotheses relative to this novel trader-type, 
while Section 3.5 offers an overview of the markets for which these hypotheses 
are tested (always within the context of our hypotheses). Section 3.6 discusses the 
methodology employed (3.6.1), the data utilized (3.6.2) and presents some 
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descriptive statistics (3.6.3). Section 3.7 presents the results and discusses the 
empirical findings; Section 3.8 concludes. 
3.2 Theoretical background 
In the stock-trading context, feedback trading has been used as a term to 
describe the conduct of a specific type of trader whose investment decisions are a 
function of historical prices. If he trades in the same direction with past prices he 
is called "positive feedback trader", while if he trades to the opposite direction, 
"negative feedback (contrarian) trader". 
Although feedback trading is price-based, there is little agreement as to its 
practice; people do not use past prices the same way. A common tenet, however, 
underlying feedback trading is that the employment of past prices can yield extra 
insight into their future course; as a result, feedback trading per se runs counter to 
the notion of (weak-form) market efficiency. 
A number of psychological biases can be associated with feedback trading. 
Positive feedback trading can, for example, be reinforced (Barberis et aL 1998) 
through the representativeness heuristic (overweighting recent data as 
representative of a trend-at-works) and the conservatism-bias (undef\.veighting 
recent data if the perception of an opposite trend-at-works prevails). It can also be 
fueled by the overconfidence-bias (aggressive trading following an "euphoric" 
period of recent gains; see Odean, 1998~ Glaeser and \\'eber, 2004a; Glaeser and 
Weber, 2004b). Negative feedback trading can be reinforced through the 
"disposition-effect" (preference of realizing gains through selling "\\ inning" 
stocks rather than losses from selling "losing" ones: see Shefrin and Statman, 
1985). Feedback trading can further be motivated through th~ availability of data. 
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Historical data on prices, for example, are easy to find in the financial press (see 
Huddart et aI, 2002), while more sophisticated data are harder to find. Finally, the 
simplified analysis of such data (as carried out mostly by technical analysts in the 
press) facilitates the communication of these "technical heuristics" to a wider 
audience, which is perhaps not typified by a sufficient educational background or 
investment experience. 
Feedback trading, however, is not restricted to noise traders who may be 
susceptible to behavioural biases, maintain less abilities/resources or use technical 
analysis. A series of papers (see e.g. Koutmos, 1997~ Antoniou et aL 2005) have 
argued that rational traders may employ trading rules based on historical prices if 
they feel they have to shield themselves against (or take advantage of) abrupt 
market movements; portfolio insurance (Luskin, 1988) and stop-loss orders 
(Osler, 2002) are relevant here. Such strategic choices on behalf of rational traders 
are founded upon the belief that noise traders might push prices away from their 
fundamental value, thus leading to a mispricing of indefinite duration and 
magnitude (see Barberis and Thaler, 2002). 
The possibility of rational "informed" traders exploiting the feedback 
pattern of noise traders has been addressed in the Finance literature through a 
series of analytical models. De Long et al (1990) assume a model where rational 
speculators receive a signal reflective of forthcoming information relative to a 
stock's fundamentals. If the content of this signal is indicatiye ofa rise in its price 
in the future. they decide to buy the stock now and sell it prior to the information 
going public (i.e. prior to the anticipated positive response of prices to it). 
H()\\e\'er, in due course, they realize that noise traders are beginning to folll)\\ 
their trades as time goes by: thus, as the speculators start buying the stock, noise 
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traders engage in positive feedback trading and prices begin to deviate upwards 
from fundamentals. When the speculators start observing this trend-chasing 
potential, they try to exploit it by selling when the information expected is 
announced and then going short on that stock in anticipation of a price-reyersal. 
De Long et al (1990) contend that this behaviour of the speculators is trend-
inducing and leads to the reinforcing of positive feedback trading, upon the \yaves 
of which they are riding, thus facilitating the exacerbation of price volatility. 
Farmer (2002) and Farmer and Joshi (2002) explore the possibility of the 
interactions of feedback traders with multiple versions of rational traders. One 
such version of the latter involves pursuing state-dependent threshold value 
strategies aimed at exploiting the perceived mispricing of a stock. More 
specifically, these papers assume that a rational trader who is trading upon the 
fundamental value of a stock is able to estimate the deviations of its price from 
fundamentals. If so, he may choose to take advantage of this mispricing in order 
to enter/exit the market before the mispricing becomes excessive. This means, for 
example that, instead of leaving the market in view of a mispricing, he stays on, 
up until his own pre-determined thresholds indicate that it is profitable to do so. 
This is in line with what has been mentioned previously, with respect to "rational" 
feedback trading using "stop-loss" orders and portfolio insurance and bears the 
positive effect of keeping the number of transactions (and the associated costs) to 
a mmUTIum. 
Andergassen (2003) devises a model similar to the one of De Long d al 
(1990) and finds that the longer it takes for an asset's true \'alue to be realized by 
the market the more the rational speculators feel inclined towards reinforcing 
trend-chasing rather than trading on fundamentals. In other words, rational 
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speculators may prefer to lure noise traders into a trend-chase since thev can 
, " 
exploit them before fundamentals become public kno',vledge. The difference in the 
behaviour of noise traders between this model and De Long et aI's (1990) is that 
in the latter, noise traders were assumed to be of positive feedback nature while 
here they are assumed to exhibit a binary behaviour: either they trade on the 
asset's fundamental value or they engage into trend-chasing. Andergassen (2003) 
also finds that, if the speculators in this model act with a manipulative intent. then 
their impact tends to increase with their market power. 
The ad hoc exploitation of noise traders' behaviour by rational traders who 
take advantage of their informational leverage is, however, only one way to view 
this issue. Allen and Gale (1992) have shown that an individual 'vvho is 
uninformed, yet imitates the trades of an informed trader, can make profits. This is 
possible, if he engages in trade-based manipulation, i.e. trying to corner the 
market through his buying and selling pressure without having to resort to 
traditional manipulative practices, such as rurnour-mongering. The idea seems to 
be not far from the models described above, the difference being of course that the 
manipulator here is assumed to be uninformed. However, Allen and Gale (1992) 
show that, as long as he can imitate the behaviour of his informed peer, he can 
attract noise traders. This is supposed to be the case, if the latter misperceive him 
as being informed. when in fact he is not. We might contend here that this trade-
based manipulator must be of a certain size in order to be able to achieve these 
things (i.e. know \vho the informed trader is, know his strategies and copy them. 
as well as attract noise traders). 
t\1adrigal (1996) develops a two-period model accommodating three typ~s 
of traders: a fundanlentals-based informed insider. noise traders and a non-
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fundamental speculator. The latter aims at inf~rring the insider's information 
through the observation of the noise traders' order-flow at period 1; using this in 
conjunction with the first period's price, he trades at period 2. The insider is aware 
of this and modifies his trades in order to manipulate the speculator's beliefs; in 
the end, the model shows that the speculator is likely to ride on the waves of noise 
and positive feedback trade, while the insider profits from this by bucking the 
trend. 
In a paper related to Allen and Gale (1992), Mei et al (2004) show how 
trade-based manipulation can yield profits when used to take advantage of the 
behavioural biases of noise traders. The paper describes the manipulator as a 
trader who can exert substantial pressure on stock prices and who is using this 
ability of his to induce noise traders to trade in a certain direction. The authors 
note here that it is the disposition-effect of noise traders that constitutes the target 
of the manipulator, i.e. the inclination towards keeping losing stocks, while selling 
winning ones. Thus, the manipulator formulates a strategy based upon this bias, 
without relying upon fundamental information. 
Hamadi et al (2005) introduce the concept of the "illusionary" trader, 
whose sole purpose is the dissemination of ambiguous ("polysemous") signals 
into the marketplace in order to capture the attention of a critical mass of traders, 
whom they term as "believers". The difference between this paper and traditional 
heteroaeneous-aaents' models is that the "believers" do not have to be noise e e 
traders, but can even fall into the category of informed ones. The idea here is that 
investors are under time-pressure \vhen having to process information in order to 
reach a decision and, thus may include the "illusionary" information in their 
information-sd and, perhaps, consider it to be true. As a result, illusionary trading 
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is not far from rumour-mongering, since both of them incorporate the concept of 
disseminating signals of questionable quality. 
Our analysis so far has presented two types of heterogeneous-agents' 
models; the first, involved fundamentals-based traders intentionally exploiting 
noise traders by taking advantage of the infonnational gap between the two; the 
second, involved traders, who are trying to take advantage of noise traders by 
relying upon non-fundamental infonnation. 
We would like to draw some attention to the following: the fonner type of 
noise-traders' exploitation has been empirically tested, through the employment of 
real-market data (see, for example the heterogeneous-agents' models of Cutler et 
aI, 1991; Sentana and Wadhwanl, 1992; Satchell and Yang, 2003; Westerhoff, 
2006) among others); we are not aware of extensive empirical research regarding 
the second type of noise-traders' exploitation. 
To address the latter issue, we introduce a novel trader-type within an 
existing empirical, heterogeneous-agents' framework (that includes both rational 
and feedback traders in its original construction) whose trading conduct involves 
feedback trading when a specific threshold has been violated. This trader-type, 
whom we shall call "threshold trader", aims at exploiting feedback traders by 
trading on their trading basis (the trend) whenever a specific signal provides him 
with the indication that it is beneficial to do so. 
Our research produces the following contributions: 
1) introduces a novd trader-type whose trading conduct is reflective of non-
fundamental. speculative behaviour 
2) tests for its presence through the extension of an existing return-based 
modd 
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3) empirically examines its presence across markets with differences in their 
heterogeneity (reflected here through the composition of investors) 
stemming from the differences in their regulatory structures 
4) examines whether intertemporal changes in heterogeneity across markets 
affect the significance of the presence of threshold traders. 
3.3 The Model 
3.3.1 The original model: Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) 
Our research has focused on a specific model-lineage that has evolved 
throughout the past decade, since it was formally introduced by Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) and has literally dominated the literature related to feedback 
trading, since it has been applied for a variety of markets, both developed 
(Koutmos, 1997; Watanabe, 2002; Bohl and Reitz, 2004; Bohl and Reitz, 2006; 
Antoniou et aI, 2005) as well as developing (Koutmos & Saidi, 2001: Nikulyak, 
2002; Malyar, 2005). Given that it bears the interesting property of addressing the 
issue of different trader-types' interaction in a way that allows for its enumeration 
using real market data, we decided to base our research upon its premises. 
The model assumes two types of traders, namely "rational" ones, who 
maximize their expected utility and "feedback" ones who trade on the basis of 
lagged past returns (one period back). The demand function for the former is as 
follows: 
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(1) 
where Q/ represents the fraction of the shares outstanding of the single stock (or. 
alternatively, the fraction of the market portfolio) held by those traders, £1_1 (,~) 
is the expected return of period t given the information of period t-1. a is the 
risk-free rate (or else, the expected return such that Q/ = 0), e is a coefficient 
measuring the degree of risk-aversion and a} is the conditional variance (risk) at 
time t. 
The demand function of their feedback peers can be portrayed as: 
(2) 
where r is the feedback coefficient and r/_1 is the return of the previous period (t-
1) expressed as the difference of the natural logarithms of prices at periods t-1 and 
t-2 respectively. A positive value of r (r >0) implies the presence of positive 
feedback trading, while a negative value (r <0) would imply the presence of 
negative feedback ("contrarian") trading. 
In equilibrium all shares must be held; hence: 
(3) 
If so, then: 
Thus: 
(4) 
which provides us with a modified version of the CAP:vI in the presence of 
feedback traders. 
Assuming'l = EI _1 ('1) + G1 , we have: 
(5) 
where '( represents the actual return at period t and G{ is the error term. 
To allow for autocorrelation due to non-synchronous trading, Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) modify (5) as follows: 
(6) 
where Yo is designed to capture possible non-synchronous trading effects and 11 = 
-8 y . 
The addition of feedback traders in an otherwise CAPM-setting bears 
some interesting implications. As equation (5) shows, the inclusion of the term 
Y '1-1 8 a} leads to return-autocorrelation, the magnitude of which is a function of 
the risk in the market (as denoted by a}). Hence, the higher the volatility gro\\s. 
the higher the autocorrelation. Also the sign of the autocorrelation \\ill be 
determined by the sign of the feedback trading prevalent among feedback traders: 
if positive feedback traders prevail, then the autocorrelation \\'ill be negatin? 
whilst it will he positive in the presence of more negative feedback traders. 
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However, the feedback coefficient (11) is not independent of yolatility in 
this model. Positive feedback trading may well lead to the launch of a trend, thus 
forcing prices to fluctuate more wildly, hence becoming more volatile; the 
relationship can also assume a different form, as highly volatile markets may lead 
many investors to resort to strategies of positive feedback style, e.g. by employing 
portfolio insurance and stop-loss orders, which might cause a general price 
decline (in the event of a rising trend) or further exacerbate the price slump in case 
of a price fall. 
The implications for rational traders from a rIse In volatility are also 
obvious. As volatility rises, so does risk and, as a result, the risk-premium 
required on their behalf in order to hold more shares; assuming constant risk-
aversion (the e -coefficient), their ability to profit from a hypothetical trend may 
not be taken for granted, as the market will have grown riskier and they may well 
decide to liquidate their positions early on rather than follow the trend (see Kyle 
and Wang, 1997). Of course, as we have already argued, they might choose to 
stay on, in an attempt to profit from this trend, in the spirit of the "informed-
based" exploitation models discussed in the previous section. 
3.3.2. Threshold traders: extending Sentana and Wadhwani 
(1992) 
Having presented the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model \ve \\ill no\\ 
attempt to introduce the "threshold"' trader-type, who, as has already been 
suooested becomes active once a certain threshold has been \iolated. 
00 ' 
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More formally, threshold traders are assumed to operate under the 
following demand function: 
Z/ = Ar/_II/_I (7) 
where A, is the threshold traders' feedback coefficient, '/_1 is the return of 
the previous period (t-1) expressed as the difference of the natural logarithms of 
prices at periods t-1 and t-2 respectively and 1/_1 is a binary variable that is equal 
to: 
1, if a given threshold has been violated at period t-1 
zero, otherwise 
As their demand function indicates, these traders are also feedback traders 
(much like their "plain" feedback counterparts in the original Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) model), the sole difference being that they become active after 
the violation of a certain threshold. 
At equilibrium, all shares must be held; therefore we will have: 
(8) 
In the presence of this type of trader, equation (6) would now have to be 
modified as follows: 
(9) 
and by substituting r 2 = - () A" equation (6) would now look like: 
(10) 
We mentioned previously that thresholds may be employed in relation to 
traders' strategic behaviour, namely as a tool for exploiting (or mitigating against) 
mispricing. Moreover, a threshold constitutes a reference point and as such it is 
relevant to the biases that traders are susceptible to and the heuristics they utilize 
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when trying to rationalize their market environment and their investment choices 
(see Huddart et aI, 2002). 
However, the utilization of thresholds here does not restrict itself to this 
context only. To understand the very notion of threshold-usage in the present caSe, 
we also have to refer to biological models, most specifically those of population 
ecology, which entail the coexistence (symbiotic or competitive) of species (t\\"o 
or more) in a given environment (Edelstein-Keshet, 1987). In those models, the 
gains realized by one of the species (translated into "food") have a direct impact 
upon their levels of participation (translated into "group size") in their habitat. 
An example here involves predator-prey settings, whose mechanism can 
be described as follows. Assume there exists a number of prey in the beginning, 
upon which the predators start preying; assuming also a constant rise in the prey's 
population, the preying rate gradually increases. In view of the latter, the 
predators' population rises (they are physically able to give birth to more new 
predators) and from a certain point onwards, this leads to the decline of the prey 
population's growth. This development is detrimental for the predators' numbers, 
which are then showing signs of decline as well. Given this, the prey has a chance 
to recover from the initial offensive and rise again numerically. Thus, both 
populations tend to fluctuate within a certain range, as we discussed in Chapter 2 
(Edelstein-Keshet, 1987). 
The point we would like to raise here is the one related to the critical 
thresholds, i.e. those associated with the s\\"itch in the directional c\"olution 
(increase or decrease) of the two populations. These thresholds are associated with 
"visibility", i.e. the more the prey becomes after a certain point numerically the 
more visible it is to the predators. 
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Tracking down "prey" in capital markets through bare eye is obviously not 
a realistic option, as the number of market participants and the mUltiplicity of their 
transactions renders such a task impossible. Therefore, a trader will have to resort 
to an indicator of his choice in order to be able to detect the population dynamics 
of the conjectural "prey". 
Concurrently, the next question that arIses naturally is the following: 
having decided to designate our hypothetical trader's behaviour as threshold-
based, which might be the most appropriate indicator to base the choice of our 
threshold upon? 
We contend that this IS an Issue associated with SUbjective judgement. 
From a practical point of view, technical analysis is almost exclusively based 
upon price-, or joint price-volume indicators. Stop-loss orders also use prices as 
triggers 15. 
We hypothesize that volume can be a reasonable proxy as the basis for the 
threshold-strategy here; more specifically, we assume that threshold traders 
become active once their volume-based indicator signifies the presence of rising 
volume. After all, a rising volume is reflective of increased market participation 
and it is perhaps reasonable to assume that the more the players, the more money 
is on the table and hence, the more chances of reaping profits. A relative argument 
15 Our hypothetical threshold trader-type is assumed to trade upon non-fundamental-based 
indicators; as a result, we cannot include fundamentals' indicators (macroeconomic indicators, 
such as inflation and interest rates as well as company-specific indicators, such as earnings, 
dividends and cashflow) as possible "candidates" of their choice. However, we believe that there 
is a difference between using fundamental information and trading on it. A trader could, for 
example, use a company's earnings in an extrapolative fashion, i. e. trying to "see" patterns in 
them (Barberis et ai, J 998). This can, by no means, be associated with the rational, fundamentalist 
approach and as such could also be in line with threshold trading behaviour. Hence, then, another 
issue arises: can fundamentals be used by traders in a non-rational way? However, we refrain 
from pursuing this argument any further, as our intention here is to provide a picture of non-
fundamentalist, threshold-based traders without raising similar (perhaps, arcane) considerations. 
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here might be that as the volume of trade rises, so does the number of active noise 
traders (see Wang, 2002), thus improving the chances for their exploitation. 
The choice of volume has been motivated by the position it commands in 
the Finance literature, as it has been associated with a number of issues: 
Informational content: Blume et al (1994) find that volume enhances the 
precision of information; thus, investors who practice "price-plus" trading (i.e. use 
past prices and past volume) tend to enjoy an improved informational status 
compared to the one they would enjoy were they to employ past prices alone. This 
issue has also been addressed by Antoniou et al (1997) and Gervais et al (2001) 
who found that past volume may well increase the potential for returns' 
predictability. Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) have examined whether low-
volume stock returns can be predicted by high-volume stock returns following the 
dissemination of marketwide information. Their presumption rests upon the 
speed-adjustment-hypothesis, which states that high-volume stocks respond faster 
to a signal than low-volume stocks. Their results have suggested that thinly-traded 
stocks' returns can be predicted by examining the returns of high-volume stocks. 
This is also in line with what McQueen et al (1996) find, namely that small stocks 
tend to exhibit a temporal delay in their reaction to (marketwide) news vis-a.-vis 
large stocks when news is good and no delay (simultaneous reaction) when news 
is bad (what they call "directional asymmetry"). Hameed and Ting (2000) 
documented a significant positive relationship between returns from a contrarian 
strategy and volume for the Malaysian market; thus, contrarian profits from more 
liquid securities were found to be higher versus those from less liquid ones. 
Volatility: Another part of the volume-related research has centred its interest 
upon the relationship between volume and price volatility; as Karpoff (1987) has 
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indicated in his paper, this relationship has been found to be positive, a fact that 
has been denoted by a large amount of studies. Bae, Ito and Yamada (2002) fmd 
similar results when conducting a microdata study of the Japanese market as do 
Chan and Fong (2000) who test the relation of various volume-proxies (trade-size, 
trade-number and order-imbalance) with volatility. 
Behavioural issues: Using a large micro-database (over 730,000 individual 
investors' accounts) Barber et al (2003) find among other things that individual 
investors in the US have the propensity to buy stocks with abnormally high 
trading volume as well as high past returns. The authors utilize the attention-
grabbing effect in their attempt to interpret their results: hence, high trading 
volume captures investors' attention and guides them towards certain stocks. One 
reason, as the authors posit, is the buy-sell asymmetry; when investors wish to sell 
a stock, they make this choice out of a limited number of stocks already in their 
portfolio; however, when it comes to purchasing a new stock, the choice of it may 
have to be made from a larger universe of stocks. It is in this case that volume 
may be used as an indicator for stock-picking (high volume stocks enjoy more 
coverage, as they are reported through the financial press). 
Barber and Odean (2003) used a proportional micro-database (727,000 
individual investor accounts and 43 professional money managers' accounts) and 
reported similar results for the trading behavior of individual investors in the US. 
Statman et al (2004) find that individual security turnover is positively 
related to past (market and security) returns, with the impact of a market return 
shock (defined as being equal to one-standard deviation) bearing an effect over 
future volume for up to six months in the US. The case of volume rising after high 
past market returns is explained here through the concept of overconfidence that 
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was mentioned in the beginning: high past returns (thus, higher gains) may lure 
more investors into the market, thus fueling the volume of trade. 
Our discussion above has, thus illustrated that the volume of trade 
constitutes a variable capable of allowing investors extra insight into the 
behaviour of securities' prices. Even though other variables could be employed to 
proxy as indicators for the threshold-based strategy delineated previously, \ve 
argue that the choice of volume here satisfies our fundamental assumptions about 
the nature of our threshold-trader. Being a non-fundamental speculator, his aim is 
to time his feedback trading in order to potentially exploit noise trader activity 
without relying upon fundamental information. In this respect. we believe that 
volume constitutes a legitimate proxy, as it is a variable of non-fundamental 
content capable of capturing behavioural traits of potential noise trader activity 
(Barber et aI, 2003; Barber and Odean, 2003; Statman et aI, 2004). 
3.4 Hypotheses 
Given the above, we formally state our hypotheses: 
1. threshold traders are found to exhibit discernible behavioural patterns 
(irrespective of statistical significance) across various rising volume 
levels 
) if threshold traders are, indeed found to exhibit discernible behaviour 
across various rising volume levels, th.:n there are specific rising 
volume le\'e!s at lrhich their presence becomes statistically significant 
3. if hypotheses 1 and 2 hold, then this can be attributed to the 
differences in the hl'terogeneil)' (and heterogeneity-related regulatory 
j~'([rllres) of each marker 
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4. threshold traders' behaviour changes across time as a result of {he 
changes in market-heterogeneity over time 
5. threshold traders are found to exhibit discernible and statistically 
significant behaviour during periods of extreme market events 
The first hypothesis states that in order for the threshold traders to be 
considered a distinctive group within a market, their presence must adhere to a 
certain pattern whenever the volume of trade exhibits a rise, regardless of its le\'el: 
how this "pattern" will be considered is something we shall refer to in more detail 
in the next section. Suffice to say for the moment that this hypothesis tries to 
identify the general behavioural direction of threshold trading. It is also in line 
with the "informational" and "behavioural" aspects of volume discussed 
previously, according to which volume can provide extra insight into price 
movements and, as such, may be utilized as an ancillary variable for trading 
purposes. 
The second hypothesis tries to identify whether threshold traders become 
statistically significant at certain rising volume levels (assuming their trading 
exhibits a discernible behavioural direction). The idea here is quite 
straightforward: if hypothesis 1 is confirmed and threshold traders are found to 
exhibit uniformity in their behaviour, then it is reasonable to assume that this 
uniformity presents itself significantly at specific (rising) volume le\'ds. 
The third hypothesis explores \\'hether the findings of the first t\\'o 
hypotheses can be attributed to the differences in the regulatory framework of 
each market and, concurrently, its heterogeneity. 
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The fourth hypothesis investigates whether intertemporal differences in a 
market's heterogeneity (as reflected through investors' composition) can be 
associated with differences in the behaviour of threshold traders over time. 
Finally, the fifth hypothesis states that threshold traders' behaviour during 
periods of extreme events is reflecting a pattern that is both distinctive (see 
Hypothesis 1 above) as well as statistically significant. The idea here is simple: 
extreme events are associated with high volatility and, as mentioned previously 
there is a positive relationship between volatility and the volume of trade (see 
Section 3.3.2). Since threshold traders are designated to be trading anytime their 
volume-based indicator signifies the presence of rising volume, it would be 
interesting to see if their behaviour exhibits any distinctive pattern during those 
volatile periods. 
3.5 Market-heterogeneity: which markets and why 
We mentioned previously that the threshold-traders' hypothesis shall be 
examined in markets with differences in their "heterogeneity" and we identified 
the latter term with the composition of investors in each market. We shall now 
present evidence related to the degree of heterogeneity inherent in three markets, 
namely Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. These are the markets for which 
we will be testing the presence of threshold traders and we deem it appropriate to 
explain: a) why we selected them and b) how they differ among themselves both 
in terms of the regulatory provisions that impact upon market-heterogeneity as 
well as in terms of market-heterogeneity itself. 
\\'e \\ill begin by explaining \vh1' \ve chose to \H)rk with Asian markets .. \ 
number of studies (Koutmos and Saidi, 2001: Richards. 2005) have shown that 
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Asian markets in general (these three markets included) accommodate substantial 
positive feedback trading. If so, then the potential for trend-chasing and its 
concurrent exploitation is existent; since threshold traders are desianated to be ~ 
"trading-on-the-trend" we consider the focus on this region' s stock markets to be 
justified. 
The fundamental reason related to the selection of those three markets is 
the array of their differences in terms of heterogeneity and heterogeneity-related, 
regulatory features. We shall begin first by providing a brief description of 
market-heterogeneity as a term. 
We have already noted that we identify market-heterogeneity with the 
composition of investors in a market. The composition itself is usually based upon 
the identity (individual/institutional) and the origin (indigenous/overseas) of 
market participants. Investors' composition is calculated here on the basis of 
turnover-value, i.e. using proportions of the value (in $USD) of the total annual 
turnover activity. The choice of turnover-value as a proxy here was made in order 
to enumerate the presence of various investor-types through their active 
participation in the trading process, not their equity-holdings (i.e. market 
capitalization); another reason related to the fact that investors' composition 
(when available) is mostly given in terms of turnover-value. 
However, the problem of comparability among markets with respect to 
their heterogeneity arises. How can \ve establish, for example, \vhether one market 
is more "het~rogcneous"' than another? To that end, we link the "dcgr~~" of 
heterogeneity of a market to the percentage of overseas im'estor/6 o\'~r time, The 
/6 In practicl', till' bulk (90% or more) of ()\'erscas traders' participation, as Table 3.1 indIL'att's, is 
of institutional origin. 
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reason for it is that (as will be shown shortly) those traders are the ones most 
affected by regulatory restrictions related to market-entry and/or trading conduct 
and as a result, changes in those restrictions over time are assumed to be related to 
changes in their participation-levels. 
The institutional features we are investigating here as relevant to market-
heterogeneity pertain to specific regulatory provisions, namely: entry restrictions, 
investment restrictions, tax -provisions, as well as market frictions (e .g. price 
limits). Such restrictions place limits on the entry and the trading conduct, 
especially of foreign investors, thus reducing their scope for activity in a market-
and, consequently, limiting its heterogeneity. 
We will explore threshold trading in those three markets within a time-
window corresponding to a period following the "opening'~ of those markets to 
overseas investors; we chose the period commencing on May 2nd 1995 and ending 
on December 31 st 2003 (as shall be denoted later, this choice was also related to 
data availability). We argue that the coexistence of multiple trader-types in a 
market is a function of its heterogeneity, the latter being the byproduct of a 
market's regulatory framework. Since our hypothetical threshold traders 
constitute a testable "extra" trader-type, it would be interesting to examine its 
presence across three markets with different regulatory structures (and, as a result. 
degrees of heterogeneity) during a period of ongoing financial liberalization for 
them. 
To gain a better picture of the differences in the regulatory features that 
affect the heterogeneity of each market, we shall now present a brief oven'iew of 
those features for each of the three markets during the 1995-2003 period. 
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Table 3.1: Investors' composition for Hong Kong, S. Korea and Taiwan (% of market trading value) 
Types of 
investors!) Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
~ 
UK 33 34 53 41 45 49 36 32 30 
Local SK 63 66 69 72 72 66 66 64 57 
individuals TW 91.93 89.25 90.73 89.73 88.23 86.1 84.41 82.3 77.84 
UK 33 26 20 22 18 18 19 24 28 
Local SK 19 15 12 8 13 12 10 9 11 
institutions TW 6.69 8.62 7.55 8.63 9.36 10.27 9.69 10.05 11.51 
UK 28 30 19 31 30 28 38 35 35 
Overseas SK 9 11 13 14 10 17 19 21 26 
institutions TW 1.37 2.12 1.71 1.62 2.4 3.62 5.89 6.68 9.41 
HK 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 2 ./ 
Overseas SK 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 
individuals TW 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97 1.24 
Sources: Ho, R. Y. w., Strange, R. and PIe sse, J.: "The Structural and instltutlOnal Features ofThe Hong Kong Stock 
Market: ImplicationsJor Asset Pricing", Working Paper, King's College London, Department of Management, 2002; Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange Factbook 2003; Korean Stock Exchange, Taiwan Stock Exchange. NB.: The proportion of turnover-
value attributable to other trader-types (e.g. members' principal trading) is not included here, as we wish to focus on the 
major categories oj market participants (foreign-local, individual-institutional); thus. the sum of each trader-type's 
percentagesJor each marketfor each year may not equal 100%. Abbreviations: HK = Hong Kong, SK = South Korea. TW 
= Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Investors did not face price limits, trading halts or circuit breakers when 
trading in the Hong Kong market during the 1995-2003 period (Ho et ai, 2002). 
Brokerage fees represented a minimum of approximately 0.250/0 of transaction 
value; since April 2003 they became freely negotiable (Ho et aI, 2002); neither 
capital gains nor personal dividends were taxed. 
Overseas investors did not face any entry restrictions with regards to 
capital flows or foreign exchange transactions (Chui and Wei, 1998) when 
deciding to trade in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE, hereafter). As a 
result, one would expect to encounter a substantial proportion of foreign investors 
in Hong Kong; Table 3.1 is indicative of this. 
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According to this table, overseas investors accounted, on average, for 33% 
of the total turnover value of the HKSE for the 1995-2003 period; subtracting 
their (relatively minuscule) individual component, we find that the average 
proportion of overseas institutional traders during that period was equal to nearly 
310/0. When the total institutional component of the HKSE is taken into account, 
we find that, on average, during that period, it accounted for 53.5% of the total 
turnover value (local individuals accounted, on average, for 39% of the total 
turnover value during that period). As a result, the HKSE included a substantial 
institutional (overseas, by majority) component in its investors' population over 
the entire period. 
No restrictions are known to have been imposed to overseas traders (or 
any other trader-type for that purpose) with regards to the conduct of trade. Short-
selling has officially been allowed since January 3rd 1994 (11 th and 15th Schedules 
of the Rules Regulations and Procedures of the HKSE Ltd)l7 and is applicable to 
stocks specifically designated by the HKSE whose list is updated periodically. 
Although most Asian markets l8 impose restrictions on short-sales, this does not 
seem to be the case with Hong Kong. 
South Korea 
Price limits were applied in the Korean market; during the 1995-2003 
period, the trading band for each stock was set to ± 12 percent (± 15 percent since 
September 1998). Trading halts and circuit breakers \\'ere also provided by the 
market's regulation. Securities' transaction tax was around 0.3% of the sales' 
J7 Source: HI\SE websih' (http:! \\'\\'w.hkex.com.hkJ 
/8 St!t! ,\lorgan Stanley's rlporr htrc' lI"l\·wot..'cdorgidataoecd 5/-13 1"-165550 ref/ 
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proceeds. Brokerage comnllSSlOns were estimated to be around 0.4% of the 
transaction's value on average for off-line and 0.1 % for on-line transactions. 
Capital gains taxes applied only when the investor was a non-individual (i.e. 
corporate/institutional entity), while dividend-taxes were applied to all investors 19. 
For a foreign trader to transact, registration with the Financial Supervisory 
Service was required in order to obtain an Investment Registration Certificate20 
with an ID-number. To further be able to trade, he needed to designate a standing 
proxy as well as open an account with a local securities' firm. Overseas investors 
were subject to certain ownership limits regarding their aggregate investments 
within the 1995-2003 period; these, however, were subject to gradual increase21 
and since May, 25 1998 have virtually been abolished, with the exception of 
specified limits of investment in certain industries deemed of strategic 
importance22 for which ad hoc laws had been passed. Short-sales were allowed (as 
part of rules on margin trading) only to individual investors subject to 
restrictions23 ; foreigners were not allowed to engage in margin transactions. 
Given the above, we expect the number of overseas investors in the 
Korean market to be rising during the 1995-2003 period as a number of 
19 For more information, see the 2002-(p.63) and 2004-(p.63) Reports as well as the 2002-(p.45-
46) and 2003-(p.49) Fact Books of the Korean Stock Exchange. 
20 Resident traders of non-Korean nationality were e:temptedfrom this requirement. 
11 Separate ownership limits existed for each overseas investor individually and for overseas 
investors as a group. For more information, see the 2002-(pp.59-60) and 2004-(pp.61-62) Reports 
of the Korean Stock Exchange. 
]] These industries (Electricity, Telecommunications, Broadcasting, Airlines and Tobacco) 
allowed foreign investors to maintain a maximum percentage of their shares outstanding; the 
percentage for each foreign investor ranged between J% and 15% (for many companies no data 
on those ceilings of investment were available), while for foreign investors as a group it ranged 
between 15% and 49.99%. For more information, see the 2002-(pp.59-60) and 2004-(pp.61-62) 
Reports of the Korean Stock Exchange. 
23 For more information, see the 2002-(p.31) Report as well as the 2002-(p.25) and 2003-(p. 28) 
Fact Books of the Korean Stock Exchange. 
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restrictions have been gradually relaxed. Table 3.1 24 is indicative of this· as the , 
table shows, resident individual investors maintained a clear majority in the value 
of transactions (on average, 66% between 1995 and 2003). The corresponding 
figures for foreign (most of whom institutional (Choe et aI, 2004) investors and 
local institutional investors were 16% and 12%, respectively, with foreign 
investors becoming more active especially after year 2000. A series of microdata-
based studies related to the Korean market (Yung and Innwon, 2000; Kim and 
Wei, 2002a; Kim and Wei, 2002b; Chae and Lewellen, 2004; Choe et al, 2004; 
Richards, 2005) indicate a strong propensity towards positive feedback trading on 
behalf of institutional investors in that market. 
Taiwan 
Price limits were applied in the Taiwanese market during the 1995-2003 
period; the upper limit remained fixed throughout the period at +7%, while the 
lower limit exhibited certain fluctuations: it equaled -7% until 27/911999, -3.5% 
until 911011999, reversed to -7% until 20/3/2000, then back to -3.5% until 
114/2000 and (back again) to -7% afterwards. Securities' transaction tax was 
around 0.3% of the sales' proceeds. Brokerage commissions were estimated to be 
around 0.14% of the transaction's value on average. Capital gains taxes were non-
existent, while dividends were subject to a withholding tax25 • 
Overseas investors were subject to entry restrictions during the 1995-2003 
period. According to the regulations regarding foreign investment in 1995, foreign 
institutional investors who met certain requirements (Qualified Foreign 
].I The proportions of investor-types was derived using back-of-the-envelope calculations from the 
data of the buy/sell transactions (value) for separate investor categories; the data was retrieved 
from the website of the Korean Stock Exchange. 
15 For more information. see the 2003-(p.43-44) Fact Book of the Taiwan Slack Exchange. 
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Institutional Investors-QFIIs) could invest directly any amount between 5 and 200 
million $USD; investments on behalf of QFIIs were subject to "ceilings" (QFIIs 
as a group could not invest more than 3 billion $USD; their investments could not 
represent more than 12% of shareholder-ownership in aggregate and 6% 
individually)26, Foreign individuals and foreign corporations were allowed to 
invest in the market directly only after March 1996; their investment ceiling was 
defined as equal to 5 million $USD annually, while the ceiling for QFIIs was 
raised on that year to 400 million $USD as were their ownership limits (to 25% 
for shareholder-ownerhip in aggregate and 10% individually). Restrictions also 
applied with regards to specific industries27; what is more, foreign investors were 
not allowed to engage in short-selling28 . As of 2003, the government promised to 
abolish the QFII-system to allow for greater flexibility in foreign participation, 
while a new categorization imposed allowed for the classification of foreign 
investors into four categories contingent upon their status (foreign institutional 
versus overseas Chinese and foreign individual) and their residence (onshore 
versus offshore). Relevant investment limits apply; overseas Chinese and foreign 
individuals are not allowed to invest more than 5 million $USD, while there exist 
limits for foreign institutional investors only if they are "onshore" (50 million 
$USD). 
Table 3.1 depicts the proportions of investors of various types over the 
1995-2003 period based upon the annual turnover-value. Given the previous 
discussion regarding investment limits, we would expect foreign investors to 
26 Source: http://w .. rn·.duke.edul-charveylCountryrisk!chronology/taiwan.htm 
27 Ceilings for foreign ownership in brackets: Cement and Minerals (50%), Shipping (one-third), 
Inland Transportation (foreign investment not aI/owed) and Utilities (~49.99%). 
28 The discussion so far is based on evidence documented in the website of the Taiwanese Stock 
Exchange. 
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constitute a small part of the total investors' population. Indeed, as the table 
shows, domestic individual investors represented, on average, approximately 87% 
of the total turnover value; the corresponding proportions for domestic 
institutional and foreign (institutional, in their supreme majority) traders were 9% 
and 4% on average, although one should also note that overseas institutional 
participation seems to be rising after year 2000. According to a number of 
micro data-based studies (Yang, 2002; Lin, 2003) investors in Taiwan engage in 
feedback trading although there seems to be little agreement as to its direction 
among various investor types. Domestic individual traders do not seem to be able 
to exploit their dominant position; Lee et al (2003) and Barber et al (2004) find 
that they are noise traders who incur losses when transacting with their 
institutional counterparts. 
Having presented the three markets, we shall now attempt to provide a 
brief comparative picture of them on the grounds of market-heterogeneity and the 
regulatory features relevant to it, as presented thus far (a summary of what follows 
can be found in Table 3.2). 
Entry restrictions: First of all, given our previous discussion, it is evident 
that of all the three markets, it is Hong Kong that appears to be the most liberal 
one in terms of entry restrictions for foreign traders. Contrary to Hong Kong, the 
other two markets are typified by a number of barriers related to the entry of 
foreign investors. Nevertheless, one should note that the other two markets 
(especially the Korean one) have undergone some major regulatory reforms 
throughout the 1990s that have rendered them more open to overseas investment. 
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Table 3.2: A summary ofthe heterogeneity-related regulatorv features of Hong Kong. South Korea and 
Taiwan 
Regulatory 
features 
related to Markets Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
heterogeneity ~ 
~ 
Overseas Overseas traders: 
investors: QFII; new 
individual and categorization of 
Entry restrictions None group quotas as of2003; 
(terminated after investment-
May 1998); ceilings; individual 
industry-specific and group quotas 
investment ceilings 
remain 
Institutional 
traders not 
Short-selling allowed to sell Overseas traders 
Investment restrictions allowed only on ad short,' overseas not allowed to sell 
hoc designated traders not short 
stocks allowed to engage 
in margin 
transactions 
Price-limits, 
Trading restrictions None reported circuit-breakers, Price-limits 
trading-halts 
Capital-gains tax 
applicable to non-
Tax-provisions No capital-gains- individual traders; No capital-gains 
or dividend-taxes dividend-tax tax; dividend-tax 
applicable to all existent 
traders 
Transactions costs 0.25% of Approx. 0.4% of 
(expressed here as transaction-value transaction-value Approx. 0.14% of 
brokerage fees) (until April 2003) (0.1 % for online transaction-value 
transactions) 
Sources: see Section 3.5 
Investment restrictions: When it comes to restrictions regarding the trading 
conduct, Hong Kong maintains its characteristic as the most '"liberal" of the three 
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markets in our sample, as no material barriers to the conduct of trade for any type 
of investors have been documented. In comparison, South Korea and Taiwan 
retain a series of restrictions regarding the mode of trade, especially that of 
foreign investors. 
Tax-provisions: Regarding taxation, the provisions related to it are found 
to be substantially less in Hong Kong (no capital gains' or dividends' tax) 
compared to South Korea and Taiwan. 
Heterogeneity: With regards to the composition of investors, again here 
we note the apparent difference between Hong Kong and the other two markets; 
Hong Kong is characterized by an average majority of institutional (mostly 
foreign) investors, while South Korea and Taiwan maintain a dominant 
(indigenous) individual component29 . 
Therefore, our analysis has shown us that the degree of heterogeneity of a 
market (as measured by the proportion of overseas trading volume) seems to be a 
positive function of the degree of market liberalization. Hong Kong appears to be 
the most "heterogeneous30" (and "liberal") of the three markets; Taiwan still 
maintains substantial restrictions regarding overseas investors while South Korea 
has undertaken significant liberalization measures and can be assumed (in a 
schematic sense) to stand in-between Hong Kong and Taiwan in terms of 
heterogeneity31. 
19 However, it is worth noting that the overseas component is growing in all three markets from 
year 2000 onwards. Whether this is due to the relatively low prices in those markets in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis (1997) that promptedforeign traders to (re-)invest in the region is not 
something we can be assertive about; all the same, though, it remains a possible explanation. 
30 With the highest average overseas trading volume (approx. 3J%)-see previous section. 
3/ Note here that the discussion pertains to the 2/5/ J 995-3 J / J 2/2003 period; as a result, post-2003 
changes are not taken into account. 
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The rationale for testing the relation between threshold tradina and market 
e 
heterogeneity (as a function of a market's institutional settings), thus becomes 
more apparent in view of the above discussion. Threshold trading per se 
constitutes a version of feedback trading and, as such, is expected to e\:hibit 
certain differences across markets with different institutional settings. This is 
because the latter have the potential of influencing feedback trading patterns 
through their entry/trading restrictions (which mostly tend to affect foreign 
traders). 
A market where overseas traders are subject to entry-quotas renders the 
practice of any type of feedback trading (indeed, trading itself, in general) on their 
behalf problematic, since a foreign trader who wishes to feedback-trade in such a 
market may not be able to do so due to entry- (if the entry-quota for foreign 
investors has already been filled) or trading-restrictions (he may not be able to 
trade because the price limit for the day has been '"hit"). Another reason as to why 
he may not be able to trade is because short-selling may be proscribed in that 
market32. If short-selling is not allowed, the very practice of threshold trading is 
compromised, as threshold traders will be unable to sell when the threshold's 
violation indicates a sell-signal. With respect to short-sales, we would like to note 
here that they constitute an important element in the trading process, since they 
allow for the expression of the '"pessimistic" part of the investors' population (see 
Miller, 1977; Gervais et aI, 2001). In other words, if investors are not allo\\'ed to 
sell short an imbalance is bound to arise, as the "sell-force" of the market \yill be 
deprived of a trading tool; as this implies a rise in the significance of the "buy-
J: Alost Asian markets mail1{,Jin severt! restrictions O\'er short-selling; see the the predous mention 
to A'forgan Stanter 's report on {ilL' rt!gion 
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force", the possibility of a mispricing (upwards) increases. If threshold traders 
cannot sell short (in accordance with their threshold-indication), then obviously 
there is little point in using it. Thus, any restrictions on short-sales impede the 
expression of wider heterogeneity in the market, as part of it is not able to trade in 
a way consistent with its beliefs. 
Thus, institutional restrictions have the potential of reducing the scope for 
the uninhibited practice of feedback trading. Although the practice of certain 
"stylized" (i.e. adaptive to market-specific conditions) feedback strategies33 
cannot be overruled, we contend that liberal market environments are expected to 
be more conducive to the practice of different types of feedback trading, by 
allowing for wider market participation. As a result, threshold trading, being 
feedback in its essence, may as well be exhibiting differences in its presence 
across markets with different institutional settings, as well as within the same 
market across time as its structure is subject to regulatory reforms. 
3.6 Methodology and Data 
3.6.1 Methodology 
In order to test for threshold trading, we use the modified Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) model; recall that, according to the specification defined in 
equation (10): 
33 If a market operates under price limits, then a feedback trader might devise a tradi~g str~tegy 
such that it would allow him to take advantage of these limits. Price limits make It easier to 
"programme" pre-specified profit-levels, since the price-range for each day is pre-defined. If the 
upper price limit, for example, is set at 5%, the market is experiencing a~ up~ard trend and a 
feedback trader would like to realize profits of, say 20 %, all he has to do IS wa.'t for at leas~ fo~r 
days before he sells. This way, his feedback trading is conditioned upon a certam target, which In 
turn is conditioned upon the movements of prices within a specific price-band. 
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According to the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model Y
J 
= -() r (implying that, 
if Y1 is negative, the sign of feedback trading is positive) and according to our 
substitution in (10) r 2 = - () A. (implying also that if Y 2 is negative, the sign of the 
feedback trading of threshold investors is positive). Thus, we are testing for the 
null hypothesis, namely that Y 2 = 0 (i.e. there are no threshold traders) versus the 
alternative one that Y 2 '* 0 (there are threshold traders). We shall also be referring 
to the results of the feedback (Y1) coefficient in order to see if there is any 
association between its results and the results of the threshold coefficient (as both 
of them relate to the same feedback demand function). 
The conditional variance a} is modeled here as an EGARCH-process 
(Nelson, 1991, Brooks, 2002): 
EGARCH allows for asymmetric responses of volatility to positive and negative 
shocks, since if the volatility-returns relationship is negative, IfI will be negative 
as we1l34• As standardized residuals from GARCH-models tend to exhibit signs of 
leptokurtosis, we estimate the EGARCH-model by assuming a Generalized Error 
Distribution (OED). 
The indicator upon which thresholds are calculated in our tests originates 
from technical analysis. Our threshold traders-given their demand function-are, in 
J-I The EGARCH falls within a large family of GARCH volatility-measures allowing for 
asymmetric effects of volatility. The asymmetric effect relates to the situation where volatility 
exhibits larger increases for negative returns compared to (equally large) positive returns. Such a 
fact has been associated with leverage-effects at the corporate level (Brooks, 2002), since large 
price declines would be expected to inflate the debt-equity ratio. For more on this, see Kasch-
Haroutounian and Price (2001). 
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essence, feedback traders and, as such, trade on the basis of past prices. Feedback 
trading, as an umbrella-term, covers technical analysis35; consequently, the fact 
that threshold traders associate feedback trading with technical thresholds cannot 
be considered inconsistent. Having said that, we, by no means imply that 
threshold traders are technical traders, necessarily. It could as well be the case that 
they are informed traders capitalizing on the technical heuristics widely available 
to the public with the purpose of exploiting them-and the public. 
The technical indicator upon which the grounds of our threshold trading 
hypothesis are tested is called volume-ratio (VR) and is calculated by dividing the 
volume of trade by its moving average. The purpose of this ratio is to measure the 
amount of volume relative to its historical moving average, thus inferring the 
magnitude of its increase / decrease over time. It follows that: VR = V / MA, 
where VR is the ratio's value, V is the volume of trade and MA is the 
corresponding moving average of the volume. 
An issue here arises regarding the calculation of the movmg average. 
Technical analysts employ a variety of moving average specifications, such as 
simple, exponential, triangular, variable, weighted, adaptive, and endpoint moving 
averages. Here, we test for the significance of threshold traders on the basis of 
volume-ratios whose mOVIng averages in the denominator follow two 
specifications, namely simple and exponentia136. The employment of two 
specifications hinges upon the fact that the very specification itself might bias the 
35 Given the almost mystical properties that technical analysis attributes to past prices regarding 
their predictive ability it has also come to be known as "voodoo finance " (see Westerhoff, 2006). 
36 These are the two specifications that appear with greater frequency in technical analysis 
sources. The fol/owing technical analysis websites were consulted in order to construct our 
volume-thresholds: hJlI) .·-:/WlI'w.slockchclrts. c',1J1!,hflp.· //trading-stocks. netfirms. com';/lftp. . 'Wn'\\, ImJlso{t,com.', 
hllp:/lwww. markelscreen. com:; htro:/i'www. equ is. com-'. http::/www,incredlblecharls.com. 
hllp:/!www.l(!doc.org, www.prophet.llet. 
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results, i.e. a market might for some reason generate significant results for one 
specification and not for another. 
A brief note on the moving average construction follows. 
-Simple Moving Average: it represents the mean value of a variable for a 
gIven number of periods over time. A volume-ratio whose moving average 
component is of this specification will be called simple volume-ratio, will be 
denoted as VR and will be followed by a number, designating the number of 
periods (in our case, days) for which it is calculated. 
-Exponential Moving Average: it is calculated as EMA(t) = [(V ALUE(t)-
EMA(t-I)] * Multiplier + EMA(t-I), where VALUE here stands for the value of 
the variable under study (i.e. trading volume) and the Multiplier is calculated as: 
[2/ (Time Periods37 + I)] 
A volume-ratio whose moving average component is of this specification 
will be called exponential volume-ratio, will be denoted as EVR and will be 
followed by a number, designating the number of periods (in our case, days) for 
which it is calculated. 
We chose four different lengths of moving averages to work with, namely 
10, 20, 150 and 200 days. For the purpose of comparability as well as behavioural 
monitoring, we group volume ratios into two categories, namely "short" and 
"long" ones. More specifically, "short" volume ratios include moving averages of 
37 Time periods for which the moving average is calculated. 
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10- and 20-days length, while "long" ones include moving averages of 150- and 
200-days length. We, thus test for two different versions of threshold traders , 
those using short and those using long volume ratios. 
We noted in a previous section (3.3.2) that threshold traders are designated 
to become active anytime the volume of trade exhibits a rise. In view of that, we 
test for the significance of threshold trading for volume ratio values in excess of 
1.0, i.e. when the volume of the previous day (t-1) is above its contemporaneous 
(at time t) moving average; the latter implies a rise in the level of volume with 
respect to its underlying moving average. Thus, "rising" volume levels are 
associated here with those volume levels for which the volume of trade is above its 
moving average. We also test for ratio-values 0.5 times apart (i.e. lagged volume 
being 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 and so on times greater than its contemporaneous moving 
average38) in order to test for the consistency of threshold traders' behaviour 
across various rising volume levels (above the underlying moving average) in 
accordance with our first hypothesis. For brevity reasons, we shall be referring to 
the various volume ratio values we will be testing for as "ranks". 
To visualize both the concept of those "ranks" and the evolution of a given 
volume ratio over time, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide us with the plots of the 20-
and 200-day simple volume ratios for Hong Kong during the sample period 
(2/5/1995 - 31/12/2003). Table 3.3 provides us with some descriptive statistics 
38 The rationale of the tests here is as follows: by dividing the volume by its moving average, we 
get the time series of the volume ratio which we plot on a chart. We, then, scale. the chart-area/or 
VR-values of 0.5; if the highest observation of the VR on the plot crosses the lme ot say. 3.0 but 
does not reach the line of 3.5, we perform our tests only up to rank 3. O. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Hong Kong 20- and 200-davs Simple Volume 
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Ranks (of 
rising volume 
levels) 
Rank 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
Ratios (2/5/1995-31/12/2003) 
20-day VR 
2122 
1,019752187 
2,312575626 
0,260605697 
0,298210634 
0/0 of total 
Number of sample 
Observations 
1005 
148 
14 
observations 
0,473609802 
0,069745523 
0,006597549 
1,,'" 
--' 
200-day VR 
1942 
1,143904522 
4,053395487 
0,109380819 
0,600905068 
0/0 of total 
Number of sample 
Observations observations 
930 0,478887745 
442 0,227600412 
213 0,109680742 
69 0,035530381 
20 0,010298661 
4 0,002059732 
1 0,000514933 
I 
I 
with respect to the 20- and 200-day simple volume ratios on the premises of rising 
volume ratio ranks 0.5 times apart. 
As the table indicates, the number of observations decreases. as the rank 
grows. One might postulate that the higher volume ratio ranks correspond to 
volume-spikes related to high volume levels compared to the \'olume's historic 
average. 
We mentioned previously (Section 3.4) that we wish to test for the 
discernibility of threshold traders' behaviour across various rising volume levels 
(Hypothesis 1). The term discernibility refers here to the uniformity of the sign of 
the threshold coefficient across various "ranks" for each volume ratio category 
(short/long); since threshold traders operate on the basis of a feedback function, 
their sign can be either positive or negative (indicative of negative or positive 
feedback trading, respectively). Thus, discernibility here is associated, essentially, 
with the appearance of a consistent positive/negative threshold sign in all tests 
across all ranks for a specific category (short/long) of volume ratios. 
As far as Hypothesis 2 is concerned, we have to note the following. For a 
discernible threshold pattern to manifest itself significantly at a specific rank, its 
significance must be evident in, at least, three out four volume ratios of its 
category. This is because we would like to mitigate against possible length- or 
specification-biases, which would be the case, for example if: a) the threshold 
coefficient were to be significant for two volume ratios of that rank and b) both of 
them \vere of identical length/specification. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 shall be tested through the break-up of th\? full-sample 
period. in line \\ith these hypotheses' content. 
124 
We have already noted that the degree of a markeC s heterogeneity over 
time shall be denoted by the levels of overseas investors' participation. In 
conjunction with hypothesis 4, we test for the significance of the presem.c of 
threshold traders across sub-periods characterized by differences in market-
heterogeneity, as indicated by Table 3.1. The choice of sub-periods here adheres 
to a certain logic: the "cutoff' point is not traced at the beginning of the year at the 
end of which there appears to be a surge in the ranks of overseas investors, but 
rather at the beginning of the next year. The point here is to ensure that the period 
following this "cutoff' point involves a surge that exhibits continuity (i.e. 
perseveres during the following years). More specifically, \ve test for Hypothesis 
4 by assuming the following periods for each market: 
Hong Kong: 2/5/1995-31/12/2001, 1/1/2002-31/12/2003. According to 
Table 3.1, overseas investors exhibit a rather abrupt rise by year-end 2001. which 
continues until the end of our sample period. 
South Korea: 2/5/1995-31/12/2000, 1/1/2001-31/12/2003. According to 
Table 3.1, overseas investors exhibit a rather abrupt rise by year-end 2000, which 
continues until the end of our sample period. 
Taiwan: 2/5/1995-31/12/1999, 1/1/2000-31/1212003. According to Table 
3.1, overseas investors exhibit a slight rise by year-end 1999, which continues 
until the end of our sample period. 
With regards to Hypothesis 5. \ve chose the Asian crisis period as the 
proxy-period for extreme market events. We assume the \\"indo\\ bet\\cer 
2/7/1997-31112/1998 as the "in-crisis" window in line \vith Lin (2003) who also 
includes substantial referencing on the issue of this \\"indow-choice. Tests are 
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conducted for all three markets to evaluate the behaviour of threshold traders 
within this period, as well as before and after it. 
Finally, with regards to Hypotheses 4 and 5 we' would like to note that, in 
case we identify a discernible threshold pattern during a sub-period, the 
significance of which manifests itself at specific volume ratio ranks, we will 
perform Wald tests to assess the significance of the difference between the 
threshold coefficients in that period with those in the other period/s at those ranks. 
3.6.2 Data 
Our data relates to the all-shares' indices39 of Hong Kong (AOI), South 
Korea (KOSPI) and Taiwan (TAIEX); all data have been obtained from the 
DataStream database as well as from the respective websites of the 
aforementioned stock exchanges40 and involve daily observations of index closing 
prices and turnover by volume (number of shares traded). 
Data on market-specific investors' composition (Table 3.1) were retrieved 
from the respective websites of the three stock exchanges. 
Our sample covers the period between 2/511995 and 31112/2003 and 
corresponds to the post-liberalization era for Asian markets. This period allows us 
to examine threshold trading when the underlying market-heterogeneity tended to 
increase with financial liberalization (see also Holmes and Wong, 2001). Another 
issue relevant to our choice relates to the fact that data on investors' composition 
39 The choice of indices (and not, for instance, individual stocks) is due to the fact that the Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992) model has so far been tested only for market indices (be they all-shares or 
si=e-Isector-specijic) and, hence, in the interest of comparability with e.x:isting results it would be 
beller to test for similar data-types as well. 
40 Hong Kong: http://www.hkex.com.hklindex.htm, South Korea: http://sm.krx.co,krl, Taiwan: 
hltp:llwww.tse.com.twlchlindex.php. 
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was only available from 1995 onwards for Hong Kong and Taiwan and this 
prompted us to select this as the starting year of our sample. To ensure 
comparability among all three markets, we chose May 2nd 1995 to be our starting 
date, as volume-data for the Korean market were available after that date. 
3.6.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the daily index returns of the three markets are 
provided in Table 3.4. The statistics reported are the mean (~), the standard 
deviation (0'), measures for skewness (S) and kurtosis (K) and the Ljung-Box 
(LB) test statistic for ten lags. The skewness and kurtosis measures indicate 
departures from normality (returns-series appear significantly negatively skewed 
and highly leptokurtic). 
Rejection of normality can be partially attributed to temporal dependencies 
in the moments of the series. It is common to test for such dependencies using the 
Ljung-Box portmanteau test41 (LB) (see Bollerslev et aI., 1994). The LB-statistic 
is significant for the returns-series of Hong Kong and South Korea, but not 
Taiwan. This provides evidence of temporal dependencies in the first moment of 
the distribution of returns, due to, perhaps non synchronous trading or market 
inefficiencies. However, the LB-statistic is incapable of detecting any sign 
reversals in the autocorrelations due to positive feedback trading. It simply 
provides an indication that first-moment dependencies are present. Evidence on 
~J The LB-test is used to test for serial correlation in the residuals of a time series and is estimated 
on the premises of the following test-statistic: Qm = T(T + 2)L: = I (p(K)2 /(T - K), where Tis 
the sample size, p(k) is the autocorrelation at lag k and m is the number of lags being tested. The 
serial correlation hypothesis is accepted if Qm > X 21-a,m, where a is the significance level for 
which the test is undertaken on the basis of the chi-square distribution. 
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higher order temporal dependencies is provided by the LB-statistic when applied 
to squared returns. The LB-statistic is significant for the returns-series of all 
markets without exception. Moreover, it is, always higher than the LB-statistic 
calculated for the returns, suggesting that higher moment temporal dependencies 
are more pronounced. 
Table 3.4: Sample statistics: daily index returns (2/5/1995 to 31112/2003) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
J1 0.01861956882 -0.0052838901 0.00096167055 
(J 1. 63527552863 2.3020763828 1.726280737-1-1 
S -0.19281 *** -0.05891 -0.02285 
K 8.46232*** 2.61103*** 1.84935*** 
LB(lO) 37.90720324*** 34.38004325*** 14.91266-197 
LB2(lO) 747.708837*** 453.9265829*** 25-1.2939828*** 
(* - 10% SIgn. Level, ** = 5% sIgn. Level, *** = 1% SIgn. Level)./-l = mean, (1 = standard deVIatIOn, S = skewness, K = 
excess kurtosis, LB (n) and LBtn) are the Ljung-Box statistics/or returns and squared returns respectively distributed as 
chi-square with n degrees offreedom where n is number oflags 
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Threshold trading: Discernibility and statistical significance 
To provide ourselves with an initial picture of the presence of feedback 
trading in our three markets, we tested the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model 
in its original form for the 2/5/1995-31/12/2003 period; results are reported in 
Table 3.5. The coefficients describing the conditional variance process, OJ, ~, 'I' 
and K, are all statistically significant (1 % level) in all cases, with the exception of 
OJ in South Korea. Note also that 'I' is negative and statistically significant for all 
three markets, implying that negative innovations tend to increase volatility more 
than positive ones. The feedback coefficient is indicative of positive feedback 
trading in all three markets, significantly so in Hong Kong and Taiwan, yet not in 
South Korea. 
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We shall now present the results from our empirical tests of the Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992) model with threshold traders (hereafter, "modified"' 
Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model). Before we commence our discussion, we 
would like to note that each of the tables to follow shall effectively illustrate the 
Table 3.5: Maximum likelihood estimates ofthe original Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model 
Parameters Markets 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan ~ 
-
~ 
0.029321601 -0.060509119 -0.0663-18831 
a (0.029629286) (0.055912349) (0.033-14205-1) ** 
0.183243634 0.136500697 0.129452393 
ro (0.024166163)*** (0.031175545)*** (0.038837463) *. * 
-0.020242033 -0.005741185 -0.023993738 
rl (0.005395382)*** (0.004320923) (0.010330039)*** 
-0.007653401 0.008568138 0.022177797 
e (0.015727495) (0.014183904) (0.00506-1823) ... 
0.021951709 0.017639890 0.055621590 
OJ (0.006176947)*** (0.010959954) (0.02093-1652)· .. 
0.976095941 0.991268403 0.947689070 
~ (0.006853162)*** (0.006211526)*** (0.020612340)" *. 
-0.082021654 -0.036426920 -0.08-15-16356 
If (0.015821697)*** (0.013336760)*" (0.020084740)*** 
0.177961936 0.142391350 0.175576566 
K (0.023186226)*** (0.036036599) *** (0.037996758)"* 
(* = 10% sign. Level, ** = 5% sIgn. Level, *** - 1% sIgn. Level). Parentheses mclude the 
standard errors of the estimates; sample period: 2/5/1995-31/12/2003. 
'1 == a + (r 0 + rIO} ) '1_1 + eo} + &1 
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results from the modified model's tests regarding the feedback and the threshold 
coefficients only42; the white rows in each shall correspond to the feedback 
coefficient (Yl) results while the shaded ones to the threshold-coefficient (y 2 ) 
results of the modified Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model. 
As Tables 3.6 and 3.7 indicate, the feedback coefficient (Yl) appears to be 
overtly tilted towards positive feedback trading (its sign is found to be negative 
for all tests in all ranks for all volume ratios, be they short or long); its statistical 
significance manifests itself in Hong Kong43 and Taiwan44, while South Korea 
failed to provide us with significant results. The results for the feedback 
coefficient are in line with those documented previously from the tests with the 
original Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model. 
Hong Kong threshold traders appear to be adhering to a constant negative 
feedback trading pattern when we test for short volume ratios. Indeed, a quick 
inspection of Table 3.6 reveals that all threshold coefficient results are uniform in 
sign (positive); however, it is at rank 1.0 that the statistical significance of the 
threshold coefficient appears to be "clustering". At that rank, the threshold 
coefficient is statistically significant (5% level) for the VRI0, EVRI0 and the 
VR20. As a result, when short volume ratios are utilized, Hong Kong threshold 
traders exhibit a behaviorally discernible (negative feedback trading) pattern, 
which is found to be statistically significant at rank 1.0 (VRI0, EVRI0, VR20). 
n Reasons related to space-considerations prevent us from outlining the results for all coefficients 
for both the return as well as the conditional variance equation. Our intention here is to present 
results that shall: a) depict the overall feedback direction of each market's index and b) indicate 
the direction (positivelnegativefeedback) of threshold trading at various volume ratio ranks. 
~3 At the 1% level for short and at the 5% level for long volume ratios. 
~~ 10% level for both short and long volume ratios. 
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Since no statistical significance was encountered for the threshold 
coefficient at rank 1.5 for two (VR10, VR20) out of those three volume ratios we , 
ran further tests using the area between ranks 1.0 and 1.5 as a threshold; results 
revealed that the significance of the threshold coefficient documented above 
persisted within the area between ranks 1.0 and 1.5 for all three volume ratios. 
When long volume ratios were tested, Hong Kong provided us with no discernible 
threshold trading pattern45 , while evidence of statistical significance for the 
threshold coefficient appeared scant across our results (see Table 3.7). 
South Korean threshold traders do not adhere to any discernible 
behavioural pattern for either short or long volume ratios; their statistical 
significance is limited and mostly concentrated at the top ranks of both short and 
long volume ratios. Rank-specific patterns do arise; however, absent the one at 
rank 3.046 for long volume ratios (which provides us with a statistically 
significant-at the 50/0 level-positive feedback pattern), the rest (ranks 1.047 and 
1.548 for short and ranks 2.049 and 2.550 for long volume ratios) lack statistical 
significance (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7). 
Taiwanese threshold traders also do not demonstrate any discernible 
behavioural pattern across either short or long volume ratios, while their statistical 
significance is limited for short volume ratios and is mostly concentrated at the 
top ranks (3.0-3.5 51 ) of long volume ratios. Rank-specific patterns do arIse; 
45 Nevertheless, there appear to be certain rank-specific patterns (rank !.~: posi~ive/eedback 
trading; ranks 2.0 and above: negative feedback trading), albeit weakly statistically Significant. 
-16 Corresponding to the observation of the 16/1/1998. 
-17 All threshold coefficients indicative of positive feedback trading. 
-18 All threshold coefficients indicative of positive feedback trading. 
49 All threshold coefficients indicative of negative feedback trading. 
50 All threshold coefficients indicative ofpositive feedback trading. 
51 The observations corresponding to rank 3.0 of the long volume ratios in Taiwan are: 
VR150 (rank 3. 0):8/4/1996, 20/11/200/ and 26/1 11200 I. 
EVR150 (rank 3.0): 8/4//996 
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however, absent the ones at ranks 3.0 and 3.5 for long volume ratios (which 
provide us with a statistically significant-at the 5% level-positive feedback 
pattern), the rest (ranks 1.052 and 1.553 for short and ranks 1.554 and 2.055 for long 
volume ratios) lack statistical significance (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7). 
Thus, it appears that South Korea and Taiwan fail to reveal any 
discernible, behavioural pattern for threshold trading across all ranks for both 
short as well as long volume ratios and, as a result, we fail to accept the first and 
the second hypotheses for these two markets. Contrary to South Korea and 
Taiwan, a discernible behavioural (negative feedback) pattern surfaces in Hong 
Kong across all ranks of short volume ratios; this pattern becomes statistically 
significant at rank 1.0 and corresponds to a substantial number of our sample's 
observations (approximately 47% for rank 1.056, depending upon the volume 
ratio's length and specification). In other words, threshold traders in Hong Kong 
appear to be negative feedback trading anytime the volume of trade exceeds its 
10- and 20-day simple and exponential moving average. Consequently, we argue 
that the first and the second hypotheses can be accepted for the Hong Kong 
market. 
VR200 (rank 3.0): 8/4/1996 and 26/1 112001 
EVR200 (rank 3.0): 8/4/1996 
52 All threshold coefficients indicative of positive feedback trading. 
53 All threshold coefficients indicative of negative feedback trading. 
5~ All threshold coefficients indicative of negative feedback trading. 
55 All threshold coefficients indicative of positive feedback trading. . , 
56 Approximately 43% for the 1.0-1.5 area, depending upon the volume ratIO s length and 
specification. 
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3.7.2 Threshold trading and the differences in heterogeneity 
across markets 
Our analysis in Section 3.5 indicated that Hong Kong is the market \\iith the 
least heterogeneity-related, regulatory restrictions. Contrary to that. the other two 
markets imposed certain limits both in the entry and the trading practices of 
investors during the 1995-2003 period, with direct implications, especially upon 
the participation levels of overseas investors as summarized in Section 3.5. This 
means that, if a trader wished to implement the threshold-strategy, he would h~\"e 
to consider issues, like entry restrictions (e.g. amount of capital invested, 
investment ceilings) as well as trading restrictions (e.g. short-sales' prohibition, 
price-limits). 
Consequently, the regulatory framework in Hong Kong allows for minimal 
obstacles in the presence and activity of the threshold-trader type, thus providing 
it with the opportunity of pursuing its trading pattern without restrictions. As our 
results from the previous section indicated, when short volume ratios are used, 
Hong Kong threshold traders are found to exhibit a discernible pattern. whose 
statistical significance can be identified at certain volume ratio levels; since none 
of the other markets is reflective of any such pattern, this, by itself, provides us 
with the ground to accept the third hypothesis, namely that the possibility of 
associating the discernibility (and, concurrent, significance) of thre~hold trading 
across markets with differences in the regulatory framework (and. thus. 
heterogeneity) does exist. However, heterogeneity (much like a market's 
regulatory structure) is not something static; it evolves over time and it is this very 
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Table 3.6: Short volume ratio results (2/5/1995-31/12/2003) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 
-0.004317557 
(0.002609507)* 
0.610800061 
(0.307037990) •• 
-0.005688767 -0.004317557 
(0.004861589) (0. 002609507) * 
0.585889735 0.610800061 
(0.357065009) (0.307037990)** 
-0020-1011357 -0.020265903 -0.02064291-1 -0.005692825 -0.005689004 -0.004400 149 -0.0057-17//7 -0.023655688 -0.023956605 
(0. 0{)6111 ') 1 If) ••• (0005447789)·*· (0.006014149)*·* (0.004852827) (0.004477825) (0.0035371 73L J(j.004249100) {0.O079241841*** (0. 009991963L ** 
o 136625-123 0.009189075 0.334865593 0.579866975 0.585942526 -0.034874236 0.119873507 -0.05371-1390 0.053287623 
(0.1')0138945) (0.092259180) (0.195500010)* (0.325156977)* 1().3872 I 6620) (0.024778741) (0.015009904) *** (0.087336387) JO.268895088)_ 
-0021558590 -00208635')2 -0.021240809 -0.020285676 -0.005603016 -0.005481212 -0.005090-19 I -0.004735357 -0.024429524 -0.02461-1481 -0.024360955 -002-1751933 
(00067-11057)*** (0.00-l57308fi) ••• (0.005464027) •• * (0.006296628) *** (0004828571) (0.004467044) (0.004460538) (0.005019397) (0.008265823) *** (0.010098495) ** (0.009750489) ** (IJ (11155926)** 
0.013{)60366 0.009902276 0.004609185 0.000667621 -0.002878252 -0.008810003 -0.003878580 -0.014805294 0.045618420 0.066068929 0.005362490 0.02-1501768 
1().0182844251 (0004697133 J •• (0004201763) (0.015588193) (0.012805535) (0.0204143171 (0.0074805501 10.002103315)··* (0.022200902) •• (0.0371362521* (0.01717/415) (0. 021522494) 
-0.032347772 -0.031015279 -0.030671570 -0.022123051 -0.OU406506U -0.003775071 -0.004939905 -0.002588349 -0.020159350 -0.020502959 -0.019231297 -v 0]0')29343 
(0.0067 J 89 /3) ••• (0.006821223)**· (0006696880)*·· (0.006188894)*·· (0.004509887) 10.006018439) (0.006458492) (0.001855718) (0008917646)*· (0.012302297)* (0.011550892)· (0.012528507)* 
0 . ..017488896 ..0 . ..015567136 0.015525102 0.004159044 -0 . ..002266714 -..0.0..03..013498 -..0 . ..0..01253288 -..0.003972796 -0.00757-1255 -0.0062-13178 -00100756lf8 -0.005209349 
(..0006653..072) ••• (..0 . ..0067075..06)··· (0.006650089) •• (0.007039569) (0.005995069) (0.006358309) (0.004578797) (0.002531765) (0.0102-17//4) (O.OJJ614623) (0.01 1l07133) (0.010900253) 
White rows indicate the results for the feedback coeffiCIent, whtle the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coeffiCIent. Parentheses mclude the standard errors oj the 
estimates; sample period: 2/5//995-3///2/2003. (* = /0% sign. Level, .. = 5% sign. Level, .** = /% sign. Level). 
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Table 3.7: Long volume ratio results (2/5/1995-31112/2003) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VR150 EVR150 VR200 EVR200 VR150 EVR150 VR200 EVR200 VR150 EVR150 VR200 
-0.020224428 -0.005216066 -0.005550517 -0.000060257 -0.0230-13-1·1-1 -0.0230-12517 -0.0230-12517 
(0.006207679)··· (0003786-196) (0.00-1535725) (0.000283692) (0.006272290)*·· (0.008039524)*·· (0.00803952-1) ... 
0.232901794 -0.09942112-1 -0.017734683 -0.10572-1371 -0.359807582 -0.359812664 -0.359812664 
(0.241600030) (0.009709830) ••• (0.022608563) (0.040744646) ••• (0.096484663) .... (0./19818-133) ..... (0.1/98/8433)"· 
-0.020774312 -0.020300411 -0.020467309 -0.006162079 -0.0025/9419 -0.005510534 -0.005243669 -0.023473140 -0.0230425/7 -0.023/0255/ 
(0.005230/25)*·· ((j.005433727) ••• (0.006226-1961··· j(J.00/533449)··· (0.003/88880) (0.0044-11737) (0.004664356) (0.0/ /86635/)·· (0.00803952-1) .... (0.0//55//89)" 
0124384987 0.009217899 0.014726555 -0.0-18101482 -0.1025/3165 -0.005/90562 -0.04800-1272 -0.2/47/7306 -0.359812664 -0.2605599/2 
(0. /20-1833/6) 10.053/26470) (0.0595/738"l ((J.0/565978-1)*·· (0.023847021)··· (0.007318812) (0.0/9377953) •• (0.093256191)" (0.1198/8433)··· (0. /22553805)"· 
-0.0210/299/ -0.020484568 -0.020832561 -0.020902250 -0.005085329 -0.005515472 -0.005082067 -0.005615733 -0.02386216-1 -0.02396-1976 -0.023881707 
(0.006253974)·" (0.008682314)·· (0.00385996/)··· .(00055530521··· J(J.004577830) (0.004946409) (0004561930) (000-16-12/53) (0.009945955)·· (0.007302231)"~ (0 OO'.J6802IU)·· 
0.04226/052 0.0/6497022 0.03/923913 0.039425093 -0.0075483/7 -0.003411402 -0.006655736 -0.002038559 -0.02/679956 0.000611353 -0.019-113-114 
(0.025609/ /7)· (0.092680/591 10.0297624261 (0.0383352 781 (0.0/4372552) (0.014771343) (0.003223323) .... (0 004885/89) (0.061345759) (0. / /5483503) (11.0524529811) 
-
-0.0205 I / 139 -0.020792683 -0.020389916 -0.020812556 -0.00/90938/ -0.0077/7531 -0.005929529 -0.006574440 -0.023985343 -0.023983085 -0.023996625 
(0.005655149)·" (0.006050549),,·· _((J. 0047972/6) ••• (0.0063/8630) .. •• (0.000437607) ••• (0.004024943)· (0.005198825) (000-1974795) (0.010396280) •• (0.0090316-17)·" • (O.0{},)563562) •• 
0.050764194 0.03888/950 0.026957230 0.039082786 0.000966062 0.0078199-10 0.00066'i('74 0.0033-11744 -0.002359397 -0.0130804/7 -(J.()02913603 
(0.028654284) • J(J.030868663) (0.025965833) (0.031751423) (0.000777782) (0.008852163) (0.00684)110) (0.0070-1041/) (0.03011644-1) (0.044103734) (I) (40554624) 
-00199194-13 -0.020659073 -0.019854677 -0.019924018 -0.009519872 -0.006326986 -0.008308849 -0.005146075 -0.023/55850 -0.025298964 -00240134-19 
{O. 004 1 77378)··· (0.005774637)··· (0.005405273) ••• (0.005594481) ... (0.00606998 I) (0.006046908) (0006076085) (0.007840998) (0.0/0227894)" (0.009528733) ...... (I! OOW/7455) .... 
-0.005658470 0.012065037 -0.010873948 -0.0067368/2 0.006681759 0.O()1067100 0.004391993 -0.001086/92 -0.023334367 -0.031367128 -00/2853554 
(0.015994705) (0.0196659691 (0.015453667) (0.019835542) (0.006306890) (0.006300038) (0.005312719) (0.004005947) (0.0/4330073) (0.0/7763035)" (0013139180) 
-0.01931/813 -0.017476491 -0.018167934 -0.017476066 -0.009163')57 -0006391229 -0.005616078 -().008258309 -0.025087027 -0.025116884 -0021112315 
(0.004713688)··· (0.006341948)··· (0.006131948)*" (0.005473075) ..... (0.007725839) (0.007550233) (0.007870964) (IJ007060J 30) (0.005331465)*"· (0.0067151241 ... (IJ.()) 1J')620 1 J)* 
-0.019890646 -0.016704030 -0.013863551 -0.017297098 0.004122062 0.000739329 -0.000142002 0.01J2791651 0.004679/58 0.004751870 -OOJ325N05 
(0013195941) (0.01/319551J. (0005187569) .. •• (0.011371509) (0.006232050) (0.006147577) (0.006981681) (OOO538J335) (0.0099-14189) (0. 0091 651i5 7) (OOIIJ')17XI')) 
White rows md,cate the results for the feedback coeffiCient, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coeffiCIent. Parentheses mclude the standard errors oj [lie 
estimates; sample period: 2/5/1995-3/112/2003. (* = 10% sign. Level, .. = 5% sign. Level, **. = 1% sign. Level). 
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EVR200 
-0.0230-12517 
(0.008039524)··· 
-0.35981266-1 
(0.//98/8433)_··· 
-0.0230-125/7 
(0.00803952-1)··· 
-0.3598/2664 
(01/98/8433)··· 
-0.023898858 
(0007958794)··· 
0.065432208 
(00912-13532) 
-002397/292 
(0.0208216261 
-().009535148 
(0. 151 133770) 
-0.025549722 
(0.010754331)" 
-0.035504/37 
10.020700009)* 
-0.02399352/ 
(0 0(8667983) .... 
0000168528 
(0.1109703713) 
evolutionary relationship between threshold trading and market heterogeneity 
that the next part of our discussion shall try to investigate. 
3.7.3 Threshold trading· and intertemporal changes in market-
heterogeneity 
If hypothesis 3 is a mere identification of the possibility of relating 
threshold trading with the underlying heterogeneity of a market, it is interesting 
to study whether this possibility can be supported empirically, i.e. whether the 
behaviour of threshold traders (as documented by our results so far) is subject to 
changes intertemporally as a market's heterogeneity changes over time. To that 
end, we split the sample window for each market into two sub-1--~riods (before 
and after the rise in overseas investors' participation) using the ;'cutoff' points 
indicated in our discussion in Section 3.6.1 and tested our modified Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) model for both sub-periods. We shall now review our results 
on the basis of each of the two sub-periods. 
3.7.3.a First sub-period: limited overseas investors' participation 
The results for the feedback coefficient for all three markets for the 
period prior to the rise in overseas investors' participation are indicatiye of overt 
positive feedback trading (see Tables 3.8 and 3.9), which is found to be 
statistically significant in Hong Kong (1 % level) and Taiwan (5% level) f,r both 
short and long volume ratios; for South Korea, results indicate very limited 
statistical sianificance for both short and long volume ratios. :=-
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When short volume ratios were tested, the results for the threshold 
coefficient for Hong Kong indicated the presence of an overt negative feedback 
trading pattern across all ranks whose statistical significance tended to "cluster" 
at rank 1. G, The latter constitutes an identical picture with our previous findings 
for the full-period tests and implies the existence of a discernible and significant 
(1 % level) negative feedback pattern at rank 1.0. Since no statistical significance 
was encountered for the threshold coefficient at rank 1.5 for two (VR10, VR20) 
out of those three volume ratios, we run further tests using the area between 
ranks 1.0 and 1.5 as a threshold; results revealed that the significance of the 
threshold coefficient documented above persisted within the area between ranks 
1.0 and 1.5 for all three volume ratios. When long volume ratios were tested, the 
results for the threshold coefficient for Hong Kong did not produce any 
discernible threshold patterns. 
The results for the threshold coefficient for South Korea seem to indicate 
the absence of any discernible threshold pattern when we tested for short volume 
ratios57 . When long volume ratios were tested, our results were similar, only that 
now we noticed a "clustering" of its statistical significance at the top ranks of 
each long volume ratio, which provided us with an indication of a discernible 
positive feedback pattern at those ranks. 
The results for the threshold coefficient for Taiwan indicate the absence 
of any discernible threshold patterns \vhen short volume ratios are used; actually, 
the threshold coefficient does not appear to be statistically significant in any of 
the tests performed. When long volume ratios are tested, the results for the 
57 Soh' also the scant l'\'idl'llct! 0/ statistic'al Significance/or the threshold cOl:tJicient (Tllble 3,8), 
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threshold coefficient indicate the presence of a near-overt58 positive feedback 
trading pattern across all ranks whose statistical significance tends to emerge 
mostly at the top ranks. 
3.7.3.b Second sub-period: increased overseas investors' 
participation 
The results for the feedback coefficient for all three markets for the period 
following the rise in overseas investors' participation, are indicative of overt, yet 
(mostly) statistically insignificant, positive feedback trading for both short and 
long volume ratios (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). The results for the threshold 
coefficient for all three markets seem to indicate the absence of any discernible 
significant threshold pattern for both short as well as long volume ratios; actually 
statistical significance59 appears rather scattered throughout our threshold-
coefficient results, as Tables 3.10 and 3.11 illustrate. 
An interesting first observation here is the one related to the feedback 
coefficient, which, although overtly indicative of positive feedback trading 
during both periods in all markets, is found, in the cases of Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, to lose its statistical significance in the aftermath of the rise in overseas 
investors' participation 60. 
58 The sign of the threshold coefficient at rank 2.5 for the EVR150 is indicative of negative 
feedback trading. 
59 Perhaps the only case worth mentioning here is the one of Taiwan when long volume ratios are 
tested; the results for the threshold coefficient indicate the appearance of statistical significance 
mostly at the top ranks; again, as for the period prior to the rise in overseas investors' 
participation, their sign is still mostly indicative of positive feedback trading, with the same 
exception (top rank~ 2.5) for the EVR150, which, asfor theftrst sub-period, is still indicative of 
negative feedback trading. . 
60 Similar results were obtained when running the original Sentana and Wadhwam (1992) model 
for the two sub-periOds for each market. 
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Table 3.8: Short volume ratio results (limited overseas investors' participation) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 
-0.003456555 
(0.003967025) 
0.166816526 
(0.290177724) 
-0.003421789 -0.003456487 -0.003604276 
(0.003674133) (0.004153129l (0.004680043l 
0.667700247 0.166802153 0.166207 JJ 8 
(0.338480485) •• (0.295640787) (0.299954610) 
-0.019664162 -0.019575163 -0.019867582 -0.003573223 -0.003603908 -0.003330540 -0.003604707 -0.049868008 
(0.005104380) ••• (0.006067724)··· (0. 004967964}_·" [0.003261607) (0.004450779) (0.004349100) (0.004376056) (0.018994525)"· 
0.124877526 0.011149569 0.325660471 0.660651346 0.166236079 -0.043866309 0.160592935 0.005803807 
(0./47369156) (0.064304827) (0.157259221)·· (0.423694435) (0.326148217) (0.028517349) (0.313080024) (0.172590236) 
-0.0207171 64 -0.020081785 -0.020237218 -0.019577428 -0.003318344 -0.003202580 -0.003167208 -0.002250057 -0.052607711 -0.052007894 -0.048209569 
1..0· 0059826591 ••• (0.005836010) ... (0.005936877) ... (0.005292717)*·* (0.004278271) (0.003673604) jp.004321268J.. (0.003653990) (0.02JJ13287)·· (().021098012)*· (0.019476983)·· 
0.012956903 0.007867719 0.004416675 0.000341512 -0.007304651 -0.016379614 -0.003751361 -0.021643817 0.054641039 0.067005920 -0.015539952 
10.0/6710453) (0.004034182)* (0.011655666) (0.015304985) (0.0171 19353) (0.020858837) jp.009084242) (0.OJJ391410) * (0.043477001) (0.069201991) (0.025984854) 
-0.028671761 -0.028541083 -0.028579185 -0.020238704 -0.001603691 -0.000655563 -0.000680658 0.000183JJ4 -0.046464013 -0.048191994 -0.048204741 
1..0.004139429)··· (0.003444916)*·· (0.0040689901". (0.O0624034l)*** (0.005308414) (0005620466) (0.001327611) (0.005255803) (0. OJl518060)",* * (0.021661007) •• (0.023367514)·* 
0.014398228 0.013545771 0.015094590 0.001872314 -0.003395283 -0.004796518 -0.004066373 -0.005628151 -0.010856701 -0. 0062 1J 938 -0.006831260 
(0.004006097) ••• {0.003002757)··· (0.004764215)··· (0.006303555) (0.006490097) (0.005938578) (0.002738836) (0.005378925) (0.015738028) 10.0/6775701) (OOI818<J52<J) 
White rows indicate the results for the feedback coeffiCient, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coeffiCient. Parentheses mclude the standard errors 
of the estimates. (* = 10% sign. Level, ** = 5% sign. Level, *** = 1% sign. Level). 
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I 
-0.050127608 
(0.021595067) •• 
0.056262870 I 
(0.246095056) 
-0.051851053 
(0.021749383)*· 
0.024282436 
(0.035129458) 
-0.050396023 
(0.0221385051 .. 
-0.002479778 
(0016352572) 
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Table 3.9: Long volume ratio results (limited overseas investors' participation) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VR150 EVR150 VR200 EVR200 VR150 EVR150 VR200 EVR200 VR150 EVR150 VR200 
-0. 0.19523817 -0..0.0.2988870. -0..0.0.3353310 -0..0.0.0.88480.8 -0..0.-17663811 -0..0.-17663811 -0..0.-176640.17 
(0.0.0.5382831)*·· (0..0.0.2790.727) (0..0.0.40.35628) (0..0.0.0.422876)·· (0..0.230.52190.) ** (0..0.230.52190.)** (00.210.45398) •• 
0.228667165 -0.0.9490.6130 -0..0.23799850. -0..097154810 -0.269490845 ·0..269490845 -0..269490.471 
(0..175976719) (0..0.15311766) ••• (0..0.16850.643) (0..0.0740.0.856)*** (0.114858-178) ** (0..114858-178) .. (0.11 31414(4)" 
-0..0.20.104793 -0.0.19599117 -0..0.19771899 -0..0.0.335450.8 -0..00.3553030 -0..003214120. -0..0.0.3200.30.8 -0.0.-17663811 -0..047663811 -0..0.47664017 
(0..005740.0.0.5)--- (0.DD53699971··· 10.·00.478890.2)··* ((1.0.0.3844224) (0.0.01335481),,·· (!J. 0.0.433 7859) (0..0.04893440.) (0.023052190.)*· (0..0.230.52190)** (0.0.21045398)" 
0.10.8723793 0..0.0.690.9363 0.014182955 -0..023540.50.5 -0.0.94463244 -0..00.820.30.70 -0.04248-1710. ·0.269490.845 ·0..269490845 -0..269490.471 
(0.102523437) (0..0.462747891. JD.D056773721·· ((j.D2D643921) (D.00702735-Q·· • (0.0.1494270.5) (0.0170850.59)" (O.ll 4858478)"" (0.114858-178) .... (0.11 314140.4) .. 
·0..0.20.34540.9 -0.0197740.96 -0..0.20.0.13653 -0..020334436 ·0.0.0.2975025 -0..00.3743300. -0..0.02632537 -0.00.3878655 -0..048960.721 -0.0.49974862 -0..0.48978331 
(0..005250.575) ••• (0. 0.0.4486497) ••• (0..006136734)*·· (0.00.5559143) .... (0.0.0.3977896) (0.0.04293062) (0.00.4109418) (0..00.2556754) (0..023461077)·· (0.022954266)," (0..019298560.) •• 
0..0.38613121 0..0.14230.0.24 0..027669177 0.036035439 ·0.0.0.7134544 0.00.1797246 -0.008570.543 0.0.0.2033964 -0.128418766 0..01279-1734 -0.158739796 
(0..0.23864238) (0..006390.0.21)" (0..0.29956131) (0.026860994) (0..0.11250.985) (0.0.13148764) (0..011 Jl2613) (0.00.1811515) (0..1490.36512) (0..128365473) (0..134555957) 
-0.0.20.1440.52 -0..020.188431 -0..0.19867397 -0.0.20.150.090. -0..0.0.4140.679 -0.0.0.4983671 -0.0.0.410.2611 -0..003820286 -0.050.70.7872 -0..0.53335729 -0.050.151918 
(0. 005421915)-·- (0..0.0.5361676) --. (0..0.0.4511074)·" (0.00.5946665) ... (0..0.0.4549245) (0..004820.757) (0.00550.7257) (0..0.0.4350.119) (0..0.23188335)" (0.024878115) ... (0.0.19326587)",--
0..0.45677443 0.0.3465481/1 0..0.19715127 0..033480.987 0..00.2225997 0..0.04316990 0..0.01826240. 0..0.0.1489591 -0..0.280.69386 -0..050.439960. -0.0.15359695 
(0..0.24147282)- (0..0.2340.8021) (0.0.228450.75) (0..0.2680.2384) (0..0.07353243) . (00.0.7936984) (0.00.731950.9) (0.0.0.7258988) (0.064096499) (0..0.68835351) (0.0.56684341) 
-00.19441140. -0.0.19687505 -0.0.19304191 ·0..0.19452717 ·0..0.0.7027249 -0..002890.379 -0..0.0.60.00.596 -0.0.0.1864914 -0.0540.14531 -0.0.5500.3143 -0.052268464 
(D.OO45D8293r·· (0..00.5270.665) ••• (0..00.45478951"- (0.0.0.5272634) ••• (0..0.0.5089486) (0..00.5326909) (0..0.0.5620.924) (0.0.0.5491191) (0.0.24023369) .... (0. 022(44290) •• (0.022896748)" 
-0.003825699 () 0.11 183968 -0.0084570.0.4 ·0..0.0.4586126 0.0.0.5241772 -0..0.00.887182 0.0.0.3582995 -0..0.0.21/64448 -0.0.-17043589 -OO678U!8JO -0.0.35932170. 
(0.0.1436640.0) (O.o.I833557o.) (0.0.14292775) (0..0.18266226) (0..0.0.60.69438) (0..0.0.470.9916) (0. 0.0.60.88982) (0..0.0.580. /436) (0.0.27366497)" 1(1.029475722) .. (0..0.3444(1158) 
.0. 0.18564876 -0..0.16463536 ·0..0.17529665 -0..0.16544877 -0..0.0.70.21264 -0..0.0.46874 46 -0..0.0.0.139859 -0..0.0.4385367 -0.04580.6939 -0..0.47732669 -0..0.50.853529 
J() o.o.5RO!/(30) _ •• (0.0.0.4235677)··· (0.0.0.5434494) ••• (0..0.0.5283343),,·· ((j. 0.0.6743342) ((JDD6582J.19) (0..0.0.7947195) (0..0.0.6860.381) (00.2253400.7)·· (0..0.180.22859)··- (0..0.2362310.8.1·-
-00.19134797 -0.0.16451934 -0..0.12912835 ·0..0.16846744 0..0.0.40.88795 0..0.0.1214488 -0..0.0.3816466 0..0.0.0844611 -0..023923455 -0.015788067 -0.0.3980.0694 
(0010.464051)- (0..0.10.281996) (0..0.0.660.7362)- (0..0.11568419) (000.70.77742) (0.0.0.477340.7) (0..00.65650.04) (0..0.0.63220.61) (0.019548899) (0.0.17471044) (0.0.25514071) 
While rows indicate the results for the feedback coeffiCient, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coeffiCient. Parentheses mclude the standard errors 
of the estimates. (* = JO% sign. Level, ** = 5% sign. Level, *** = J% sign. Level). 
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-0..0.-176640.55 
(O.D221164D30) •• 
-0.269489070 
(0.119015840)·· 
-O.IJ47664055 
(0..0228640.30) .. 
-0.2694890. 70 
(0.1l9015840)" 
·0..0.49757993 !\ 
(0..021222480)" 
·D.D22Jl870D 
(0.138236265) 
·0..0.50.521565 
(0..0.21819795)--
-0.0.32699922 
(0.0.6260. 180.7) 
·0..0550.930.83 
(0..0.22369953) .. 
·0..0.62134365 
(0..0.44777417) 
-0..0.49493768 
(0..0. 138466(5)*--
·0.019650916 
(0012026329) 
One possible explanation here might be that the increase in foreign investors' 
trading has led to the decline of the significance of positive feedback trading. 
Holmes and Wong (2001) show that the entry of foreign investors has led to a 
reduction of the impact of noise trading in Singapore, South Korea61 and Taiwan for 
the 1988-1996 period. Although our period of investigation extends far beyond 1996, 
the findings of that paper appear to be conceptually relevant to the ones documented 
previously. 
With regards to the threshold coefficient, South Korea and Taiwan failed to 
furnish us with any discernible significant threshold patterns for both short and long 
volume ratios, either before or after the advent of overseas investors. On the other 
hand, Hong Kong produced a discernible (negative feedback) pattern observed 
during the period prior to the advent of overseas investors; this pattern was found to 
be statistically significant (1 % level) at rank 1.0 of short volume ratios and involved 
a considerable number of our sample's observations (approximately 480/0 at rank 
1.062, depending upon the volume ratio's length and specification). Note that this 
pattern disappeared during the period following the rise of the foreign traders' 
presence in market-activity. Why this might be the case is not that straightforward. 
Following the Asian crisis, the Hong Kong Government resorted to a massive 
purchase of Hang Seng Index (i.e. high-cap) stocks in mid-August 1998 to mitigate 
against speculative short-selling pressure on stock prices; the divestiture of those 
6J Note here that the findings of Holmes and Wong (2001) for South Korea imply that the impact of 
noise trading has not been significantly reduced during the post-liberali=ation period; interestingly 
enough, our findings indicate that the feedback coefficient is statistically more significa~t during the 
period following the advent of overseas investors, both with the original and the modified Sent ana 
and Wadhwani (1992) model for this market. However, no point of comparison is possible here due to 
differences in sample windows. . . 
62 Approximately 46% for the area between 1.0-1.5, depending upon the volume ratio s length and 
specification. 
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stocks began during 2001. If threshold traders were unable to produce any 
discernible significant pattern after year-end 2001. then one might argue that this 
might be due to the abrupt rise in overseas investment, which (for some reason) led 
to the demise of the first sub-period's threshold pattern. 
However, when we ran Wald tests to test for the significance of the differences of the 
threshold coefficients for the VR10, VR20 and EVR10 at rank 1.0 for both sub-
periods, we found the differences between them to be insignificant, thus casting 
doubt over the actual impact of the rise in overseas trading. In view of what has been 
said so far, therefore, we argue that we can accept the fourth hypothesis for the Hong 
Kong market; changes in heterogeneity do appear to influence the discernibility of 
threshold traders' presence over time, although its impact on the latter's significance 
appears questionable. 
3.7.4 Threshold trading during extreme market events 
The purpose here is to investigate whether the behaviour of threshold traders 
exhibits distinctive patterns during periods that could be characterized as "extreme", 
We chose the Asian financial crisis period (217/1997-31/12/1998) as a proxy for such 
"extreme" events, in line with the discussion in Section 3.6.1. To that end \\'e tested 
for the significance of threshold trading by running the modified Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) model for the crisis' period, the period before it as \\dl as the 
period after it. Here, we shall report our results for each sub-period (pre-. in- and 
post-crisis) separately. 
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Table 3.10: Short volume ratio results (increased overseas investors' participation) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVRlO VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 
-0.251493236 -0.05377 1698 -0.013036053 
(0.180173621) (0033677529) (0.01 I 388487) 
-0.034978503 0.011890700 -0.0859804 I 9 
(0.178360475) (0.083697491) (0.056087772) 
-0.228758343 -0231957571 -0.23367 1863 -0.234467 149 -0.056623660 -0056732208 -0.052657809 -0.063493249 -0.014181569 -0.013815676 -0.013659837 
{0.172618773) (0./73428049) (0. I 7532932 I) {0.186123780) (0.038201687) (O.030618168)* (0.037905252) (0.038835563) (0.010507168) (0.008697189) (0.013101976) 
-0.371324122 -0.299828152 -0.272465895 -0.260232466 0.022387277 0.025175865 -0.003961620 0.036415710 0.029840044 0.042 I 63353 0.020179945 
(0.229947886) (0. 230448695J.. ((J.192593108) 10.219046287) (0.030013226) (0.067924177) (0.026698287) (0.025552428) (0.022348462) (0.0534727 I 2) (0.01863301 I) 
-0.247561263 -0.242943291 -0.251219821 -0.228337582 -0.047022857 -0.04863 I 67-1 -0.051674855 -0.051373482 -0.015335842 -0.0/4785418 -0.01 I 162046 
.12.167840733) (0.1806195291. (0. I 77384978) (0.156175133) (0.025379181)* (0.029191814)* (0.03 I 458688) (0.058347992) (0.015095317) (0.015498578) (0.01555501 I) 
0.089972039 O. 126883386 0.000187640 0.107243881 -0.017477098 -0.011967789 -0.006265247 -0.010477721 0.004500215 0.003033462 -0.005164058 
(0.086138356) (0.077359789) (0.089148870) (0.08099 I 994) (0.018591610) (0.015695367) (0.015085381) (0. 071 779 JJ 2) (0.015537622) (0.015335326) (0.012353628) 
While rows indicate the results for the feedback coefficient, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coefficient. Parentheses include the standard errors 
of the estimates. (* = 10% sign. Level, ** = 5% sign. Level, *** = 1% sign. Level). 
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Table 3.11: Long volume ratio results (increased overseas investors' participation) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VR150 EVR150 VRlOO EVRlOO VR150 EVR150 VRlOO EVRlOO VR150 EVR150 VRlOO 
-0.055494568 -0.053735206 -0.0134604 I 8 -0.013425428 
(0.043009118) . (0.0333840061 (0.011335004) (0.012278682) 
-0.163793089 0.001494934 -0.143313377 -0.168525/07 
(0.015137170)*** (0.1690244252 (0.0019656741*" (0.0347 12272) .... • 
-0.258283972 -0.258446761 -0.261072019 -0.053106161 -0.050543233 -0.053842963 -0.053329635 -0.013445804 -0.013455670 -0.0130850// 
(0.175050705) (0.190716105) (0.193536025) (0.028580949) .. (0.036188541) (0.035023710) (0.030977896) .. (0.012543402) (0.012239171) (0.010773710) 
-0. 166784'W7 -0. I 73656145 -0.272423956 -0.005894634 -0.063626934 0.001005187 -0.003619867 0.021029311 -0.134690241 0.045961613 
(0.193954503) (0. 14IJ95169) (0.211183050) (0.052976573) (0.052504160) (0.044525225) (0.051754638) (0.082481509) {0.042080935)*'" (0.069699269) 
-0286M13979 -I) 26114X484 -0.219369643 -0.270554589 -0.058628177 -0.057178087 -0.055026679 -0.057383122 -0.013356962 -0.013530293 -0.013239388 
(0.217854/38) (IJ.194-102-l84) (0.204353337) (0.183770116) (0.02 I 594252)* .... (0.033652457)* (0.039823658) (0.032719IJ62· {O. 0 I 2866286) JO. 0 I 2390582,L (0.012988917) 
-0.3299831$26 -0.190709050 0.174155349 -0.287273670 0.030004498 0.018306075 0.004307518 0.025521215 0.013391574 0.014181370 0.015170980 
(0.205012901) (0. 147480197) (0.213853672) (0.186044281) (0.00691J 540)*·· (0.0387545192 (0.027373637) (0.03236639Jj 12.034245 I 451 JO.048211907) (0.040425784) 
-0.26706-1230 -0.264966861 -0.250084045 -0.269739486 -0.056647286 -0.057019259 -0.056356342 -0.056160823 -0.0135//407 -0.013732627 -0.013484474 
(0.235395940) (0.204937389) (0. 162646242) (0.196395955) (0.030457855)· (0.033600002)· (0.038054853) (0.035832508) (0.013862562) (O.OIJ376519) (0.010141703) 
-0.045745315 -0.054320371 0.003472100 -0.0733//327 0.006109397 0.014938103 0.005067402 0.009873038 -0.005204470 -0.004189141 0.002995616 
(0. I 7828(655) (0.232505008) (0.0854851312 10. 1952099/4) (0.022482000) (0020929205) (0.019090310) (0.017851079) (0.018776366) (0.026155978) (0.02 I 580029) 
-0250890685 -0.257249030 -0.252529210 -0.255046795 -0.051955704 -0.043707436 -0.051818953 -0.053508934 -0.02 I 563984 -0.02J.J18001 -0.013849122 
(0 178388084) (0.164019638) (0. 180107960) (0. 169441578) (0.032389528) (0.028251369) (0.032943106) (0.031512863)" (0.013010638)* (0.007936868) ...... (0.0094810713) 
0.005882422 0.100157229 0.026376463 0.087344276 -0.00375391 I -0.016527076 -0.003754741 -0.000380816 0.02277 I 565 0.022936502 0.002193910 
(0.092 153859) (0.082797345) 10.089389829) (0.08474587 I) (0.015281847) (0.0J.J357753) (0.015265408) (0.015816730) ((J.01330199W (0.01081833W* (0.006955040) 
White rows indicate the results for the feedback coefficient, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coefficient. Parentheses include the standard errors 
of the estimates. (* = JO% sign. Level, ** = 5% sign. Level, *** = J% sign. Level). 
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-0.012841203 
(...0.0093259631 
0.203437777 
(0.081268306)··· 
-0013391427 
(0.012549804) 
0.014170656 
(0.055850823) 
-0.013721809 
(0.012393890) 
-0.013067534 
(0.025271074) 
-0.016753757 
(0.0130587 J/) 
0.0/5874591 
(0.013775129) 
3.7.4.a Pre-crisis: 2/5/1995-1/7/1997 
The results for the feedback coefficient for all three markets for the pre-crisis 
period are indicative of overt positive feedback trading (see Tables 3.12 and 3.13). 
which is found to be statistically significant only in the case of South Korea (10% 
level) for both short and long volume ratios; evidence of the statistical significance 
of positive feedback trading (as reflected through the feedback coefficient) in both 
Hong Kong and Taiwan appears scant for both short and long volume ratios. 
The results for the threshold coefficient for Hong Kong before the cnSIS 
indicate a rather mixed picture, with the threshold coefficient failing to align itself 
with any distinctive feedback direction for both types of volume ratios; statistical 
significance appears to be sporadic. No clear pattern appears to emerge for South 
Korea either, while statistical significance tends to manifest itself mostly at the top 
ranks of both short63 and long64 volume ratios. The results for the threshold 
coefficient for Taiwan indicate a pattern of overt-yet mostly insignificant-negative 
feedback trading when short volume ratios were used. When long volume ratios 
were tested, results indicated a rather mixed picture, with the threshold coefficient 
failing to align itself with any distinctive feedback direction; notice that, at the top 
ranks (3.0 and above), the indication is of statistically significant (100/0 level) 
positive feedback trading. 
63 Ranks ~,O and abo\'(' are indh'ath'e of statistica/~)' significant (l0% level) negative J~edback 
trading. .. ' ~~ Rank l . .'1 is indicative of statistica/~)' significant (/0% level) n~'gclf n'l' jl''':cillcll'k tradmg. 
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Table 3.12: Short volume ratio results <Pre-crisis) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 
·0.08-1223173 
(0.028424553)*** 
0.315968985 
(0.063136890)*** 
·0.082553997 ·0.084223173 ·0.084223173 
(0.01988964-1) u. (0028-124553)*** (0.02842-1553)"* 
0.317188917 0.3 I 5968985 0.315968985 
(0.051669039)*·· (0.063136890)*** (0.063136890) ... 
·0.085514854 ·0.082553997 0.030407915 ·0.059364886 ·0 ()927 IS05] 
10.0403943381 •• jO. 019889644) * .. 1( 011144804) ••• j(JOI930818l)··· (OON820575)** 
0.316494759 0.3/71889/7 0.2614Jl275 0.332225928 0.0/02-19612 
(0.049885 158) *. * (0 05 I 669039) ••• (0.121830464)** (0.2005768-16) * (021707JJ92) 
-0.103478716 ·0. /0353 Jl54 ·0.09663100-1 ·0.10083622 I ·0.08-1970 I 2 1 ·0.075-101056 ·0.082315698 ·0.074659507 ·0.071945403 ·0.081914070 ·0.079927952 
(0.079124823) (0078388437) (0081400712) (0077721234) ( 00375782Jl)** (0.0-11071368)- (0.04064451)8) ** (0.042 17 1764) * (0. 09287845-1) (0.176510170) (0. ()78647475) 
0.264548015 0.2546-12811 0.21017-1254 0.233515783 ·0.014065263 0.244002620 0.055493225 0.181847449 0.054012966 0.04257108-1 0.046494128 
(0.151722943)- (0.185875387) ( 0.146-194995) (0. 139Jl901 3) (0.082131021) (0.163852668) (0.119660265) (0.1272-/9709) (0.076161064) (0. JJ 333 /750) (0.055866483) 
·0.115839402 ·0.093454770 0.612281428 ·0.106679236 ·0.071910165 ·0.071532802 ·0.100544968 ·0.09/l25689 ·0.093566-185 ·0.097595253 ·{J0957395,},} 
(0.070513364) (0.07266,}574) (0./1 4 1 583831··· (0.074614193) (0.040981333)· (0050286274) (0.041894748)·· (0.046586279) • (IJ. 1 186170761. 10.0/6467/00)*·· (O.1J78687776) 
0.015172989 ·0.023020238 ·0.019894637 ·0.000645614 ·0.025482831 ·0.024331281 0.015928696 0.008957695 0.022343861 0.027008875 O.IJ27754026 
(0071969009) (00701-19526) ( 0.Jl4827745) (0.065/10000) ( 0.038936360) (0.0-11457456) (0.035845846) (0.036116165) (0.033606738) (0.021227135) (IJ 1J36-1369] I) 
White rows indicate the results for the feedback coefficient, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coefficient. Parentheses include the standard errors 
of the estimates; sample period: 2/5//995-117//997. (* = /0% sign. Level, ** = 5% sign. Level, *** = /% sign. Level). 
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EVR20 
·0.098649176 
(IUl44725292)'" 
O.OS1837831 
12.2865781(8) 
·()OS4245)22 
JO.0572 1 286-1) 
0.08095 I 267 
({UJ3-1165677)" 
·O.O,}9269315 
(0.063 -13 3 583) 
0. 029694J05 
(O. 027739-160) 
,~ 
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Table 3.13: Long volume ratio results (Pre-crisis) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VR150 EVR150 VR200 EVR200 VR150 EVR150 VR200 EVR200 VR150 EVR150 VR200 
-0.0-19251731 -0.0-18647360 -0.0-19251-158 
(0.100882100) (0.086220300) (0.10./352710) 
-0.352561793 -0.376202198 -0.352555605 
(0.165393068)"'''' (0. JJ 2940024)",** (0.18-134-1-18-1)'" 
-0.0-19251731 -0.048646857 -0.04925/-158 
(0.100882100) (0.094901429) (0.104352710) 
-0.352561793 -0.376200903 -0.352555605 
(0.165393068)"'· j(J.1250537451"''' (0.184344-18-1)· 
-0.107055077 -0.102257157 -0.107523646 -0.106558991 -0.083055356 -0.082779068 -0.081695517 -0.082778931 -0.068785051 -0.099853518 -0.087393399 
(0089956397) (0.080881432) (0.081418317) (0.078858181) (0.033518555)·· (0.040358291)·· (0.03927158-1)*'" (0.040908548)"'''' (0.113462289) (JJ.092881926) j(J. 03665').189)·· 
0.008130263 -0.703912943 -0.122035349 -0.124522257 0.370932251 0.354900901 0.344366785 0.35-1900312 -0.JJ9309067 0.039043290 -0.143340088 
(0436500046) (0.51 I 495492) (0.188800-110) (0.645360068 (0. 149222766)*'" (0.170417379)",· (0.127015308) ••• (0.2072/3331)'" (0.187970106) (0. 155263560L (0.153294376) 
-0.106398930 -0.108061907 -0.100929690 -0. JJ6663095 -0.085191498 -0.086644102 -0.085//7407 -0.0866./4396 -0.071602388 -0.094078073 -0.095566190 
(0079715886) (0.080483186) (0.054028540) • (0.048984604)*'" (0.038547949) •• (0.037985452)·· 10.031516670)··· (0.037818432)·· (0.206654708) (0.041067466)·· j(J. 0429 I 0007)·· 
0.037879998 -0.069662636 -0.110593634 0.097645007 0.13870809-1 0.191932687 0.077174697 0.191932318 -0.036730676 -0.049455278 0.002791917 
(0. 146941042) (0.081336515) 10.108463514) (0.154006266) (0.156001537) (0.176156412) (0.163952330) (0.168311524) (0.101674262) (0.084622991) (0.080795519) 
-0. //0812823 -0.105403982 -0.11-1270957 -0.092835942 -0.084953770 -0.093023638 -0.084945691 -0.093808098 -0.095514430 -0.069687791 -0.092595625 
(0.082890487) (0.080370680) (0.076418880) (0.084343107) (0.041095201)·· (0.042327974)·· (0.041345537)",· (0.039590850) •• (0.046418107) •• (0.090161716) (0.017IU2675)··· 
0.005888250 -0.002612866 0.011113874 -0.018935276 -0.000204203 0.054792526 -0.000803150 0.058104319 0.004784805 -0.040702014 0.000386780 
(0.064344102) (0.070906837) (0.073079818) (0.073435-1231 (0.058312426) (0.052575815) (0.055597820) (00-19516199) (0.061752597) (0.056575260) (0.0586491061 
-0.077447933 -0.046871592 -0.072572692 -0.016170641 -0.091560462 -0.094145019 -0.079093808 -0.093-163404 -0.0-15-12671-1 -0.0577396U7 -0.08486335-1 
(0030762943) •• [0.081713860) (0.034965160) •• (0.088136-172) (0.0-16501606)·· (0.043-126991)",· (0.043470006)", (0.0-13221998)",· (0.066113661) (0.06892IW37) (0. IJ 705061 66) 
-O.057R40223 ·0.072126128 ·0.070079805 ·0.1105547-10 0.007-128981 0.011900482 ·0.0100-17-121 0.010762029 -0.0762988-1-1 ·0.073/UN95 -0. 1153086036 
(() 077691324) (0.087939935) (0.112-1-16556) (0.066916177J.· ((J034763808) (0.039818598) (0.035425480) (0.037681-179) (00-12986601)· (0.04793//33) (0. 043330S'J5) 
While rows md,cate the results for the feedback coeffiCient, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coeffiCient. Parentheses mclude the standard errors 
of the estimates; sample period: 2/5/1995-//7//997. (* = /0% sign. Level, ** = 5% sign. Level, *** = 1% sign. Level). 
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EVR200 
-0.0-1925/-158 
(0.104352710) 
-0.352555605 
(0.1843-1448-1) • 
-0.0-19252009 
(0.111106149) 
-0.352562967 
(0. 179JJ7UJ)·· 
-0.059413935 
(0.025645423)·· 
-0.00-1283014 
(0.179346903) 
-0.081564481 
(0.032927682)·· 
0.000/31897 
(0.041669171) 
-0.08-1484866 
(0.243243006) 
-0.023764937 
lQ077642908) 
-0. OS8248318 
(0075695252) 
-o.07/36(J071 
(0 (45171222) 
3.7.4.h In-crisis: 2/7/1997-31/12/1998 
The results for the feedback coefficient for Hong Kong and Taiwan for 
the in-crisis period are indicative of overt positive feedback trading (see Tables 
3.14 and 3.15), which is found to be statistically significant in Hong Kong (5% 
level) and occasionally in Taiwan, for both short and long volume ratios; 
evidence of overt and statistically insignificant positive feedback trading can also 
be found in South Korea, yet only for short volume ratios65 . 
Results for the threshold coefficient from tests with short volume ratios 
during the crisis indicate a rather mixed picture for Hong Kong, with the 
threshold coefficient failing to align itself with any distinctive feedback 
direction; statistical significance appears to be sporadic. Similar results were 
obtained when long volume ratios were tested. However, there, we managed to 
observe something rather interesting at rank 1.0, as all four volume ratios there 
exhibited a uniform, statistically significant (1 % level) positive feedback trading 
pattern. Since no statistical significance was encountered for the threshold 
coefficient at rank 1.5 for three (VR150, EVR150, EVR200) out of those four 
volume ratios, we ran further tests using the area between ranks 1.0 and 1.5 as a 
threshold; results revealed that the significance of the threshold coefficient 
documented above persisted within the area between ranks 1.0 and 1.5 for all 
four volume ratios. 
Regarding South Korea, the threshold coefficient is found to be nearly 
always66 indicative of overt (and mostly statistically insignificant) positive 
feedback trading when we test for short volume ratios. Tests with long volume 
65 Results from long volume ratios for this coefficient in South Korea contain evidence of both 
positive as well as negative feedback trading. 
66 With the exception of the threshold coefficient at ranks J.O.(VR20, VR150, EVR/50, EVR200). 
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ratios failed to reveal any distinctive threshold direction; significance there 
appeared to be mostly concentrated in the top ranks (3.0 and above)67. 
Results from short volume ratio tests for Taiwan generated a rather mixed 
picture, with the threshold coefficient failing to align itself with any distinctive 
trading direction, while results from long volume ratio tests contained evidence 
of overt positive feedback trading68; statistical significance (5% level) here tends 
to manifest itself mostly at rank 1.5 and is indicative of positive feedback 
trading. 
3.7.4.c Post-crisis: 1/1/1999-31/12/2003 
The results for the feedback coefficient for all three markets for the post-
crisis period are indicative of overt positive feedback trading (see Tables 3.16 
and 3.17), which is found to be statistically significant for Hong Kong (5% level) 
for both short and long volume ratios; the cases of South Korea and Taiwan 
provide us with evidence of scattered statistical significance (10% level) for both 
short and long volume ratios. 
When short volume ratios were used, the results for the threshold 
coefficient for Hong Kong after the crisis indicated a rather mixed picture, with 
the threshold coefficient failing to align itself with any distinctive feedback 
direction; statistical significance appeared to be sporadic. Notably though, a 
statistically significant (10% level), negative feedback trading pattern appeared 
during the post-crisis period at rank 1.0 (see Table 3.16). 
67 At those ranks, threshold traders appeared to adhere exclusi\'e~~' to positive feedback trading. 
68 With the exception of the threshold coefficient of the VRl50 at rank l.O. 
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Table 3.14: Short volume ratio results On-crisis) 
I-Iong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 EVR20 VRIO EVRIO VR20 
-0.014472596 -0.013623572 -0.014460422 -0.002697493 -0.033367737 
jp. 00670596 I) -- (0.006175529)-· (0.006180284)*- (0.005581637) (0 043//7905) 
0.255643478 -0.017674522 0.263150183 -0.09516JJ73 0.383852108 
(0.2335195141. (0.060823352) (0.161346878) (0.022536434) --- (0.473018827) 
-0.0/4677137 -0.013291989 -0.012949420 -0.013828369 -0.003797352 -0.004000823 -0.002347915 -0.002543910 -0.037810372 -0.030593445 -0.032780018 
jp.005785461)*- (0.003780643)*-- (0.006031616)-- (0.006144092)-· (0.006839434) (0.005238623) (0.006703401) (0.005474987) (0.012262663) ...... (0.029713276) (0.048939544) 
0.002184009 -00//707369 -0.014824208 -0.012744391 -0.002405392 -0.013338764 -0.008610086 -0.019698084 0.100795060 0.077661378 -0.005846067 
(0.0134283541. (0.009897559) (0.008548524)* (0.020727958) (0.0182/5529) (0.024786482) (0.006937248) (0.015810130) (0.157111878) (0.069856824) (0.079834672) 
-0.021079793 -0.020348852 -0.020945871 -0.0/3156601 -0.001613105 -0.001317835 -0.0064045/6 -0.002476857 -0.007348966 -0.015061372 -0.03375727/ 
~.00643100~-·· (0.006460359)*-- (0.00770/497)*-- (0.004634209)--· (0.008552286) (0.006517591) (0.009869022) (0.008956022) (0.031926057) (0.039014662) (0.042305255) 
0.008680858 0.007728187 0.008333104 -0.004547882 -0.002776652 -0.003110406 0.003482548 -0.0019187/0 -0.037869119 -0.022991370 0.000421035 
(0.006065825) (0.006073299) (0.006601609) (0.006204008) (0.005238744) (0.004834916) (0.006874381) (0.006158317) (0.042766240) (0.053880961) (0.028618741) 
White rows indicate the results for the feedback coefficient, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coefficient. Parentheses include the standard errors 
of the estimates; sample period: 21711997-3111211998. (* = 10% sign. Level, ** = 5% sign. Level, *** = 1% sign. Level). 
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-0.033394/34 
(0.025239001) 
0.103598014 
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Table 3.15: Long volume ratio results (In-crisis) 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
VR150 EVR150 VR200 EVR200 VR150 EVR150 VR200 EVR200 VR150 EVR150 VR200 
-0.003466786 
(0.006944225) 
-0.021676090 
(0.013176223)· 
-0.014247793 -0.003427253 -0.002441583 -0.002252077 -0.003172787 
(0.005764719)*· (0.0082338502 (0.006223304) (0.002370165) (0.006991832) 
0.034145413 -0.032406868 -0.095399320 -0.011009763 -0.031980485 
(0.093627712) (0.0170211 10)· (0.011902273) .. •• (0.009854507) (0.015414882)·· 
-001-l25U1188 -0.014154851 -0.013296587 -0.014103864 -0.002082302 -0.002656179 -0.001982276 -0.002728510 
(0006161437) ** (0.005796549)·· (0.005393306)·· (0.006385298)·" (0.003096997) (0.006438976) (0.007177922) (0.006267884) 
0.023755830 0.034893667 0./49351505 0.0361J 3894 -0.007766882 -0.003785529 -0.006793310 -0.003230592 
(0095803972) (0.085855027) (0.052260029) ••• (0.072363834) (0.007763398) (0.010766779) (0.010265487) (0.010031254) 
-0.0138938117 -0.013865 J.l6 -0.OJ.l315253 -0.014258887 -0.002335925 -0.003609983 -0.001107153 -0.002524355 -0.033453690 
{O.006J7-i-1fifi)* * (0005846505)*· (0.006392528)*· (0.005531486)*"· (0.00747921 I) (0.001357498)··· (0.007411699) (0.007015439) (0.060333672) 
o 06492062Y 0.077505544 0.011189856 0.017708600 -0.002098234 -0.000753384 -0.003715281 -0.001759288 O. 127 J.l1I 1 7 
(0073236703) (0089082803) (0.046773247) 12· 08858042 3l ((j. 0071926931 (0.003685964J (0.00752/371) 10.007917755) _to. 106387105) 
-001 51084 I 3 -0.013712391 -0.0 J.I 13 4992 -0.0 J.l857619 -0.001780596 0.004459369 0.002079089 0.004590839 -0.030976988 -0.028979615 -0.032906747 
(0005% 55011 •• (000570U24) •• (0.006220580)·· (0.005437743)"· (0.002303828) (0.009731808) (0.004112589) (0.009670484) JO.035422909) (0.034000(}46) (0.034110515) 
-IJ023 7 6J708 0.029854132 -0.029638773 -0.02 1963946 -0.002319511 -0.008598622 -0.005584869 -0.008794338 -0.125611509 -0.147413069 -0.11 J.109952 
(0015582980) (00580758H3) (0.013983154)*· (0.013446549) (0.002721312) (0.006599 J.l9) (0.004343028) (0.006369000) (0.060302558)·· (0.058542916)" .. (0.076452589) 
-0 UI 52-13246 -0013681562 -0013668166 -0.013576698 -0.009457 I 52 -0.010681321 0.003295384 -0.008281773 -0.031897550 -0.028501N190 -0032619326 
(0005815423)··· (0.005725846)" {O.0050005311"· (f)o05962453)*· (0.012845324) (0.011356847) (0.011300902) (0.013832795) (0.051887118) (0.034977841) jO. O·/Ii I 45(24) 
-0.031269314 -0.035057401 -0.034459270 -0.034528471 0.005748162 0.006720132 -0.007465690 0.004521142 -0.018081288 -0.016860853 -0. OW8l113-11 
(001207-1331)··· (0.005033 I 32)*·· (0.006614643)··· (0.011066263)·" (0.0090952541 (0.008049 129) (0.008393210) (0.009901497) (0.071815551) (0.028691325) J!i.04071<N138) 
While rows md,cate the results Jor the feedback coeffiCIent, while the shaded rows correspond to the threshold coeffiCIent. Parentheses mclude the standard errors 
oJthe estimates; sample period: 11711997-3//1211998. (* = 10% sign. Level, ** = 5% sign. Level, *** = 1% sign. Level). 
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EVR200 
-0.030769856 
(0.031370920) 
-0. 134265667 
((1.054735235) .... 
-0.0293/666/ 
(0.039564608) 
-0.010548400 
(0.035000041) 
Further tests for that period revealed that this pattern~s significance is 
encountered (100/0 level) within the area between ranks 1.0 and 1.5. When long 
volume ratios were used, results were overtly indicative of negative feedback trading 
of circumstantial statistical significance. 
When short volume ratios were used, the results for South Korea during the 
post-crisis period were nearly always69 indicative of positive feedback trading on 
behalf of threshold traders; statistical significance was absent here. The results from 
the tests with long volume ratios indicated a rather mixed picture, with the threshold 
coefficient failing to align itself with any distinctive feedback direction; its statistical 
significance exhibited signs of clustering at the top ranks of each long volume ratio, 
where the threshold sign was indicative of a statistically significant, positive 
feedback trading pattern. 
Tests with both short and long volume ratios after the crisis generated a 
rather mixed picture for Taiwan, with the threshold coefficient failing to align itself 
with any distinctive feedback direction. The statistical significance of the threshold 
coefficient here tends to manifest itself mostly at the top ranks of the long volume 
ratios only; more specifically, at ranks 3.0 and above the indication (much like for 
the in-crisis period) is one of statistically significant (10% level) positive feedback 
trading7o. 
69 With the exception of the threshold coefficient of the VR20 at ranks 1. O. (in-crisis) and 1.5 (post-
crisis). h h Id .m· I 
70 With the exception of the top rank (2.5) of the EVR200. which gave us a t res 0 coeJJ,e,en 
indicative of negative feedback trading. 
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With regards to the presentation of the results above, we may note the 
following. First of all, it is interesting to note that, with the exception of a limited 
number of tests, the feedback coefficient appears to be firmly tilted towards positive 
feedback trading irrespective of the period under investigation (pre-, in- or post-
crisis). The temporal presence of its statistical significance does not exhibit 
uniformity across the three markets; in Hong Kong it manifests itself significantly 
during and after the crisis, in South Korea before and after the crisis, while it does 
not appear to be overwhelmingly significant in Taiwan in any of the three sub-
periods. None of the three markets furnished us with evidence of any discernible 
significant threshold pattern, be it for short or long volume ratios for the in-crisis 
period; as a result, we fail to accept the fifth hypothesis here for any of them. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Exploiting noise traders is not necessarily a practice confined to rational, 
fundamentals-based investors; even investors without explicit knowledge of 
fundamentals may try to exploit the trading conduct of noise traders. A number of 
analytical models have been proposed in the Finance literature to describe both 
"modes" of exploitation. Contrary to fundamentals-based speculation, however, the 
concept of non-fundamental speculation has never been tested empirically, i.e. using 
real-market data. 
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Table 3.16: Short volume ratio results (Post-crisis) 
\ 
.. 
Hong Kong South Korea Taiwan 
-.~----- .~-------
RA~KS VR10 EVRIO 
i 
VIUO EVIUO VRIO EVRIO VIUO EVIUO VRIO EVRIO VIUO 
t I I 
--.--- rr) ()i}r~3l} 
-0.051115617 -0.02-1983106 -u () 1 85579 19 
I (0 O!IO!~I~O,·· (0.02274-1499)" " (0 01 0820-1 I 6j+ 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
._--
--~----
(0.030-19256-1) 
·0 {j(jIJ73')1 ')2 o. / 70-19369-1 -0.01/280933 -0.08/826776 
((J 08-1 U33 28) (0.21)90399-17) (027809-167/) (0.0516060 75) 
.1) 05-1!3HJ26 ·0.052466856 -0.05909/ /63 -0051-110-139 -0.02-156/6/9 -0.025118518 ·0.025-166605 -0.025-126022 -0.019395170 -0019IS]775 -0.OI86516S1 
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To address this issue, we introduced a novel trader-type ("threshold trader") 
who is not a "fundamentalist", yet conditions his trades upon a certain piece of 
information that allows him insight into the underlying market trend (and, through 
the latter, into the presence of noise traders, portrayed here as feedback traders). 
We assumed that the "threshold trader" uses a technical indicator (volume-ratio) 
and becomes active anytime its value exceeds a certain threshold reflecting a rise 
in volume. To test for the presence of threshold traders empirically, we used a 
modified version of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model for various values, 
lengths and spe~ifications of the volume-ratio. 
We tested for the significance of the presence of threshold traders in three 
markets (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan), because our intention was to study 
how the threshold-traders' behaviour manifested itself in markets with differences 
in the regulatory settings related to the entry/trading conduct of investors, i.e. with 
differences in their degree of financial liberalization; the degree of market-
heterogeneity (reflected here through the participation of foreign investors) was 
introduced here as an indicator of a market's liberalization. 
Results indicated a discernible and statistically significant threshold trading 
pattern in the Hong Kong market when short volume-ratios were used, and we 
showed how that market's regulatory environment, coupled with its heterogeneity 
could be employed as possible factors to account for this pattern. The latter 
maintained its discemibility during the period prior to the rise in overseas 
investors' participation; however, when comparing its presence at those ranks at 
which it was found to be significant in the period prior to the rise in foreign 
trading to the same ranks for the period following this rise, it was found to be 
insignificantly different. South Korea and Taiwan generated no statistically 
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significant, discernible threshold patterns be it Dor the full . d &". th b 
' peno or lor e su -
periods associated with our heterogeneity-related hypothesis. 
We also tested for the threshold traders' presence during the 1997 Asian 
crisis period, in line with the widely documented positive volatility-volume 
relationship (Karpoff, 1987), since rising volume was designated to be their 
trading basis; none of the three markets was found to demonstrate significantly 
discernible threshold patterns during the Asian crisis period. 
Our evidence suggests that the degree of a market's heterogeneity (i.e. the 
participation of overseas investors) does appear to be conducive to the rise of 
certain threshold trading patterns; our results, actually, imply that a liberal 
regulatory environment and higher foreign participation tend to favour the 
manifestation of threshold trading patterns71 • Since threshold traders operate under 
a feedback demand function, this is in line with what we mentioned in the 
beginning (Section 3.5) regarding the practice of feedback trading and how it may 
vary across different regulatory regimes. 
We would like to accentuate the fact that our study constitutes an initial 
attempt to test for non-fundamental speculation empirically. It is our 
understanding that the choice of the indicator upon which threshold traders would 
trade is only limited by the availability of indicators (and relevant data). We 
reckon that further studies on the issue of threshold trading could involve other 
(volume- and non-volume-based) indicators to test for the behaviour of threshold 
71 The wording here may appear cautious, however, we consider it app~opriate to r,epeat here t~at 
our results provided us with indications "in favour" of,the hetero~enelf)'-~ypo~h~sls for a sp~cific 
category (short) of volume ratios; long volume ratios did not p;oVlde us with Similar results m the 
case of Hong Kong. As a result, claiming that Hong Kong s heterogene/~' leads to threshold 
traders being able to demonstrate any discernible pattern would probab~r be maccurate here, 
157 
traders, as well as other proxies (beyond heterogeneity) to account for their 
possible patterns. 
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Chapter 4 
An Investigation of the Impact of Specific 
Regulatory Provisions upon Market-wide 
Herding 
4.1 Introduction 
Herd behaviour has received notable attention in the Finance literature 
during the last two decades to the extent that it has led to the evolution of a rather 
impressive research strand. A large array of studic:s, both analytical as \\ell as 
empirical in nature (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) 
have attempted to provide extra insight into various aspects of the herd mentality, 
Analytical models have attempted to illustrate yarious possible theoretical 
manifestations of herding, often by invoking the concept of informational 
cascades as a result of social interactions (e.g. Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et aI, 
1992) and professional considerations (e,g, Scharfstein and Stein, 1990: Trueman. 
1994). Empirical studies have endeavoured to quantify herding, either through the 
employment of microdata72 (e.g. Lakonishok et aI, 1992: \\'ermers. 1999) or 
aggregate data (e.g. Christie and Huang. 1995; Chang et a1. :WOO; Hv,:ang and 
Salmon. 2004); research of the kind has been quite extensive. the result being that 
77 The term "microdata", when IIsed in our chapter, shall refer to any f)pe ()/ data rl'/,lfl'd to 
investment entities, be they a/individual, institutional or other background; it cm'as data, such as 
investors' accounts and transaction-data, II 'e make lise o( the term as opposed to "aggregate" 
data, ""Iich rl~r~'r to any type (~( data related to the aggrt'g,ae market /evel, sw:h as pril'l's, \'u/ume 
et al. 
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empirical evidence regarding herding IS now available for vanous markets 
internationally. 
An interesting feature of the empirical research relative to herding is that it 
has mostly been carried out within the contexts of single markets, \\ith the aim of 
assessing herding, either across specific investor-types (e.g. Lakonishok et aL 
1992; Wermers, 1999; Choe et aI, 1999; Kim and Wei, 2002a and b) or across 
various market segments (Christie and Huang, 1995; Gleason et aI, 2004, Demirer 
and Kutan (2006) or both (Oehler, 1998). Exceptions to the above constitute the 
studies by Chang et al (2000) and Hwang and Salmon (2004) who study herding 
across a variety of markets. However, the choice of those markets in these studies 
is not motivated by the existence of certain features of theirs that could potentially 
bear an effect upon herding but rather hinges upon a simple comparison of 
"developed versus developing markets". As a result, there appears to be a scarcity 
of empirical herding research both at the comparative level (i.e. examining 
herding in different markets) as well as with regards to the relation of specific 
market features to herding. 
To that end, we extend the scope of empirical research in this area by 
testing for herding on an inter-market basis conditional upon factors that have the 
potential of bearing an impact upon the observed herding; more specifically. \ve 
test for herding on the basis of the following features: a) capital gains' taxes. b) 
short-sales' restrictions and c) index-futures' introduction. The first feature hinges 
upon the notion that the presence/absence of capital gains' taxes may int1uence 
herding in the marketplace. The second feature is based upon the concept (\liller. 
1977) that short-sales' restrictions can give rise to on~rpricing; as overpricing is a 
possible byproduct of herding. the latter'S significance may well be amplified in 
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the presence of such restrictions. Finally, the third feature is based upon the 
association between herding and positive feedback trading and recent (Antoniou 
et aI, 2005b) empirical evidence according to which the introduction of index-
futures bears an effect over the positive feedback trading at the underlying spot 
market's level. All in all, our aim here is to test whether the aforementioned three 
features promote or inhibit the manifestation of herd behaviour across markets. 
A key distinguishing feature of our research relates to the fact that our 
study is not driven by an abstract notion of testing for herding in any single 
market or across any randomly chosen markets; rather it is the array of herd-
related market-features that motivates the choice of our sample. In addition to 
that, it allows for extra insight into the implications of specific regulatory 
provisions, as the features upon which the significance of herding is tested 
constitute elements of the capital market regulatory framework. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 includes a review 
of the literature pertaining to herd behaviour (4.2.1) with special reference to the 
features (4.2.2) we are testing for with regards to herding. Section 4.3 presents the 
entire model-development of our concept while Section ..fA delineates the 
hypotheses relative to our study. Section 4.5 presents the data utilized (4.5.1) 
discusses the methodology employed (4.5.2) and presents some descriptive 
statistics (4.5.3). Section 4.6 presents the results and discusses the empirical 
findings; Section 4.7 concludes. 
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4.2 Theoretical Background 
4.2.1 Definitions and Sources of herding 
Herding, as Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) have noted, involves a "similaritv 
in behaviour" following "interactive observation". Therefore, herding is witnessed 
when people follow the observable information, actions or the payoffs from those 
actions of others. However, the rationale underlyina this tendency to\vards o _ 
imitating others is not easy to delineate, as it appears to be ascribed to various 
motives, which we shall now discuss. 
i) Psychology: In line with popular beliefs, the impetus underlying 
imitation has been assumed to lie within the human nature: people may simply 
prefer to copy others. This tendency towards conformity (Hirshleifer. 2001)) may 
well be related to the interaction of people, as they communicate with one 
another. Communication may be explicit (e.g. when people are conversing - see 
Shiller, 1995), yet it may also be tacit (when people observe each others' choices, 
e.g. in fashion - see Bikhchandani et aI, 1992). Thus, it is the \'ery fact that 
humans dwell within societies and the concomitant interactions among them due 
to this cohabitation that lay the ground for the evolution of imitative phenomena. 
ii) Payoff externalities (Devenow and Welch, 1996): FollO\,ving the 
decisions of others may be associated with informational payoffs. \vhen one: a) 
possesses no private information, b) has private information yet is uncertain about 
it, perhaps because it is of ambiguous or low quality. c) perceives others as better-
informed or d) perceives his abilities of processing information to be inadequate. 
If so, he may choose to free-ride on the informational content of others' actions, 
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thus tackling the problem of information-acquisition (and the rele\'ant 
uncertainty) . 
iii) Informational cascades: If an investor possesses private information. 
he may still decide to ignore it and follow the actions of others, when the 
information conveyed by others' actions provides a useful set of information on 
its own (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). This is expected to be particularly the 
case when the alternative options available are limited; if the latter holds, then this 
will translate into an equally limited array of possible responses towards those 
options, thus enhancing the potential for converging to one of them (Devenow and 
Welch, 1996). 
iv) Professional reasons: Professionals, be they fund managers or analysts 
are subject to periodic evaluation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) which is normally 
of a relative nature, i.e. they are evaluated on the basis of the performance of their 
peers, mostly those with similar (e.g. stocks, bonds, money-market, industry, 
foreign marketls et al) specializations (Ross et aI, 1999). Since their abilities do 
not exhibit uniformity, this provides them with an incentive to monitor the trades 
of their peers in order to avoid deviating from the perceived "benchmark" 
(Lakonishok et aI, 1992). 
Such a situation, where separating "luck" from "skill" has important career 
implications is depicted by Scharfstein and Stein (1990). who posit that in an 
environment characterized by some kind of uncertainty, it might payoff for 
professionals to imitate their peers' actions and ignore their private information 
when making decisions. Assuming that positive circumstances materialize in the 
market, highly skilled ("good") managers will make successful decisions while 
less skilled ("bad") ones will presumably be inclined to "herd" on tlll)SC. so that 
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everyone gives the impression of being equally '~skilled". Conversely, if adverse 
circumstances materialize, it is hard to tell who is "good" (the "bad" ones will 
have performed "badly" anyway, while the "good" ones will have probably 
performed worse than expected). 
v) Reputational considerations": Well-reputed managers may opt for 
herding if reputational fears prevail (i.e. if the potential damage to their reputation 
by a failure outweighs the expected benefits from a success); less-reputed 
managers may resort to herding as a means of free-riding on the reputation of 
better-reputed colleagues. If we assume that the well-reputed individuals are also 
the better-able ones (as it is hard to imagine how a manager's reputation would 
have grown in the absence of a distinctive ability), this may help explain the 
herding tendencies denoted previously with regards to the issue of ability. A 
number of studies (Trueman, 1994; Graham, 1999) conducted within the field of 
financial analysts have shown how the expectation of reputational externalities 
can lead to herding. Trueman (1994) shows that under conditions of uncertainty, it 
is convenient for a "weak" analyst to behave as if he were "strong" through 
copying his "stronger" peers, since he stands a fair chance of gaining the 
investors' recognition (reputational externality), as soon as the information of his 
"strong" peers proves correct Graham (1999) shows that, when an analyst's 
remuneration is associated with his reputation, a well-paid analyst would opt for 
herding, if that would help him maintain his high reputation - and salary. 
vi) "Homogeneity": The argument here pertains mostly to investment 
professionals (fund managers, financial analysts) and hinges around a few simpk 
facts (Lakonishok et aI, 1992; De Bondt and Teh, 1997: Wemlers, 1999). These 
professionals constitute a group of more or less similar traits: they share similar 
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educational backgrounds and qualifications, are exposed to similar information 
signals, may tend towards interpreting them similarly (due to background-
similarities or peer-mimicking) and are subject to a similar framework of 
professional conduct (e.g. compensation schemes, notions of prudence and 
fiduciary duty (De Bondt and Teh, 1997). As a result, it is reasonable to assume 
that their group entails a certain degree of homogeneity, which in turn may well 
render them prone to commonalities in their decision-making, like for instance 
maintaining similar structures of their portfolio-holdings (the case of fund 
managers selecting stocks picked up by many of their peers-see Lakonishok et ai, 
1992) or adhering to the line of the "opinion leaders" or the perceived majority (as 
may well be the case with financial analysts-see, e.g. Graham, 1999 and Welch, 
2000). 
vii) Spurious herding: According to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), this 
involves a similarity of responses to commonly observed signals. An example 
here involves the case of changes in fundamentals becoming public knowledge as 
they have the potential of inducing people to behave in a parallel fashion; a drop 
in deposit rates, for example may lead investors to turn to the stock market in 
search for higher returns. 
viii) Manipulative intent: The actions of a group of informed traders may 
create the impression of a profitable opportunity, thus luring others into it (Van 
Bommel, 2003). The positive feedback mechanism involved in such cases may 
well lead to the manifestation of herding phenomena, where individuals engage in 
interactive trend-chasing. The possibility of rational speculators launching the 
latter has been established in several analytical studies (De Long et ai, 1990; 
Andergassen, 2003) as well as empirically (Soros, 1987). 
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Thus, as our presentation so far suggests, herding is a phenomenon of a 
rather versatile nature and multifaceted manifestations. We shall now attempt to 
delineate the role of the features upon which our investigation of herding will take 
place. 
4.2.2 Herding and relevant market features 
In this section, we will present the case of the association between herding 
and certain market features that have the potential of bearing an impact upon it. 
These features refer to provisions of the capital markets' regulatory framework 
and include capital gains' taxes, short-sales' constraints and index-futures. 
4.2.2.a Capital gains' taxation 
Prior to embarking on the discussion of the relationship between herding 
and capital gains' taxes, we consider it necessary to note from early on that this 
issue: a) has never been investigated before and b) as such has not been resolved. 
Our discussion here shall aim at delineating the theoretical context of the topic. 
We first present the case of the presence of capital gains' taxes bearing a 
positive impact upon herding. If capital gains' taxes are present, this implies that 
the realization of any profits through the liquidation of positions is bound to come 
at a cost. Given that other costs are also involved in the trading process (e.g. 
brokerage fees), such taxes are expected to raise transaction-costs, thus rendering 
the market more frictional. If so, then there exists the potential for an impact upon 
the valuation of assets, the direction of which has evoked considerable debate in 
Finance. In their recent review on this issue, Dai et al (2006) outline the two 
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possible effects of capital gains' taxation discussed in the relevant literature 
, 
namely the capitalization-effect and the lock-in effect. In the presence of capital 
gains' taxes, the former implies that investors prefer to buy stocks at a lower price 
while the latter argues that they would prefer to sell at a higher price. 
We, therefore, notice that capital gains' taxes are capable of bearing a 
certain impact upon the behaviour of investors, thus raising concerns about the 
efficiency of the price-formation process (Ho et aI, 2002). If investors' gains are 
subject to taxation, then this probably means that the frequency of their trades will 
be reduced. Indeed, the higher the level of capital gains' taxes, the less inclined 
investors would be to engage in "aggressive" trading, as the accrued profits from 
frequent transactions would be adversely affected by ta'{ation, especially in 
jurisdictions where capital gains' taxes are a function of the stock-holding period. 
If however, capital gains' taxes provide a disincentive for intensive trading this 
may also be taken to imply that they tend to cast a negative effect upon market 
activity. It follows, that traders, who for some reason, wish to buy and sell at a 
short window may be partly discouraged from doing so, the latter indicating that 
their information (as imprinted in their trades) will not enter the public 
information pool-and hence, will not be imprinted into stock prices. As a result, a 
situation of the kind is expected to produce some negative impact upon efficient 
pricing (Ho et aI, 2002). 
Given that capital gains' taxes affect the sell-side of the market, the latter 
will appear less "expressive" than the buy-side, hence facilitating phenomena of 
upwards mispricing (overpricing). Since herding is capable of generating 
overpricing (e.g. during price-rallies), it is reasonable to assume that the presence 
of capital gains' taxes is a factor contributing to the manifestation of herding~ 
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having said that, however, we by no means wish to imply that it constitutes a 
cause of it. 
We shall now present the case of the absence of capital gains' taxes 
impacting positively upon herding. Assuming complete absence of capital gains' 
taxes, this would provide traders with an incentive to trade more "intensely". If an 
investor does not have to pay tax on the gains he realized from the liquidation of 
his positions, he may well choose to trade (buy and sell) more aggressively. If the 
latter is associated with information-based trading, then obviously this benefits 
market prices from an efficiency point of view. However, if speculative 
considerations prevail (e.g. there exists widespread day-trading), then this may 
lead to mispricing, in case the higher intensity of trades leads to larger price-
swings. The "overconfidence" bias would be expected to be rather relevant in this 
context, since, as Odean (1998) and Glaeser and Weber (2004a; 2004b) have 
shown, overconfidence tends to be associated with a higher frequency of trading. 
Thus, in such a situation, investors might be more inclined towards "gambling-to-
win", as the realization of their profits would come at a reduced cost (compared to 
a market that taxes capital gains). Also, if the absence of capital gains' taxes 
renders trading less costly, it may also lead more traders to enter the market. This 
alone bears the potential of inducing herding, as the latter is primarily the 
byproduct of a participative process (e.g. Bikhchandani et aI, 1992). However, 
higher investors' participation need not necessarily be herd-inducing, if it results 
in the impounding of more information in the marketplace, since this will actually 
lead to more efficient pricing. 
The case of herding being tacitly promoted through the absence of capital 
gains' taxation is presented in a different context by Kim and Wei (2002a), who 
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tested for the role of overseas institutional traders in the Korean market between 
December 1996 and December 1999; their tests involved examining the intensity 
of trading, as well as herding and positive feedback trading on behalf of various 
onshore and offshore foreign funds before, during and after the Asian crisis 
period. Utilizing a unique micro-database, they showed that offshore funds as well 
as funds from Hong Kong and Singapore tended to trade more aggressively, yet 
also engaged in less herding and positive feedback trading when compared to their 
counterparts from the US and Europe. This "aggression" in their trading patterns 
was interpreted by the authors as a result of the fact that offshore jurisdictions (as 
well as the Hong Kong and Singapore ones) do not impose any ta'(es on the 
capital gains realized by funds registered with them; conversely, the US and the 
European jurisdictions do levy their funds with taxes on the basis of their capital 
gains. However, what Kim and Wei (2002a) postulate is that it is the tax-
environment of the foreign funds' countries that impacts upon their herding 
propensity in the host market (in their case, Korea); our intention here is to 
examine how the tax environment of the host market affects such herding 
considerations. 
Thus, the relationship between herding and capital gains' taxes remains, at 
best, an unresolved issue, with arguments pointing towards a versatile 
relationship. Given the above discussion, we propose testing for the hypothesis of 
a significantly different manifestation of herding between markets with and 
without capital gains' tcrees. 
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4.2.2.b Short-selling 
The notion of short-selling is that someone sells a stock he does not o\\n at 
present with the obligation of buying it back at a future price. The idea here is that 
the future price is anticipated to be below the price at which he sold "today"' (i.e. 
the day the sale was formalized) otherwise there would be little incentive to 
engage in such a transaction (Mathiopoulos, 2000). 
Miller (1977) and Baker and Stein (2004) show that short-sales' 
restrictions have the potential of leading to price-overvaluation. According to 
them, a capital market is bound to accommodate people of heterogeneous beliefs; 
to simplify things, let us assume that the two major forces in the marketplace are 
those who are positively predisposed towards a stock ("optimists") and those who 
are negatively predisposed ("pessimists"). It is also reasonable to contend here 
that the former will probably be on the buy-side of the stock while the latter on its 
sell-side. If short-sales' restrictions were to apply, this would imply that the sell-
side of the market would be deprived of a trading tool; as a result, the buy-side 
would tend to appear stronger. A strong buy-side would, consequently imply that 
the possibility of mispricing cannot be ruled out, as part of the sell-side (those 
who do not own the stock) is unable to express itself. If the buyers can have a 
greater impact, then the latter might be imprinted in prices, leading them perhaps 
to deviate from fundamentals, i.e. to overpricing. Miller's picturing of this relates 
to a "demand-and-supply" notion. Short-sales' restrictions would lead to a less 
elastic sell-side (supply), as the latter would incorporate only those holding the 
stock (short-sellers would be proscribed from trading); as a result, the market 
would face an upward price-pressure from a stronger demand (buy-side). 
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How this can be associated with herding is not hard to imagine. If at some 
point in time the price of a stock rises above fundamentals due to the prevalence 
of herd-instincts and there is no possibility of short-selling, those who may have 
expected this and would have otherwise sold the stock short on beforehand are 
unable to do so now. This means that the overpricing can persist for longer, as the 
sell-side is not strong enough to counter it. As a result, short-sales' restrictions 
may amplify the potential impact of herding (assuming the latter is at works) over 
the upwards mispricing of stocks. 
Given our discussion thus far, we test for the hypothesis of the 
introduction of short-sales leading to a reduction of herding in the marketplace. 
4.2.2.c Index-futures' introduction 
In the seminal study on this issue, Antoniou et al (2005b) documented a 
reduction in the significance of positive feedback trading of the underlying spot 
markets across major stock exchanges following the introduction of index-futures. 
The authors justify their findings by invoking the assumption that index-futures 
are able to promote informational efficiency in the marketplace by attracting more 
informed (rational) players. 
The choice of the introduction of index-futures in our research as a 
market-feature capable of affecting herding is based upon conceptual 
considerations related to the association between herding and positive feedback 
trading. In its simplest form, positive feedback trading implies trading in the 
direction of the perceived trend: buy when prices rise, sell when they fall. Thus, 
positive feedback trading can be described as trend-based. On the other hand, 
herding implicitly assumes the interactive observation (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 
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2003) among individuals, based upon which they follow each other. However, if 
imitating tendencies reach a certain critical level, it is perhaps reasonable to 
assume that they are bound to lead to the launch of a trend in the market. From 
then on, it is of little difference whether successive herd-followers "follow the 
trend" or "follow the herd", since the two will have gradually become 
indistinguishable. As a result, positive feedback trading implies trading on the 
trend, while herding is a directional force capable of launching a trend. It follows 
that herding cannot exist in the absence of positive feedback trading, since those 
following a trend shaped by the herding of others must trade to its direction; it is 
this very element that prompted us to test for the impact of the introduction of 
index-futures upon herding in the market context. Thus, if the introduction of 
index futures has the potential of bearing an effect upon positive feedback trading 
at the level of the underlying spot market, it might impact upon its herding as 
well. 
Of course, as we mentioned in Chapter 2, the inverse relationship need not 
hold; positive feedback trading may be the result of rational investment strategies 
(including, for instance, portfolio insurance and stop-loss orders) without herding 
being at work. Thus, a potential reduction in the positive feedback trading levels 
at the spot market may not necessarily reduce the corresponding herding levels of 
that market. 
In view of the fact that the above issue appears to be both contradictory 
(since the causality between herding and positive feedback trading is not 
straightforward) and unexplored, we choose test for the hypothesis that the 
introduction of index-futures leads to a significant impact upon herding in the 
market. 
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Following our discussion above, we would like to recapitulate at this stage 
by drawing some attention to the fact that we test for herd behaviour in different 
markets on the basis of three specific market features, namely capital-gains' taxes, 
short-sales' restrictions and index-futures' introduction, whose association with 
herding has been outlined above in detail. 
Our research produces the following contributions: 
- extends existing empirical herding research, by testing for herding on a cross-
market basis contingent upon market-features whose association with herd 
behaviour has not been examined before 
- provides a novel framework for testing for herding across markets, as the choice 
of the markets is driven by the factors upon which the significance of herding is 
tested 
- allows for extra insight into the implications of specific regulatory provisions 
upon the presence of herding, as the features of the markets upon which the 
herding-tests are conditioned constitute parts of the institutional settings of those 
markets 
4.3 Measuring Herding: Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
The efforts towards measuring herding during the 1990s culminated into 
two distinct lineages of measures; the fonner, introduced by Lakonishok et a1 
(1992) advocated the usage of microdata (proprietary data usually involving 
transactions at the investor's level) to assess the existence of herding; the latter, 
introduced by Christie and Huang (1995) proposed a more flexible measure (at 
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least in terms of data) to that end. What Christie and Huang (1995) essentially 
argued, is that herding could be reflected in the cross-section of asset returns. in 
the sense that a lower cross-sectional dispersion of returns would indicate that 
assets moved in tandem with their cross-sectional mean, i.e. herded towards some 
sort of market consensus. Chang et al (2000) modified the herding measure of 
Christie and Huang (1995); whereas Christie and Huang (1995) tested for the 
presence of herding in the extreme tails of the return distribution, Chang et al 
(2000) developed a test aiming at capturing herding in the presence of non-
linearities. 
H wang and Salmon (2004) began from parallel considerations; instead of 
measuring herding using the cross-sectional standardized (Christie and Huang, 
1995) or absolute (Chang et aI, 2000) deviations of returns, they tested for herding 
on the basis of the cross-sectional dispersion of the factor-sensitivity of assets. 
More specifically, they argued that, when investors are driven by behavioural 
biases, their perceptions of the risk-return relationship of assets may be distorted. 
If they do, indeed, herd towards the market consensus, then it is possible that, as 
individual asset returns follow the direction of the market return, their CAPM-
betas will deviate from their equilibrium values. Thus, the beta of a stock does not 
remain constant (as the conventional CAPM would posit), but changes with the 
fluctuations of investors' sentiment. As a result, the cross-sectional dispersion of 
the stock-betas would also be expected to be smaller, i.e. asset betas would tend 
towards the value of the market beta, namely unity. It is on these very premises 
that their herding measure is based. 
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More specifically, they assume the equilibrium73 beta (let {Jimt) and its 
behaviourally biased version ({J~mt)' whose relationship is assumed to be the 
following: 
J 
(E~(rit) / Et(rmt)) = {J~mt = {Jimt - hmt ({Jimt - 1) (1) 
where E~ (rit) is the behaviourally biased conditional expectation of excess 
returns of asset i at time t, Et (rmt) is the conditional expectation of excess returns 
of the market at time t and hmt < 1 is a time-variant herding parameter. To 
measure hmt (and for this reason, herding on a market-wide basis), the authors 
calculate the cross-sectional dispersion of {J~mt ' as: 
(2) 
Equation (2) is rewritten as follows: 
(3) 
in order to extract hmt • 
Finally, (3) is written as follows: 
log [Stde({J~mt)] = Pm + H mt + Umt (4) 
where 
(5) 
with Pm = E [log [SIde ({Jimt) ]] and Umt - iid (0, (J'~,u) 
and H mt = log (1- hmt) (6) 
7J See p.589 aftheir paper. 
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Hwang and Salmon (2004) assume that the herding parameter follows an AR(l) 
process and their model becomes: 
(7) 
H mt = ¢ m H m,H + 7] mt (8) 
where 7] mt ~ iid (0, (J"~,'7) 
The above system of equations (7) and (8) accommodates herding as an 
unobserved component. To extract the latter, Hwang and Salmon (2004) employ 
the Kalman filter (see Appendix). Thus, in the above setting, the log [Stdc(j3~m)] 
is expected to vary with herding levels, the change of which is reflected through 
the H mI. The above system of equations (7) and (8) constitutes the original 
expression of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) herding measure. 
Special attention is drawn here to the pattern of H mt. If cr~,77 = 0, then H mt 
= 0 and there is no herding. Conversely, a significant value of cr~''7 would imply 
the existence of herding and (as the authors state) this would further be reinforced 
by a significant ¢m . The absolute value of the latter is taken to be smaller than or 
equal to one, since, as Hwang and Salmon (2004) posit, herding would not be 
expected to be an explosive process. 
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4.4 Hypotheses and our markets 
4.4.1 Sample-selection: Rationale 
We will now present our hypotheses on the basis of our prevIOUS 
discussion in Section 4.2. Before doing that however, we will focus our attention 
on the issue of the selection of the markets used in our work. Our intention is to 
show the criteria employed in the selection of those markets. 
The model of Hwang and Salmon (2004) tests for herding on the basis of a 
set of stocks belonging to a certain index; in their paper. they assume the 
constituent stocks of the S&P500 (United States) and the KOSPI (South Korea) 
indices. However, this choice of theirs raises the issue of comparability. The 
S&P500 accounts for a fraction (about 20-25%) of the shares listed on the New 
York stock exchange, while the KOSPI includes every single stock listed on the 
Korean stock market. Although the number of stocks of both indices involved is 
rather similar (they assume 657 stocks from the KOSPI), we contend that the two 
indices are not directly comparable, as the S&P500 is a "selection" 
(capitalization-based) index, while the KOSPI is an all-shares' one. 
Another issue here is the one of thin trading. Herding studies (Hwang and 
Salmon, 2005; Henker et aL 2006) employ a variety of criteria to alleviate this 
problem; however. these studies involve the application of a single or multiple 
sorting criteria for a single market74 . The problem here is that markets differ in 
terms of structure and trading activity and as such may require different thin-
74 Henker et al (2006) test for intraday herding in the Australian market; Hwang and Salmon 
(005) test/Iii" herding in the ['S, UK and S. Korea, yet it is only'/i)!' the L'S market that rill'.\' LI{'{'11 
their thin-trading-fillt'rs 
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trading filters. In the end of the day, the final number of stocks usina either a 
~ 
single or multiple filters for each market will reflect some kind of selection 
anyway. 
The above considerations prompted us to choose to work on the premises 
of top-capitalization indices. This selection allows us both a good approximation 
of the total market activity as well as the inclusion of the most liquid stocks (thus, 
removing any thin-trading considerations). What is more, to ensure some degree 
of comparability, we chose to select those top-capitalization indices whose 
composition does not exceed 40 stocks. Finally, we chose to work only with those 
indices for which constituent lists were available, either from online resources or 
from the respective stock exchanges, in order to ensure the accuracy of the 
estimations of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model. 
We then proceeded to a selection of markets based upon the availability of 
data regarding the hypotheses involved. Grubel (2001) and Berwin (2005) 
provided us with evidence regarding capital gains' taxation worldwide, while Bris 
et al (2004) and Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) provided us with a picture of the 
practice of short-sales worldwide. Finally, Gulen and Mayhew (2000) provided us 
with information regarding the introduction of several index-futures' contracts. 
In the aftermath of the above, we ended up with the following markets 
(indices' names in brackets): Austria (ATX), Belgium (BEL20), France (C.J.C-IO). 
Germany (DAX30), Hong Kong (Hang Seng) , Netherlands (AE\), Portugal 
(PSI20), Switzerland (S.H!). Apart from the indices whose names are indicatin~ of 
the number of stocks they accommodate the rest of the indices maintain a 
. , 
variable number of constituents. which has historically ranged \\ithin a tight band. 
The A TX has historically included 17 to 2~ stocks. while similar figures apply f()r 
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the AEX, whose constituents ranged between 13 and 25 since its inception in 
1983. The Swiss Market Index historically included 18 to 29 stocks in its 
composition, while the number of constituents of the Hang Seng index has been 
equal to 33 since the late 1960s. 
4.4.2 Sample-selection: allocating the markets to the hypotheses 
Given the above discussion, we now present the hypotheses coupled with 
relevant background on the markets used in each of them: 
Hypothesis 1: Herding manifests itself in significantly different fashions between 
markets with and without capital gains' ta:'(es 
This hypothesis rests upon the discussion of Section 4.2.2.a and is tested 
here on the basis of the following markets: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Hong Kong, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland. Our sample includes both large 
(France, Gennany, Hong Kong, Switzerland) as well as smaller (Austria, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal) capital markets. We will now provide a summary 
picture of the capital gains' taxation provisions applying in each one in brief. 
Austria levies taxes on capital gains realized by individuals and 
corporations (indigenous and overseas) in the range of 0-50 percent, subject to the 
holding period75 and the nature76 of the asset. Belgium is considered a market 
\vhere capital gains are not taxed; such a perception is enforced by the fact that 
taxation of realized capital gains is only applicable to individuals and corporations 
75 Ta.;r: between =ero and 50 percent applicable to gains reali=ed from the sales of stocks held Jur 
less than a year; also. if the seller maintained a participation of at least. ll','rl'elll in the company 
during the previous jive years, These provisions uppl.v with cerrain mriations to both individuals 
as \I'c!! as corporations. be they local or overseas; see Berwin. :005, 
"6 Shares qualifying as "business assets" are not ta'C-exempt; othenrise. the rrovisions 
sumll/,Jr/:,·j in Footnote 75 apply; see Benl'in, 2005, 
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with participations in local companies in excess of 25 percent. Germany maintains 
high capital gains' taxes (around half the gains realized are considered taxable at 
anywhere between 20 and 50 percent subject to the investor's status 77), more so 
for those realized within a short-term (6-12 months) holding period. Capital gains 
are subject to taxation at a rate of up to 27 percent in France for local individuals78 
and companies79, while separate provisions apply for overseas investors8o. Hong 
Kong constitutes a jurisdiction where there exist zero capital gains' taxes, as long 
as the gains are not arising from "trade, profession or business" (see Grube I , 
2001). Regarding the Netherlands, it is considered (Grubel, 2001) as a jurisdiction 
that does not tax capital gains; this is due to the fact that capital gains' taxes are 
very low for individuals81 (local and overseas), although corporations are subject 
to variable taxation82• Portugal taxes capital gains if the holding period is less than 
a year at net rates ranging between 10 and 25 percent83• Finally, Switzerland does 
not impose taxes on capital gains, unless special circumstances materialize84 . 
77 Local individuals are subject to taxation as follows: half their capital gains are considered 
taxable at a rate ranging from 15 to 42 percent plus 5.5 percent plus Church tax; overseas 
individuals, much like in other countries, are subject to exemptions unless their shares constitute 
part of their undertakings in Germany. Credit institutions, finanCial services' institutions, financial 
enterprises, health and life insurance companies and pension funds are not subject to exemption; 
see Berwin, 2005. 
78 The figure of 27 percent includes income tax (J 6 percent) plus surtaxes (1 J percent) and is 
levied upon local individuals in case the total sales of shares exceed £ J 5,000. 
79 In the case of local corporations, capital gains are taxed at the reduced J 5.72 percent rate (15 
percent income tax plus surtaxes) only if the shares sold were held for more than two years, 
otherwise, normal corporate profit tax rates apply (33.33 percent plus surtaxes); see Berwin, 
2005. 
80 Non-resident individuals and corporations are subject to capital gains' ta'"C (16 percent) only if 
they maintained a participation in excess of 25 percent during the previous fIVe years; see Berwin, 
2005. 
81 Shareholder-ownerships in excess of 5 percent are subject to capital gains' tax of 25 percent. 
Otherwise, local individuals are taxed only upon 4 percent of the average fair market value of the 
shares measured at the start and end of the year at a rate of 30 percent, while overseas individuals 
are not subject to tax; see Berwin, 2005. 
81See Berwin (2005) for details. 
83 Local individuals are subject to a tax rate of J 0 percent; the latter applies to overseas 
individuals subject to certain clauses. Local and overseas corporations are subject to capital 
~ains' taxes equal to 25 percent, although several exemptions due to legal reasons may apply. 
4 See Berwin (2005). 
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Thus, the above presentation seems to indicate that Belgium, Hong Kong. the 
~etherlands and Switzerland appear to be the jurisdictions in our sample \\-ith the 
most liberal treatment of capital gains' taxation compared to the other four 
markets. 
Hypothesis 2: The introduction of short-sales bears a negative impact upon 
herding 
As short-sales' constraints have been found to be associated \\-ith the 
overvaluation of assets (Miller, 1977), we test whether they are also associated 
with higher herding, as the latter has the potential of generating overpricing. We 
test for this hypothesis using the markets of Hong Kong and Portugal. The choice 
of these two markets was based upon the fact that the rest of the markets of our 
sample have legally allowed short-selling for decades and, as such, it is not 
possible to test for the impact of the latter's introduction. 
Regarding Hong Kong, the local Stock Exchange Authorities first allowed 
short sales in January 1994 for an initial sample of seventeen specifically 
designated stocks. Since March 1996 the eligibility for short-selling was extended 
to all the constituents of the underlying indices85 of index-based derivatives who 
met certain capitalization86 and turnover87 requirements (Ho et al. 2002; Chang 
and Yu, 2004). In the case of Portugal our information stems from Lobao and 
Serra (2006), who note that short-selling constraints were gradually removed 
during 1999. 
8j Such indices are: the Hang Seng, the .\filli Hang Seng Inde.x, the H-Shares Index and rht! 
FTSElXinhua Chil/tl :5 Index. 
86 Minimum capitali=ation mllst eqllal H KS I billion 
.1" Jlinimllm tllrno\,/!r-to-capitali=ation ratio must be no less than 0..1. 
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Hypothesis 3: The introduction of index-futures bears a significant impact upon 
herding in the market 
We test for this hypothesis using the following markets: Germany, Hong 
Kong and the Netherlands. We would like to devote some space to explain why. 
even though all the markets in our sample have maintained index-futures since 
identifiable points in the past, we decided to restrict our tests to these three 
markets. 
In certain cases (Belgium, France, Portugal, Switzerland) the introduction 
of index-futures took place shortly after (less than four years) the launch of the 
underlying index88. As a result, the pre-futures' introduction period grows very 
small, thus leading to estimation problems, since our herding-measure involves 
monthly observations. We also chose not to test for Austria due to the limited 
availability of historical constituent lists for the ATX-index for the pre-futures' 
period89 . Index-futures were introduced on the Hang Seng (Hong Kong) in May 
1986, the AEX (Netherlands) in October 1988 and the DAX30 (Germany) in 
November 1990. 
In all cases, and based on the premises of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
model, the significance (or not) of herding would be established through the 
results for the coefficients of the state equation: 
88 The relevant index-futures' introduction dates (underlying spot-market inde.r: launch dates in 
brackets) are: BEL20: October /993 (March /99/); CAC40: November /988 (January /988); 
PSI20: June /996 (January /993); SMI: November /990 (July /988). 
89 The A TX-inde.r: futures' contract was launched as of August /992, yet constituent lists for that 
index are available since November /99/. 
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H mt = ¢m H m,t-J + 'lmt 
As mentioned above (Section -+.3), herding is significant if: a) the 
¢ m were to be significant and b) the variance (a~,'7) of 'l mt is found to be 
significant. 
4.5 Data and Methodology 
4.5.1 Data 
We use daily data for our sample-markets mentioned previously (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Portugal, S\vitzerland); the 
data relate to the closing prices of the following indices: ATX (Austria), BEL20 
(Belgium), CAC.:f.O (France), DAX30 (Germany), Hang Seng (Hong Kong), AEX 
(Netherlands), PSI20 (Portugal), SMI (Switzerland). All data on the above 
indices' closing prices as well as the closing prices of their historical constituent 
stocks were collected from Datastream. Data on the historical constituent lists of 
these indices were obtained from the respective stock exchanges and exchange-
related websites. 
To calculate the excess returns for the H\vang and Salmon (2004) model, 
we used the followina risk-free rates for each market, which we obtained from e 
Datastream: 
- Austria (3-month VIBOR) 
- Belgium (3-month treasury-bill) 
- France (3-month PIBOR) 
- Gem1any (3-month interbank rate) 
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- Hong Kong (Prime Rate before 30112/1985; 3-month deposit rate 
afterwards) 
- Netherlands (3-month interbank rate) 
- Portugal (3-month deposit-rate up to 31112/1998; 3-month Euribor after 
11111999) 
- Switzerland (3-month interbank rate) 
4.5.2 Methodology 
We test for herding using the original Hwang and Salmon (2004) model in 
line with the discussion carried out in Section 4.3. 
We first estimate the OLS-estimates of the betas using daily excess returns 
within monthly windows in the standard market model: 
- b + pb 
ritd - au Imt rmtd + Citd (9) 
where the subscript td indicates daily data for month t. 
Having estimated these monthly betas for the stocks corresponding to each 
market index in month t, we then estimate their cross-sectional standard deviation 
for that month, thus constructing a monthly time-series of it. As Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) argue, the choice of monthly windows is driven by both estimation 
considerations (to reduce the estimation error of the betas) as well as practical 
ones (to maintain a number of observations sufficient enough to track do\\-n 
herding). 
\Ve 1I:st for the first hypothesis using the 1 1/1996-3111212005 window for 
all eight markets of that hypothesis' sample. For the second and third hypotheses. 
\\ l' test for herding in the period preceding. as \\"ell as the period following the 
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introduction of short-sales and index-futures respectively. Our estimations for the 
second and third hypotheses are conducted on the basis of time-\\'indows of 4 and 
5 years before and after the introduction-point in order to ensure the robustness of 
our findings. 
More specifically, in hypothesis 2, we test for herding in Hong Kong for 
the 1/3/1992-31/3/1996 and 1/4/1996-31/3/2000 periods (±4 years) as well as the 
1/3/1991-31/3/1996 and 1/4/1996-31/3/2001 periods (±5 years); in the case of 
Portugal, we test for herding for the 1/1/1996-31/12/1999 and 11112000-
31/12/2003 periods (±4 years) as well as the 1/111995-3111211999 and 111/2000-
31/12/2004 periods (±5 years). 
Finally, in hypothesis 3, we test for herding in Germany for the 1/12/1986-
1112/1990 and 1/12/1990-30/11/1994 periods (±4 years) as well the 111211985-
1/12/1990 and 1/12/1990-30/11/1995 periods (±5 years );in Hong Kong for the 
1/5/1982-30/4/1986 and 1/5/1986-30/4/1990 periods (±4 years) as well the 
1/5/1981-30/4/1986 and 1/5/1986-30/4/1991 periods (±5 years); in the case of the 
Netherlands, we test for herding for the 1/11/1984-31/1011988 and 111111988-
31/10/1992 periods (±4 years) as well as the 1/11/1983-3111011988 and 
1/11/1988-31/10/1993 periods (±5 years). 
4.5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents some statistics related to the estimated logarithmic 
cross-sectional standard deviation of the betas of the eight market indices' 
portfolios for each of the three hypotheses. As indicated by the table, the 
logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the betas does not indicate any 
departures from normality for any single market. Therefore, the state-space model 
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of Hwang and Salmon (2004) described previously can be legitimately estimated 
using the Kalman filter for our hypotheses. 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Herding and capital-gains' taxation 
Table 4.2 reports the results from the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model 
regarding the first hypothesis, namely that herding is expected to manifest itself in 
significantly different fashions between markets with and without capital gains' 
taxes. Our interest here is concentrated on the estimates for the parameters of the 
state-equation, namely ¢m and (J'm,'l' since significant values for those two would 
indicate the presence of significant herding. 
As Table 4.2 illustrates, herding is persistent for all eight market indices, 
as the persistence parameter (¢m ) is significant for all of them (1 % level). This 
finding is further corroborated by the estimates for the standard deviation ((J m,'l ) 
of the state-equation error (17 mt) which are significant at the 10% level for all 
markets. The value of 11m reflects the mean level of the logarithmic cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the index-portfolio betas as adjusted through herding 
(expressed here through H mt ) and is found to be statistically significant at the 10 0 
level within a given band (ranging from approximately -O.l.+ to -0.51). The 
logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the index-portfolio betas is 
found to maintain a statistically significant presence in all markets as the estimates 
or the (J'm,u indicate. 
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In SIX markets (Austria, France, Gennany, Hong Kong, Portugal and 
Switzerland) the persistence parameters are greater than 0.9, while in the 
Netherlands the value of tP m is about 0.88. Belgium records the smallest value of 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
(referring to the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviations for each market index and each 
hypothesis) 
Sample Mean Standard Error Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Markets 
~ Hypothesis 1: 11111996-3111212005 
Austria 
-0.2234158832 0.13421407-19 0.22258 0.19478 1.18050 
Belgium 
-0.2825896370 0.1122192060 0.13709 -0.12257 0.45101 
France 
-0.3125183103 0.1207213549 0.36705 -0.41407 3.55173 
Germany 
-0.3945343763 0.1299474969 0.01621 0.19207 0.18972 
Hong Kong 
-0.3307889647 0.0916978829 -0.363-16 -0.10045 2.69256 
Netherlands 
-0.2576401724 0.1576873969 0.17677 -0.52003 1.9771-1 
Portugal 
-0.3528043817 0.3331163297 0.19365 0.57760 3.1-1357 
Switzerland 
-0.3286169342 0.142-1-155221 0.28490 0.3173-1 2.12685 
Hypothesis 2 
Hong Kong ±4 years (113/1992-31/3/2000) 
-0.4112328731 0.0944649980 -0.15180 -0.37219 0.94200 
Hong Kong ±5 years (1/3/1991-31/3/2001) 
-0.3976947274 0.1008175115 -0.09728 -0.39801 0.98951 
Portugal ±4 years (113/1996-31112/2003) 
-0.2248021752 0.1315369386 -0.33490 -0.12556 1.85755 
Portugal ±5 years (113/1995-3113/2004) 
-0.1973552378 0.1422074209 -0.10973 0.02044 0.24289 
Hypothesis 3 
Germany ±4 years (1/12/1986-30/11/1994) 
-0.5034817020 0.0987843365 0.33602 0.54338 2.98758 
Germany ±5 years (1112/1985-30/1111995) 
-0.4975685361 0.0950987156 0.26159 0.-17771 2.50962 
Hong Kong ±4 years (1/5/1982-30/4/1990) 
-0.3408653169 0.0971 141691 -0.31868 -0.62475 3.18614 
Hong Kong ±5 years (1/5/1981-30/4/1991) 
-0.3412776948 0.0976598513 -0.35591 -0..J7698 3.67105 
Netherlands ±4 years (1111/1984-31/10/1992) 
-0.3563511114 0.1414503362 0.20025 0.15-142 0.72929 
Netherlands ±5 years (1/1111983-31110/1993) 
-0.3362892799 0.1463154912 0.30713 0.22986 2.16869 
tPm equal to approximately 0.78. In tenns of the absolute size of the persistence 
parameters, the markets can be ranked as follows (in descending order): Germany, 
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France, Portugal, Austria, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium. Thus, 
these initial observations seem to suggest the presence of more persistent herding 
for markets where capital gains are subject to taxation. 
We then tried to assess the significance of the difference in the persistence 
of herding across markets; to that end, we tested for the significance of the 
difference in ¢ m between markets with and markets without capital gains' taxes. 
Results from the Wald-tests in Table 4.3 indicate that the persistence parameter 
¢ m is significantly higher in markets where capital gains' taxes exist compared to 
those with minimal or zero capital gains' taxes. This is the case with Germany, 
Portugal, and to an extent, France (which appears to maintain insignificantly 
higher herding levels only compared to Hong Kong); Austria, finally, is the 
exception to the rule, as its herding is significantly higher compared only to 
Belgium. 
To gain further comparative insight into how smooth the presence of 
herding is, we report the figures for the signal-to-noise ratio, which, in line with 
Hwang and Salmon (2004), is denoted here as am,,.,! S.D. (log-CXB); as the 
notation suggests, the signal-to-noise ratio for each market is calculated by 
dividing the a by the time series standard deviation of the logarithmic cross-
m,,, 
sectional standard deviation of the betas and provides an indication of the 
proportion of the variability of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation 
of the betas explained by herding. As Hwang and Salmon (2004) showed 
empirically in their paper, the bigger the value of the signal-to-noise ratio, the less 
smooth over time herding becomes. The signal-to-noise ratios assume values 
around 0.2 for five markets (Austria, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Portugal), 
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Table 4.2: Results from the herding tests (Hwang and Salmon, 2004): Hypothesis 1 
log [Stdc(P:m)] = Pm + H ml + U m/) Uml - iid (0, lT~,v) 
H ml = ¢m H m,I-1 + llml' llml - iid (0, IT;n,,,) 
Austria BelgIUm France Germany Hong Kong Netherlands Portugal Switzerland 
¢m 
0.931638304 0.781012913 0.963833797 0.990372783 0.930112665 0.877778667 0.97000-1762 0.902389489 
(0.037035887) ••• (0.095883896) ••• (0.027187920)*·· (0.01-1418227)*·· (0.040169540)··· (0.0469-15119) ... (0.02335364-1) ••• (0.044112704)*·· 
-0.244844170 -0.28587990-1 -0.313978394 -0.510093815 -0.331300893 -0.273552343 -0.1-11689971 -0.334083933 
Pm (0.036371279)*·· (0.016162451)··· (0.038358971) ..... (0.04674-1981)*·· (0.023088009)*·· (0.0-13598515)*·· (0.042873861)*" (0.036339868) ••• 
0.033338986 0.033395613 0.0260-12734 0.022811028 0.02089531 0.067285883 0.025874215 0.0-1-1057587 
IT m,,, (0.000517685)*· (0.000602196)* (0.000284524) .. (0.000263191)·· (0.000223756)* (0.001200916)*u (0.000301508)" (0.000783080) •• 
0.100716791 0.0983013-18 0.07709271 0.091796095 0.07296285 0.072589758 0.093993548 0.0991-169-11 
lTm,u (0.001516019)··· (0.001447166)··· (0.000881763)·" (0.001203310)*·· (0.000778797)*·· (O.OOll 36900)*·· (0.001269822)··· (0.00156450-1)*" 
IT m,,,1 0.2-18-101565 0.297592673 0.215725993 0.1755-10342 0.2278712-12 0.42670-1251 0.20886871-1 0.309294295 
S.D. 
(Iog-
(,XI3) 
NB: .: indicates significance at the J% level; ••. indicates Significance at the 5% level; .U. indicates Significance at the 10% level. Parentheses include the 
standard errors of the estimates. 
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Austria 
Table 4.3: Results from the Wald-tests: Hypothesis 1 
Belgium 
0.150625-1 
(16.5-10585)*** 
Hong Kong 
0.0015257 
(0.001697) 
Netherlands 
0.0538597 
(2.11-1859) 
Switzerland 
0.0292489 
(0.623693) 
r---------------------------------------~------------------~--------------_+----------------~-------------------------- ---
France 
0.1828208 
(-15.216780)*** 
0.0337211 
(/.5383-10) 
0.0860551 
(10.01847-1)*** 
0.06l.J.J.J3 
(5.107535) ** 
r----------------------------------------+------------------~--------------_r----------------+_------------------------.~---
0.2093598 0.0602601 
Germany (210.844942)*** (17-167722)*** 
0.11259-11 
(60.982848) *** 
OJJ879833 
(37.237177) * ... 
r-----------------------------------------+------------------~--------------_r----------------+_-----------------------.---
0.1889918 00398921 
Portugal (65.-190280) *** (2.9171160) * 
0.0922261 
(/5.595-165) .. * 
0.0676153 
(8. 382630)"* 
/\'/3. *: indicates significance at the 1% level; **: indicates significance at the 5% level; ***: indicates significance at the 10% level. Parentheses iI/elI/de llie 
slonc/ard err()rs of {he est illlat cs. 
I <)() 
while they are approximately equal to 0.3 in the cases of Belgium and 
Switzerland; it is worth noting that the Netherlands furnish us with the hiahest 
b 
signal-to-noise ratio (about 0.43). In terms of the absolute size of the signal-to-
noise ratios, the markets can be ranked as follows (in descending order): 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Hong Kong. France, PortugaL 
Germany. Thus, the results from the signal-to-noise ratios indicate that herding 
appears smoother in markets where capital gains are taxed. 
In view of the above, our findings indicate that herding appears more 
persistent and smooth in markets that impose taxes upon capital gains. 
Consequently, it follows that these results support our first hypothesis, namely 
that herding tends to manifest itself in significantly different fashions between 
markets with and markets without capital gains' taxes. 
4.6.2 Herding and short-selling constraints 
Table 4.4 reports the results from the Hwang and Salmon (200-+) model 
regarding the second hypothesis, according to which herding is expected to be 
more significant prior to the introduction of short-selling; as we have already 
mentioned we are testina for this hypothesis for the Hong Kong and Portuguese 
, 0 
markets. 
For the Hong Kong market we use March 1996 as the cut-off point 
defining the pre- versus post-short-sales' introduction periods, in line \vith what 
we mentioned in Section 4"+.2. According to Table 4..+, herding appears highly 
persistent Juring both sub-periods \vith the persistence parameter (¢ m) being 
significant using both four- as \vell as five-year windows (l % level) before and 
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after the introduction-date. However, as the estimates for the standard deviation 
((J'm,,, ) of the state-equation error (TJ mt) are found to be insignificant for both sub-
periods, this seems to suggest that herding towards the Hang Seng index both 
prior to as well as following the wider introduction of short-sales in the Hong 
Kong market is probably insignificant. 
The relevant Wald-tests show us that the difference in the persistence 
parameters of the two periods is insignificant, which implies that th~ wider 
introduction of short-sales in the Hong Kong market probably had a negligible 
effect over the herding levels towards the Hang Seng portfolio. Interestingly 
enough, the persistence parameter prior to and after the introduction of short-sales 
appears to exhibit certain differences when looking at different window-lengths. 
Although the usage of five-year windows indicates that herding has maintained its 
persistence levels around the same values, the results we obtain from the four-year 
windows indicate that the drop in the persistence parameters following the 
removal of short-selling constraints is rather sharp (from 0.72 down to 0...+1). 
Although the values of the persistence parameters prior to the removal of short-
sales' constraints appear to be around the same levels (0.7-0.8), this is not the 
case following the removal of short-sales' constraints: while the four-year 
windows provide us with an estimate for the ¢m equal to 0.41, the corresponding 
one for the five-year windows rises to 0.87. The five-year \vindows here include a 
year more than the four-year ones, namely 2001 (see Table 4.4) and it is p~rhaps 
this that might constitute the reason underlying the significant discrepancy in the 
. f h' t 90 two estImates 0 t e perSIstence parame er . 
90 Possible reasons for the impact of.vear 200 I may inc/udt! the outbreak of the DorCombubble: 
the massivt' dil'l'stiture of Hang-S~'l1g-stocks bought by the Hong Kong Government dzmng nlld-
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For the Portuguese market we use December 1999 as the cut-off point 
defining the pre- versus post-short-sales' introduction periods, since most 
constraints on short-sales were lifted during that year (Lobao and Serra, 2006). 
The results reported in Table 4.4 suggest that herding appears highly persistent 
during both sub-periods, with the persistence parameter (¢ m) being highly 
significant (1 % level) using both four- as well as five-year windows before and 
after the introduction-date. Having said that, however, the estimates for the 
standard deviation ((J' m,,,) of the state-equation error (17 ml) are found to be 
insignificant for both sub-periods, thus implying the absence of herding towards 
the PSI20 index both prior to as well as following the removal of short-sales' 
constraints in the Portuguese market. Much like with the case of the Hong Kong 
market above, the estimates of the persistence parameters for both sub-periods 
were found to be insignificantly different from each other. Contrary, however, to 
Hong Kong, the five-year windows did not produce substantially different results 
from the four-year windows regarding the persistence parameter before and after 
the wider introduction of short sales. 
1998. in order to mitigate against speculative short-selling pressure on stock prices during the 
Asian Crisis. 
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Table 4.4: Results from the herding tests (Hwang and Salmon, 2004): Hypothesis 2 
log [SId c (f3~mt) ] = Pm + H mt + Uml' Umt - iid (0, O"~,v) 
H mt = ¢m H m,t-l + 1]mt' 1]mt - iid (0, O"~,TJ) 
Hong Kong Portugal 
±4 years ±5 years ±4 years ±5 years 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
11311992- 11411996- 113/1991- 114/1996- 113/1996- 1/112000- 113/1995- 1/112000-
3113/1996 3113/2000 3113/1996 3113/2001 31112/1999 31112/2003 31112/1999 31112/2004 
¢m 
0.725665728 0.419656659 0.861366952 0.877347394 0.988553534 0.747827175 0.995937248 0.767883409 
(0.223240277)··· (0.265803216)··· (0.139693770)*·· (0.095971707)*·· (0.025833735)*·· (0.214039680)·" (0.019022129)··· (0.223875385)··· 
Pm 
-0.431689950 -0.383163080 -0.421819166 -0.367041526 -0.115518754 -0.175819008 -0.047068330 -0.1733372/0 
(0.019334544)··· (0.015382596)··· (0.017847981)··· (0.025279050) ••• (O.058817119)·· (0.021067597)*·· (0.061429046) (0.016399961)··· 
0.030605751 0.049488302 0.015682442 0.026547222 0.031754685 0.028673263 0.03099061 I 0.019692943 
O"m,TJ (0.00084 1997) (0.001285195) (0.000323308) (0.000484077) (0.000678021) (O.000899115) (0.000572243) (0.000558035) 
0.083136232 0.067411809 0.095446938 0.075134393 0.097632587 0.099672268 0.10724941 0.098308489 
O"m,u (0.001663623)··· (0.001403540) ••• (0.001751243)··· (0.001212553)··· (0.002221154)··· (0.002277046) ••• (0.002339871)*·· (0.001890670)·" 
O"m,II/S. D. 0.324030291 0.5654 17383 0.155739943 0.289874221 0.235318636 0.261973299 0.182483249 0.18977456-1 
(Iog-CXB) 
Wald-test -0.3060091 0.0159804 -0.2407264 -0.2280538 
«2)-(1 » (1.325404) (0.027726) (1.264907) ( 1.037677) 
0 NB: .; md,cates SIgnificance allhe J% level, •• : ",d,cales Significance althe 5% level, •••. ",t/,cates sigm/f( (Jnce althe 10% level. Parentheses /IIe/lIde Ihe slandard errors oftlte esllmales. 
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As a result, the above findings seem to indicate that the \vider introduction 
of short-sales and the removal of their constraints appears to bear little effect oyer 
the presence of herding towards the index-portfolio; our investigation of the Hong 
Kong and Portuguese markets suggests that herding toward's the Hang Seng and 
PSI20 portfolios respectively appears insignificant in both sub-periods as well as 
insignificantly different between them. Consequently. the evidence presented 
above is not able to confirm our second hypothesis, i.e. the introduction of short-
sales does not lead to reduced herding levels. 
4.6.3 Herding and the introduction of index-futures 
Table 4.5 reports the results for the markets (Germany, Hong Kong, 
Netherlands) falling under the auspices of our third hypothesis, according to 
which the introduction of index-futures bears a significant impact upon herding in 
the market. 
In the case of the German market, herding towards the DAX30-portfolio 
appears highly persistent during both sub-periods using both four- and five-year 
windows before and after the index-futures' introduction-date (\:ovember 1990). 
as the persistence parameter (¢m ) is highly significant (1 % level). 
Contrary to that, the estimates of the standard deviation ((J' m,,, ) of the state-
equation error (17 ml) appear insignificant for both sub-periods, thus implying the 
absence of herding. What is more, the persistence parameters of the two sub-
periods are found to be insignificantly different from each other. which kads us to 
the conclusion that the introduction of index-futures on the DA:\30 had no impact 
upon the herding levels towards the portfolio of that inde:\. In relation to that, note 
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also that the values of the persistence parameter both prior to as well as after the 
introduction of index-futures on the DAX30 appear to be very similar in size, thus 
providing further robustness on our results. 
Regarding the Hong Kong market, herding towards the Hang Seng 
portfolio remains highly persistent during both sub-periods using both four- and 
five-year windows before and after the index-futures' introduction-date (May 
1986), as the persistence parameter (rPm) is found to be statistically significant 
(10% level) in all cases. An interesting feature of our results is the switch of the 
sign of rPm from negative (prior to the introduction of index-futures) to positive 
(following the introduction of index-futures), which indicates that herding (as 
defined by the AR(I) process of the state-equation) exhibits negative 
autocorrelation prior to May 1986 and positive autocorrelation following that 
date. Furthermore, the estimates of the standard deviation (am.,,) of the state-
equation error (1] ml) appear highly significant (5% level) for both sub-periods, 
thus implying the presence of herding. What is more, the persistence parameters 
of the two sub-periods are found to be significantly different (1 % level) from each 
other, thus leading us to the conclusion that the introduction of index-futures on 
the Hang Seng had a significant impact upon the herding levels towards the 
portfolio of that index. In relation to that, note also that the values of the 
persistence parameter both prior to as well as after the introduction of index-
futures on the Hang Seng appear to be very similar in size irrespective of window-
length, thus providing further robustness on our results. Finally, we should note 
that the values of the signal-to-noise ratios are notably large (over 0.6), thus 
indicating that herding during both sub-periods does not evolve smoothly. 
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To allow a visual representation of this rather interesting behaviour of 
herding prior to and after the introduction of index-futures on the Hang Seng we 
provide Figure 4.1, which depicts the evolution of herding between Mav 1981 and 
April 1991. As the Figure illustrates, herding presents us with interchanging 
swings (upwards and downwards) prior to 1986 which are in line with the 
negative autocorrelation in its pattern we documented for the period prior to May 
1986 (i.e. pre-futures' introduction period). However, after February 1986 herding 
begins to assume a rather clear ascending direction in its movement, which is also 
in line with the positive autocorrelation in its pattern we documented for the 
period following May 1986 (i.e. post-futures' introduction period). 
We conclude with the Dutch market, where herding towards the AEX-
portfolio appears highly persistent during both sub-periods using both four- and 
five-year windows before and after the index-futures' introduction-date (October 
1988), as the persistence parameter (rjJ m) is statistically significant (5% level). 
Contrary to that, the estimates of the standard deviation ((j' m,l]) of the state-
equation error ('7 mt) appear insignificant for both sub-periods, thus implying the 
absence of herding. What is more, the persistence parameters for the two sub-
periods are found to be insignificantly different from each other, thus leading us to 
the conclusion that the introduction of index-futures on the AEX had no impact 
upon its herding levels. In relation to that, the values of the persistence parameter 
both prior to as well as after the introduction of index-futures on the AEX appear 
to be very similar in size, thus providing further robustness on our results. 
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Our results thus indicate that the introduction of index-futures had an 
insignificant impact upon the herding towards the DAX30- and AEX-portfolios; 
what is more, herding was found to be insignificant both before as well as after 
the introduction of index-futures in those two markets. The case of Hong Kong 
provides us with a rather interesting picture, as the introduction of index-futures 
on the Hang Seng had a significant impact on the herding towards that index, as it 
led to the switch of the herd's persistence sign. Consequently, our results seem to 
provide us with mixed evidence regarding our third hypothesis; in other words, 
the introduction of index-futures does not bear a significant impact over herding 
in all markets. 
4.6.4 Discussion 
Following the presentation of our results we shall now attempt to associate 
them with the existing literature findings on herding. We shall first begin from the 
second and third hypotheses (i.e. the hypotheses related to the impact of the 
introduction of short-selling and index-futures over herding respectively) by 
arguing that in the absence of any relevant literature on the subjects they touch 
upon, it is hard to draw any parallel with existing herding research. 
However, our results from the first hypothesis provide us with a rather 
more interesting picture. We mentioned in the beginning (4.2.2.a) that, according 
to Kim and Wei (2002a), offshore funds as well as funds from Hong Kong and 
Singapore herded less in South Korea during the Asian crisis (1997-1999) 
compared to their US and European counterparts. Such behaviour was ascribed 
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Table 4.5: Results from tbe berding tests (Hwang and Salmon, 20(4): Hypothesis -' 
Jog [Stdc(!l:mt)] = Pm + H mt + Un'" Umt - iid (0, a~.o) 
H mt = tPm H m,t-l + l]mt' l]mt - iid (0, a!,'l) 
Germany Hong Kong Netherlands 
±4 years ±5 years ±4 years ±5 years ±4 years ±5 years 
(I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) 
111211986- 111211990- 1/12/1985- 1/1211990- 1/5/1982- 11511986- 115/1981- 1/511986- 1/1111984- 111111988- 111111983- 111111988-
111211990 30/11/1994 111211990 30/11/1995 30/411986 30/4/1990 30/4/1986 30/4/1991 31/10/1988 3111011992 31110/1988 31/10/1993 
tPm 
0.908044344 0.908543831 0.873316271 0.872098252 -0.512842236 0.375817340 -0.467415336 0.279393960 0.847223051 0.919161414 0.845866913 0.863559647 
(0.090694279) ••• (0.075934441)*" (0.101458602)··· (0.083218843)*·· (0.186321523)*·· (0.214599262)··· (0.176299714)*·· (0. 156803259)· (0. II 2499995)*·· (0.265138541)*·· (0. /00965026)*·· (0.082280807 
) ... 
-0.506153499 -0.513426931 -0.494485736 -0.497966259 -0.291284639 -0.39024057 I -0.290366272 -0.39/034464 -0.389790974 -0.315926915 -0.383032857 -0.297599480 
Pm (0.022225241)*·· (0.033681313)*·· (0.017996747)··· (0.026066792) ••• (0.008059467)*·· (0.017610190)*·· (0.006864391)··· (0.015809618)*" (0.035812471)*·· (0.019720331) ... (0.029915656)·" (0.036382566)··· 
0.015185355 0.0274222 17 0.016262995 0.027658543 0.043301166 0.066877171 0.043013358 0.08253143 0.037540778 0.006340189 0.034700375 0.041391436 (J'm ,,, (0.000234023) (0.000528500) (0.000256427) (0.000503519) (0.000786504)*· (0.001639467)··· (0.000662151)*·· (0.001630011)*·· (0.001158827) (0.000210615) (0.000884310) (0.001092935) 
0.084806102 0.084241836 0.082497861 0.083863502 0.047804372 0.06099327 0.044247712 0.045472849 0.12779822 0.121510473 0.116339963 0.113430093 
(J'm,u (0.001567018)·" (0.001659627) ••• (0.001338284)·" (0.001477766)·" (0.000809769)*·· (0.001595265)·· (0.000662176)··· (0.001510323)··· (0.003761265)*·· (0.003052948) ••• (0.002797163)··· (0.002742029)*·· 
am,'ll 01639/1./35./ 0.259738323 0.181832657 0.273306056 0.617086718 0.701512104 0.648889281 0.841949666 0.255587167 (I.05124220B 0.259316057 0.295810934 
S.D. 
(Iog-
CX8) 
Wald-
test 0.0004995 -0.001218 0.8886595 0.7468089 0.0719384 0.0176935 
1(2)-(1 ») {-I. 32683ge-05) (0.000214) (17.148037)*·· {22.683458)··· (0073617) (0.046237) 
. , NB: .: Inti,cates slgnijlC£lllce at the /% level; •• : mdlcates Significance at the 5% level; ***: indicates Significance at the /0% level. Parentheses mclude the standard errors of the 
estimates. 
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by the authors to the fact that these jurisdictions ("offshore", Hong Kong and 
Singapore) do not tax capital gains realized by funds registered with them, as 
opposed to the US and European jurisdictions. In our case, we found that market-
wide herding appears to be smoother and more persistent in markets with zao or 
very lovv capital gains' taxes. Although no direct comparison is possible here (our 
research involves market-wide herding at the top-capitalization index-IeYel in 
many markets, while Kim and Wei (2002a) study herding on behalf of overseas 
institutional investors only for the universe of stocks listed in South Korea), 
results seem to point towards the direction of a relatively favorable impact of the 
presence of capital gains' taxation over herding. It is our understanding that this 
constitutes an issue meriting extensive future research. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Herding as a phenomenon in the stock market context has been the subject 
of substantial research, both at the analytical as well as the empirical level 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh. 2003). Analytical 
research has thus far provided us with the theoretical underpinnings of herd 
behaviour regarding its sources and motivations, while empirical research has 
produced an ever-increasing amount of results regarding herding across various 
markets. However, little attention has been dedicated to the comparative empirical 
examination of herding, i.e. its study across a variety of market settings: eVen the 
few cross-market studies (Chang et ai, 2000; Hwang and Salmon, 2(04) on 
herding do not approach the issue from a distinctive comparative angle. 
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We allTI at contributing to this point by investigating herding across 
several markets on the premises of specific regulatory features that, as the Finance 
literature has indicated, are capable of exerting influence over the presence of 
herding. More specifically, we test for the impact of capital gains' taxes, short-
sales' constraints and the introduction of index-futures over the significance of 
herd behaviour. Our tests involved a sample of eight (top-capitalization) market 
indices and covered a variety of time-periods from the early 1980s until 2005. 
Our results indicate that herding tends to manifest itself in significantly 
different fashions between markets that tax and markets that do not tax capital 
gains; more specifically, we found herding to exhibit more persistence and 
smoothness in those jurisdictions that impose taxes on capital gains. We also 
documented the absence of any impact upon herding in the aftermath of the 
removal of most major short-sales' constraints. Finally, our results regarding the 
impact of the introduction of index-futures upon herding show us that such an 
impact may exist in certain markets, yet not in others. 
Our results indicate that certain regulatory factors (capital gains' taxation) 
bear an overall significant impact over the manifestation of herding, while others 
(the removal of short-sales' constraints) do not or (in the case of index-futures' 
introduction) may not bear a similar impact across all markets. It IS our 
understandino that our research constitutes a useful first stimulus for further 
e 
research in this area, as the study of herding on these premises can well be 
expanded using a wider array of markets and/or herd-related regulatory features. 
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Appendix 
The Kalman Filter is a recurSIve algorithm almIng at estimating and 
evaluating dynamic linear models in what is known as the form of a "state-space 
representation". Its output generates mean square error forecasts and its 
construction involves two equations. The first one is known as the "measurement"' 
(or "observation" or "system" or "transition") equation and relates an obseryable 
variable to the states of an unobservable one. Put it this way. the measurement 
equation defines the dynamic evolution of an observed variable described in terms 
of an unobserved one; the latter's functional form is, in turn. defined through what 
is know as the "state equation". 
To illustrate the above, let us assume (Hamilton, 1994) the following 
dynamic linear system: 
(1) 
YI = A' XI + H' C;I + WI 
(2) 
where: 
Y
I 
= n x 1 vector of the observed variable at time t 
;{ = r x 1 vector of the unobserved variable ("state vector") 
A', F', H' = matrices of parameters of dimension (n x k), (r x r) and (n x r) 
respectively. 
"0"" ... -'
Vt = r x 1 white noise vector [Vt - iid (0, (J'~)] 
Wt = n x 1 white noise vector [Wt - iid (0, (J'~)] 
In the above setting, equation (1) would be the measurement equation and 
equation (2) the state equation. In its commonest form, the error term vectors Vt 
and Wt are assumed to be uncorrelated, mean zero and normally distributed while 
their respective variances «(J'~, (J'~) are assumed to be known. The Kalman filter 
provides recursive estimates for C;t on the premises of past and present 
information of the observable variables as well as existing estimates of ;1 itself 
(see Hamilton, 1994 for a detailed description of the algorithm's process). 
In the context of the Hwang and Salmon (2004) herding model we have 
the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the stocks' monthly betas 
which is the observable variable with the following functional form (see Chapter 4 
for more on its derivation): 
log [Stde (f3~mt) ] = Pm + H mt + Vmt, where Vmt - iid (0, (J'~,u)· 
The above represents the measurement equation of the model's dynamic 
linear system where the observable variable (log [Std e (f3~mt)]) is conditioned 
upon an unobservable one (H mt) reflective of changes in market-wide herding. 
Under the authors' assumption that herding follows an AR(l) process, the state 
equation for this system is: 
H mt = ¢m H m,t-l + 1] mt ' where 1] ml - iid (0, (J'~''1). 
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Using the Kalman filter, the H mt is extracted which, in turn enables us to 
calculate market-wide herding through equation (6) in Chapter 4 and depict it 
diagrammatically. 
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Chapter 5 
Institutional Herding Under Various Market 
Conditions: Evidence from Portugal 
5.1 Introduction 
The issue of whether institutional investors are susceptible to exhibiting 
herd behaviour in their trading conduct has been at the forefront of research in 
behavioural Finance during the last decade (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001), 
more so due to the wider availability of databases related to the transactions and 
portfolio-holdings of fund managers. The possibility of herd-instincts arising 
within the ranks of the latter and the implications of this with regards to stock 
returns as a result of the funds' leverage in the marketplace (\Vermers, 1999) have 
constituted the motivation underlying much of recent research in herd behaviour 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
Empirical research on institutional herding has gradually been evolving 
smce the early 1990s and has been mostly based upon the methodological 
approach proposed by Lakonishok et al (1992), which has become the stepping 
stone for subsequent research in this area. On these very premises, research has 
focused mainly upon the magnitude of institutional herding, '-' its 
stabilizing/destabilizing price-impact 1l1d whether its significance varies across 
different classifications of funds (origin, style) and stocks (size, industry). 
Institutional herding has been tested on the grounds of the Lakonishok d al (1992) 
measure in the US (Lakonishok et al. 1992~ Grinblatt et aL 1996: \Vermers, 1999), 
South Korea (Cho\.? d al. 1999: Kim and \Vei, 2002a; Kim and \Vei. 2002h). Chile 
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(Olivares, 2005), Finland (Do et aI, 2006). Germany (Oehler, 1998), Poland 
(Voronkova and Bohl, 2005), Portugal (Lobao and Serra, 2006). South Africa 
(Gilmour and Smit, 2002) and the UK (Wylie, 2005). 
Although the above amount of research on institutional herding appears 
rather voluminous, it is interesting to note that little attention has thus far been 
devoted to the impact of various market conditions upon the herding of fund 
managers. Indeed, absent very few studies (Gilmour and Smit, 2002: Lobao and 
Serra, 2006), research regarding this issue appears to be notably limited. 
To that end, we investigate institutional herding in the presence of a 
variety of herd-related market conditions in order to gauge whether the latter 
promote or inhibit its manifestation. More specifically, these conditions include: 
a) market-wide herding, b) trading volume, c) market volatility and d) market 
direction. The first of the four aforementioned features relates to herding at the 
market-level and is based upon recent research innovations (Hwang and Salmon, 
2004) while the choice of the second one is based upon participation-based, 
Finance- and non-Finance-related, herding theories (more on those on Section 
5.:2.2.b). The third feature refers to the impact of volatility upon institutional 
herding and is based upon a variety of evidence, both theoretical as well as 
empirical regarding this relationship (see Section 5.2.2.c for more details); finally. 
the fourth feature is based upon analytical arguments as \vell as empirical findings 
from the realm of herding research (as we shall be discussing in Section ~.2.2.d) 
postulating that institutional herding can be affected by the direction of the 
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market. To the best of our knowledge, these market conditions have received ve ry 
little or no attention as concerns their impact upon institutional herding91. 
We conduct our research on the impact of the above market conditions 
upon institutional herding at the level of a market's index. An index constitutes a 
reference point (Huddart et aI, 2002) for investors and as such it would be 
interesting to assess the impact of institutional herding upon it. What is more, we 
believe that, when investigating the impact of market conditions upon institutional 
herding, one needs to take the issue of consistency into consideration, in the sense 
that one should base the enumeration of both these conditions as well as 
institutional herding upon a common denominator. Given that relevant research 
appears not to have taken into account the issue of consistency92, the choice of 
studying institutional herding at the level of a specific index is made to tackle this 
problem. 
As a result, we first calculate institutional herding on the premises of the 
historical constituent stocks of a market's index; for reasons of brevity, we shall 
be referring to this type of institutional herding throughout our work as "index-
wide institutional herding". We then test for the impact of the aforementioned 
market conditions (market-wide herding, trading volume, volatility, market-
direction) upon its presence. However, the important thing to note here is that 
these conditions correspond to the level of the index (i.e. they are: the herding 
91 Gilmour and Smit (2002) address the impact of volatility upon institutional herding for South 
African unit trusts, while Lobao and Serra (2006) test-among other things10~ the impact of ~arket 
volatility and market direction upon the herding of Portuguese equIty funds. It IS our 
understanding that the impact of market-wide herding or the volume of trade upon institutional 
herding has never been tested 
92 Lobao and Serra (2006) test for herding on behalf of Portuguese equity fund managers on the 
basis of all stocks that were traded during any quarter by at least three funds in the .Po~tuK!,ese 
market. However, when assessing the impact of market direction and volatility upon 'ns.tlIu~lOnal 
herding, they estimate the latter two on the basis of the PSI20 inde.x:, which is a selectlOn-mdex. 
including the twenty most liquid stocks in that market. 
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towards the index-portfolio, the volume of the index, the index-volatility and the 
index-direction). 
Our investigation IS conducted on the basis of a uruque database of 
monthly portfolio-holdings of Portuguese mutual funds obtained by the 
Portuguese Stock Exchange (Euronext Lisbon) for the 1997-2005 period. Our 
research contributes to the existing herding literature by providing useful insight 
into the impact of various market conditions upon the presence of institutional 
herding, an issue which has received rather scant attention in the herding 
literature. A key distinguishing feature of our research relates to the fact that it ties 
both institutional herding and the underlying market conditions to a specific 
index93, thus ensuring the consistency of the investigation. We also contend that 
the study of institutional herding at the level of an index bears a certain interest 
from a practitioner's point of view as well. Since a number of derivative 
instruments are based upon market indices (e.g. index futures/options) the level of 
index-wide institutional herding may well constitute a useful element in the 
information-set of those trading in such derivatives, especially in light of the 
funds' leverage in the market. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 includes a review 
of the literature pertaining to institutional herding, with special reference to the 
market conditions upon which its significance is tested. Section 5.3 presents the 
model used to estimate index-wide institutional herding while Section 5.4 presents 
a brief overview of the historical evolution of both the stock exchange (5.4.1) and 
93 Oehler (1998) provides evidence on the herding of German funds across the sto~/cs of the 
DAX30-index; however, his research is neither exclusively index-based (he testsf~r herdmg on the 
premises of other factors as well (such as si=e and industry) nor does it lake mto account any 
market conditions. 
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the fund-industry (5.4.2) of the market under consideration (Portugal). Section 5.5 
delineates the hypotheses relative to our study. Section 5.6 presents the data 
utilized (5.6.1), discusses the methodology employed (5.6.2) and presents some 
descriptive statistics (5.6.3). Section 5.7 presents the results (5.7.1) and discusses 
the empirical findings (5.7.2); Section 5.8 concludes. 
5.2 Theoretical background 
5.2.1 Institutional herding: Sources and Motivations 
The case for institutional herding rests upon the premises of agents' 
relative homogeneity, since the possibility for observing commonality in 
behaviour is greater among market-agents who tend to face similar decision-
problems (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). Fund managers constitute a group of 
investors with rather similar backgrounds (in terms of education and professional 
qualifications) while their professional conduct is subject to a r:ertain frame\vork 
that defines the performance of their fiduciary duties (De Bondt and Teh, 1997). 
This homogeneity is expected to impact upon their trading decisions as it may 
render them prone (Lakonishok et aI, 1992; Wermers, 1999) to the analysis of 
similar indicators, which may provide them with correlated signals. If so, fund 
managers may tend to interpret the latter in a parallel fashion, which in tum may 
lead them to exhibit similarities in their trading conduct by selecting. for instance, 
stocks that have already been picked up by man:/ of their peers (Lakonishok et aL 
1992). The aforementioned conditions of relative homogeneity constitute the 
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pillars upon which the notion of institutional herding is founded. However, there 
also exist a multitude of factors that act as stimuli to its manifestation. 
First of all, fund managers are essentially in the employment of investment 
companies and, as such, are subject to principal-agent considerations. As their 
performance is evaluated periodically on a relative basis, i.e. versus the 
performance of their peers, mostly those with similar (e.g. stocks, bonds, money-
market, industry, foreign marketls etc) specializations (Ross et al, 1999), this 
creates a perceived "benchmark" upon which they may attempt to herd. As 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show, in an environment where the evaluation of the 
professionals' ability is conducted on a relative basis, there is bound to exist some 
kind of uncertainty as to who is more and who is less able. The idea here is that 
under such circumstances, it may payoff to take advantage of this uncertainty by 
imitating the decisions of others, thus "jamming" the evaluation-process. "Bad" 
(i.e. less able) managers have an obvious incentive to copy the actions of their 
"good" (more able) peers, if this will help them appear as "better" professionals. 
"Good" managers, on the other hand, may choose to follow the investment-
decisions of the majority of their peers, even if these are sub-optimal, in case 
"failing conventionally" is preferable to "succeeding unconventionally" (Keynes, 
1936); such a situation may arise if the risk of failure ( career-wise) exceeds the 
benefits of success by "going-it-alone". Thus, as Lakonishok et al (1992) argue, 
there exists the issue of separating "luck from skill", as telling the "good" from 
the "bad" manacrers in this context becomes hard to establish. o 
Reputational considerations are relevant to the aforementioned agency-
concerns, as they may also encourage fund managers to herd. A professional who 
enjoys a strong reputation in his capacity has an incentive to imitate others in 
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order to preserve his reputation (Graham, 1999); this can be the case if the damaoe 
e 
to his reputation by a potential failure outweighs the expected benefits from a 
potential success. If we assume that the well-reputed professionals are also the 
better-able ones (as it is hard to imagine how one's reputation would have grov.n 
in the absence of a distinctive ability), this may help explain the herding 
tendencies denoted previously with regards to the issue of ability. Managers vvith 
a weak reputation, however, may also resort to herding as a means of free-riding 
(Trueman, 1994) on the reputation of better-reputed colleagues (reputational 
externality). 
The latter two motivations for institutional herding (agency-based and 
reputation-based) are directly associated with more general, information-based 
issues. After all, although the motive for a less able/reputed manager to herd may 
lie in his low ability/reputation, the underlying source of this herding propensity 
should probably be traced in the informational position of that manager. If one 
possesses no information, his information is of dubious quality, his information-
processing abilities are inadequate, or he perceives others as better-informed, it is 
possible for him to free-ride on their information and discard his own. Under such 
circumstances, where such informational-payoffs are existent, fund managers may 
resort to herding (Devenow and Welch, 1996) in order to tackle their potential 
informational predicament. 
A relevant case here involves informational cascades, where fund 
managers may ignore their private information and follow me actions of others, 
when they consider the information conveyed by others' actions to provide a 
useful set of information on its own (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et ai, 1992). If 
so this is expected to lead to a poorer aggregation of information in the 
212 
marketplace and to negative informational externalities, as the private information 
of "cascading" investors is not revealed to others (since it is suppressed). 
In view of the homogeneity mentioned above, another plausible case of 
institutional herding is the "spurious" one. Spurious herding involves a similarity 
in responses to similar decision problems following commonly observed signals 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001) and needs to be distinguished from the 
expressions of "intentional" herding depicted thus far. If a change in fundamentals 
(e.g. a drop in deposit rates) materializes, this may well have the potential of 
inducing fund managers to behave in a parallel fashion (e.g. possibly invest more 
in stocks). 
We have, thus shown that institutional herding is a phenomenon that can 
be attributed to a multitude of factors. Our attention will now focus on 
institutional herding at the market-index level and the examination of those 
specific market conditions associated with it mentioned in the previous section. 
5.2.2 Index-wide institutional herding 
In this section, we will present the case for index-wide institutional 
herding by discussing in more detail those factors upon which its significance will 
be examined. These factors refer to properties of the market-index related to 
specific market conditions, which maintain a direct or indirect relationship to 
institutional herding and include market-wide herding, trading volume, market-
volatility and market-direction. 
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5.2.2.a Market-wide herding 
The impact of herding at the wider market-le\"el upon institutional herdino 
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constitutes an issue which has never been touched upon in the literature related to 
herd behaviour. Given the absence of relevant evidence on the subject, we will 
attempt to approach it by invoking a combination of herd-related concepts: as will 
shortly become evident, the relationship between institutional and mark~t-\vide 
herding can assume both signs, each supported by different arguments. 
We have noted in the introduction that institutional traders maintain a 
substantial leverage in the marketplace due to the amount of funds und~r their 
management (Wermers, 1999). As a result, it is reasonable to assume that any 
conjectural herding tendency on their behalf has the potential of inciting \\"id~r 
herding in the market, if other types of traders (e.g. retail ones) are lured into it 
and decide to join it. On the other hand, fund managers may exhibit more herding 
among themselves during periods of increased market-\vide herding. in case they 
choose to ride on its waves with the intention of exploiting it (Hirshleikr and 
Teoh, 2003). The possibility for the latter is supported by both analytical (see, e.g. 
De Long et aI, 1990; Andergassen, 2003) as well as empirical (Soros, 1987) wor~.,::s 
on rational speculative behaviour, which discuss how rational speculators may 
take advantage of the behavioural trading patterns of noise traders. \\ nat is more, 
if higher market-wide herding is associated with greater uncertainty in the 
marketplace, it may well make sense for fund managers to herd among th~ms~lves 
in order to resolve such a predicament. 
However. fund managers may find herding among them::-;dves more 
appealing during periods of relatively depressed market-\\"ide herding. i ( lower 
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levels of market-wide herding are associated with higher "tranquility" in the 
marketplace. Such "tranquility" may be associated with a more definitive market-
direction which fund managers can choose to herd upon. It may also be the case 
that relatively calm market conditions render the performance-benchmark of the 
relative evaluation of investment professionals more clear, thus easier to gauge-
and, perhaps, follow. 
As a result, there exist arguments in favour of both higher as \vell as lower 
levels of market-wide herding exerting a positive impact upon institutional 
herding; as this issue appears to be unresolved (and in view of the complete 
absence of relevant evidence in the herding literature), we propose testing for the 
hypothesis that different levels of market-wide herding bear significantly different 
effects upon institutional herding at the index level. For reasons of brevity, we 
shall be referring to market-wide herding at the index level as "index-wide 
market-herding" . 
5.2.2.b Trading volume 
The impact of a market's trading activity upon institutional herding has 
not been addressed in the herding literature so far; thus, much like with the case 
for market-wide herding we discussed previously, there is complete absence of 
relevant evidence on this topic. Consequently, here again we will try to invoke 
relevant herd-related arguments to address this issue; our discussion here aims at 
demonstrating that the relationship between institutional herding and market-
activity can assume multiple facets. 
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The arguments advocating a positive relationship between the market's 
turnover and institutional herding rest upon the nature of the "herd" as 
participation-based. Socio-psychological (Le Bon, 1895; 1910; 1912) as well as 
Finance-related theories (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et aI, 1992) have sho~ 
that collective phenomena are the byproduct of imitation among people following 
interactive observation (Hirsheifer and Teoh, 2003) that leads to conformity 
towards a certain course of action. Thus, a herd's significance is a function of the 
accrued participation it attracts. 
Let us now see how this translates in terms of institutional trading. If 
institutional traders do, indeed, herd, it is only reasonable to assume that the level 
of trading activity will exhibit a rise, more so, in view of the weight of their trades 
in the market. If fund managers herd on an existing trend, then, given their 
leverage, one would expect the level of market participation (and activity) to 
increase. If, on the other hand, fund managers "launch" a herd themselves and 
others follow suit, there will also exist a rise in market activity. Thus, either way, 
we would expect institutional herding to be more significant during periods 
characterized by an increased volume of trade. 
However, herding is not the sole pattern of institutional trading that can 
lead to a rise in the market's turnover, since it may well be the case that funds 
engage themselves in intense trading (thUS, boosting the overall market activity) 
without necessarily imitating each other. Kim and Wei (2002a) showed that 
certain categories of overseas funds engaged in heavy trading around the Asian 
Crisis in the South Korean market even though their herding levels were notably 
low. 
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As a result, a higher volume of trade can be associated with both higher as 
well as lower levels of institutional herding; as this issue appears to be unresolved 
, 
we propose testing for the hypothesis that higher levels of market-turnover bear a 
significantly different effect upon institutional herding at the index level compared 
to lower ones. 
5.2.2.c Market volatility 
The impact of volatility over institutional herding has thus far been the 
subject of very limited research in the herding literature. Gilmour and Smit (2002) 
and Lobao and Serra (2006) explored this issue for the South African and 
Portuguese markets respectively and documented evidence indicating that 
institutional herding tends to decline as the volatility of the market grows. Such 
findings may be justified through the fact that lower volatility may be associated 
with less turbulent market-conditions and, thus a more definitive market-direction 
upon which funds can herd. It may also be the case that less volatile market 
conditions render the benchmark upon which the relative performance of fund 
managers is evaluated less ambiguous and, hence, easier to follow. These 
arguments are essentially the same ones we employed before when discussing the 
impact of market-wide herding over institutional herding. 
However, fund managers may choose to herd less during volatile periods 
due to information-based reasons as well. High volatility can be conducive to the 
informational efficiency of a market if it leads to a more rapid rate of 
incorporation of information into securities (Mayhew, 2000). Consequently, fund 
managers will be faced with an increased flow of information, thus having more 
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private signals at their disposal upon which they can trade; the above constitutes a 
plausible setting, since fund managers can be assumed to be better able to manage 
the information-processing in highly volatile markets (compared, for example, to 
retail traders) given their resources. In line with the above, several return-based 
herding studies (Christie and Huang, 1995; Gleason et al 2003; Gleason et aI, 
2004; Hwang and Salmon, 2004; Caparelli et aI, 2004; Demirer and Kutan, 2005) 
document the absence of market-wide herding towards the market-index during 
extreme market periods. 
Contrary to the above, there also exist arguments favoring a positive 
relationship between volatility and institutional herding. Volatility is associated 
with more uncertainty in the marketplace as wild price fluctuations may provide 
little indication of any definitive market direction and render the market more 
risky. Under those circumstances, the informational environment itself may grow 
more uncertain, given the volatility in the public pool of information and the 
associated difficulties in the latter's effective processing. Thus, institutional 
traders may choose to imitate their peers during periods of market turbulence in 
order to tackle this uncertainty rather than rely on the information available. A 
behaviour of the kind would be in line with the herding theories mentioned 
previously regarding the role of informational-payoffs (Devenow and Welch, 
1996) and cascading (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et aI, 1992) as possible 
motivations underlying institutional herding. Rising herding tendencies on behalf 
of institutional traders during periods characterized by high volatility have been 
documented by Kim and Wei (2002b) for the South Korean market during the 
Asian Crisis period. 
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As a result, there exist arguments in favour of both higher as well as lower 
levels of volatility exerting a positive impact upon institutional herding; given the 
unresolved nature of this issue, we propose testing for the hypothesis that different 
levels of market-volatility bear significantly different effects upon institutional 
herding at the index level. 
5.2.2.d Market-direction 
The manIfestation of institutional herding can be affected by the 
directional state of the market, i.e. whether it rises or falls. The arguments here 
emanate mostly from agency-related theories of herding and imply the existence 
of differential effects of market-direction over institutional herding. 
If the market goes well, then from a conformity point of view every 
manager would like to perform well, as a potential negative performance might 
cast a stigma over his perceived ability. Also, if everyone performs well in a 
euphoric market, a negative performance is not desirable as it makes a manager 
"stand out from the crowd". Thus, as mentioned above (Scharfstein and Stein, 
1990), "bad" managers would be prone to imitating their "good" peers during 
periods of market euphoria in order to free-ride on their ability and enhance their 
position by pretending to be "better" (or "less bad"). In this context, ill-reputed 
managers would also try to copy the decisions of their better-reputed colleagues, 
if this would confer a positive reputational externality onto them (Trueman, 
1994). Thus, when the market performs well, fund managers might resort to 
herding if agency/reputational concerns prevail. In line with the above, Choe et al 
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(1999) found evidence indicating that foreign funds herded more 
themselves prior to the outbreak of the Asian Crisis. 
among 
However, managers may also herd more among themselves when ad\erse 
market circumstances materialize, if they wish to minimize the percei\ed personal 
responsibility for their negative performance-and the accruing possible 
professional implications (Goodhart et aI, 1998). Another reason rdated to 
institutional herding manifesting itself more boldly during market do\\ nturns is 
the propensity of fund managers towards making extensive use of positi\~­
feedback-style strategies, such as portfolio insurance (Luskin. 1988) and stop-loss 
orders (Osler, 2002) in order to shield themselves against the realization of huge 
losses during market slumps. The employment of these hedging strategies by 
institutional investors may lead to their trades exhibiting higher correlation during 
market downturns, thus providing the impression of increased institutional 
herding. Kim and Wei (2002b) find higher herding levels on behalf of institutional 
traders in the South Korean market following the outbreak of the Asian Crisis 
compared to the period before it, while Lobao and Serra (2006) document more 
institutional herding in Portugal during market declines compared to mark:t rises. 
As a result, there exist arguments in favour of both rising as \\'ell as 
declining markets exerting a positive impact upon institutional herding: given the 
ambiguity surrounding the discussion of this issue. we propose testing for the 
hypothesis that differential market-directions bear significantly diffen.:nt effects 
upon institutional herding at the index level. 
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In view of our discussion above, we would like to recapitulate at this stage 
by drawing some attention to the fact that we test for institutional herding on the 
basis of premises upon which very little work has been undertaken before in the 
herding literature (see Section 5.1). More specifically, we test for institutional 
herding based upon market conditions (market-wide herding, volume of trade, 
volatility, market-direction) at the level of a market's index; we are not aware of 
any other institutional herding research having been conducted on those specific 
premIses. 
Our research contributes to existing empirical herding research by: 
Testing for institutional herding utilizing a unique database of institutional 
portfolio-holdings from the Portuguese Stock Exchange 
Providing extra insight into the manifestation of institutional herding by 
investigating its presence under various market conditions. an area which 
has received little attention in the herding literature. 
Developing a consistent framework for this investigation by establishing a 
common ground for the enumeration of both institutional herding as well 
as the relevant market conditions by conducting the research at the level of 
a specific market's index. 
5.3 Measuring herding: Lakonishok et al (1992) 
Lakonishok et al (1992) put forward the first measure designed to capture 
herding on the basis of funds' trades. In its original form, it is expressed as: 
Hi,l =[ 1 B"I / (Bi,1 + Si,t) - P, I] - AF"I (1) 
where: 
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Bi,t = the number of funds that increased their positions in stock i in period t 
("buyers") 
Si,t = the number of funds that decreased their positions in stock i in period t 
("sellers ") 
E (P,) = the expected proportion of "buyers" in a period (t) relative to the total 
number of active funds under the null hypothesis of "no-herding". It is calculated 
as the number of "buyers" relative to the total number of active funds across all 
stocks in period t and the notation P, is often used instead. Its value remains 
constant for all stocks within the same period t, yet varies across periods. Note 
here that the term "active" refers to those funds that changed their positions in a 
stock and does not include the funds whose positions remained unchanged94. 
AFi,1 = represents the adjustment factor designed to capture the random variations 
of the [I Bi,1 / (Bi,1 + Si,l) - PI I] around PI and is calculated for each stock i in 
each month t, under the assumption that Bi,1 follows a binomial distribution with 
probability of success P = PI' The adjustment factor also helps to prevent the 
bias in the estimation of [I Bi,1 / (Bi,1 + Si,l) - PI I] potentially arising in case a 
stock is traded by a small number of funds. AFi,1 declines in value as the number 
of funds active in a stock rises. To illustrate this we use the approach of Jones et al 
(1999) by employing some numerical examples. Let us for a moment assume that 
PI = 0.80, i.e. that, on average, 80 percent of all active funds were buyers across 
901 This raises, of course, the issue of whether a zero change in a fund's position is suggestive of 
trading inertia on behalf of that fund or a data-induced illusion. (f quarterly data, fo~ examplt!, 
indicates that a fund's position remained unchanged, this might we/~ be the, ~utc?mt! oj a number 
of purchases and sales that resulted in the fund maintaining an idenllcal poslllOn In that stock. 
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all stocks in period t and let us also assume that one of the stocks in that period is 
traded by five funds. The AFi,1 for that stock is then computed as follows: 
(1) (2) 
No. of Binomial Probability Expected Value Product Buyers n!*(P.2ex[l/k) *0 -I2.2eX12.ln-k2 
1 Bi,tl (Bi,1 + S,,) - p II (1 )x(2) [(n-k)!*k!) 
0 0.00032 0.8 0.000256 1 0.0064 0.6 0.00384 2 0.0512 0.4 0.02048 3 0.2048 0.2 0.04096 
4 0.4096 0 0 
5 0.32768 0.2 0.065536 
Summing up the results from the "Product"-column (in line with Jones et aI, 
1999) we obtain AF"I = 0.131072. Thus, the possible herding measures for a stock 
with five funds active in it during period i, are: 
No. of Hi,l =1 Bi,l I (B"I + S,,) - p I I - AF"I Buyers 
0 0.8 - 0.131072 - 0.668928 
1 0.6 - 0.131072 - 0.468928 
2 0.4 - 0.131072 - 0.268928 
3 0.2 - 0.131072 - 0.068928 
4 0- 0.131072 - -0.13107 
5 0.2 - 0.131072 - 0.068928 
To illustrate that AF· declines as the number of active traders rises, let us 1,1 
repeat the same example by assuming that the number of active funds in that stock 
IS now seven. 
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I 
(1) (2) 
No. of Binomial Probability Expected f alue Product 
Buyers n! *w.2exldlsJ. *0 -1l.2exJ2.(n-k2 I Bi,t l (Bi,t + Si,rJ - p t I (1)x(2) [(n-k)!*k!] 
0 0.0000128 0.8 0.00001024 
1 0.0003584 0.657142857 0.00023552 
2 0.0043008 0.514285714 0.00221184 
3 0.028672 0.371428571 0.0106496 
4 0.114688 0.228571429 0.0262144 I 
5 0.2752512 0.085714286 0.0235C)296 
6 0.3670016 0.057142857 0.02097152 
7 0.2097152 0.2 0.04194304 
Summing up the "Product"-column results we obtain AF,,I= 0.12582912, 
which is less than the value we obtained for it previously when assuming five 
active funds. 
It is important to note that the Lakonishok et al (1992) measure of herding 
as depicted above indicates the tendency of investors to trade a certain stock 
towards a certain direction more than random, independent trading would 
otherwise imply. Correlation is a quintessential element of herding, as the latter 
cannot materialize in the absence of the convergence of trades; however, 
correlation can exist independently of herding, as it may well be due to "spurious" 
herding, e.g. traders jointly responding to commonly observed signals, as noted 
previously. Thus, it would, perhaps, be more accurate to claim that the 
Lakonishok et a1 (1992) measure captures the propensity of institutional traders 
towards correlated trading in a certain direction rather than actual herding on their 
behalf as it is not possible to establish the presence of intent or spuriousness (in 
line with the distinction offered by Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001) in the results 
of this measure. 
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The Lakonishok et al (1992) measure has been employed both in its 
original as well as modified forms in a variety of markets, both developed as well 
as developing. For illustration purposes, Table 5.1 presents the results in 
chronological order on the mean herding measure for institutional traders from 
studies using the Lakonishok et al (1992) measure. 
5.4 The market environment of our study: Portugal 
5.4.1 The Portuguese Stock Exchange: a short historical overview 
Following an initial period of boom (culminating during the latter half of 
the 1980s) and bust (early 1990s) after its official reopening in early 1977, the 
Portuguese Stock Exchange embarked onto a period of growth towards maturity 
during the mid-1990s. During this period the country entered into a booming 
cycle with foreign direct investment, exports and GDP docwnenting a sharp 
increase. Privatizations, namely of blue-chip state-owned firms95 were also very 
intense during this period. On June 1996, the Derivatives' Exchange in Porto was 
officially launched, thus providing the opportunity for increased market 
participation through derivative instruments. In December 1997, the Portuguese 
stock exchange was upgraded by Morgan Stanley to "mature" and 19 of its 
companies were listed in the Dow Jones indices. Finally, in 1998, it was publicly 
announced that Portugal would be joining the third stage of the European 
Monetary Union. Overall, this sequence of favourable economic events led to a 
substantial increase in trading activity while the market index rose by 270% 
(January 1996 - April 1998). 
95 Examples include "Brisa ", "Cimpor ", "EDP" and "Portugal Telecom ". 
225 
Table 5.1: Institutional herding literature on the premises of the Lakonishok et al (1992) measure 
Underlying object 0/ Mean herding 
Study Market Sample window herding Data-/requency measllre /or 
investigation institlltional traders 
Lakonishok et al US 1985-1989 Tax-exempt pension Quarterly 0.027 
(1992) funds 
~ . 
Grinblatt et al (1996) US 1/1/1975-31/12/1984 Mutual funds Quarterly 0.025 
Oehler (1998) Germany 1988 to mid-1993 Local equity funds Semi-annual 0.8 
Choe et al (1999) South Korea 2/12/1996-27/12/1997 Overseas Daily 0.035 
institutional traders 
Jones et al (1999) US 1984-1993 Mutual funds Quarterly 0.016 
Wermers (1999) US 1/1//975-1/1/1994 All equity-holding Quarterly 0.034 
mutua/ funds 
Kim and Wei (2002) South Korea 1/1/1997-30/6//998 All investor-types Monthly 0.05-0.06 
Kim and Wei (2002) South Korea 1/1/1997-30/6/1998 Overseas Monthly so. 09 
institutional traders 
Gilmour and Smit SOllth Africa 1/12/1991-1/9//999 Local unit trusts Quarterly 0.07-0.08 
(2002) 
June 1997-December 
Olivares (2005) Chile 2001 Local pension funds Monthly 0.018 
Voronkova and Bolli Poland 1999-2002 Local pension funds Annually 0.226 
(2005) 
JVylie (2005) UK 11111987-3111211993 Local equity mulual Semi-ann/la/~v 0.026 fund\' 
Lobao and Serra Portugal 1998-2000 Local equity funds Quarterly 0.//38 
(20061 
Do et a(J~(JQ6) Finlalld March 1995-May 2004 All investor-types Monthly (J.0~35 
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Between the end of 1998 and 2002, the Russian! Asian Crises and the 
Dotcom-bubble brought about higher levels of volatility to the Portuguese stock 
exchange. In the end of 1998, the Russian! Asian crises created instability that later 
spread to other developing economies, including Brazil (a preferential destination 
for Portuguese foreign direct investment). That instability was particularlv felt in 
. 
the Portuguese stock exchange between the last quarter of 1998 and the end of 
1999, with the decrease of the market index pointing towards a forthcoming 
receSSIOn. 
However, in the first quarter of year 2000, there was a significant positive 
inversion in the market trend. This fact was mainly due to a late impact of the 
Dotcom-bubble in Portugal (Balbina and Martins, 2002). During the last quarter 
of 1999 and early 2000, there was a rise in the initial public offerings of IT-
companies96 accompanied by a rally in their prices (Sousa, 2002). This rally came 
to an abrupt halt during the first quarter of year 2000, following the slump 
observed in the NASDAQ. After March 2000, the Portuguese market experienced 
a prolonged period of free-fall that lasted for over two years97• In an effort to 
boost trading activity, the Lisbon Stock Exchange joined the Euronext-platform in 
2002; however, the market exhibited signs of only moderate increase ever since 
with economic recovery still hampered by the country's slow convergence to EU-
requirements (especially those regarding reforms in the public sector and the 
Stability and Growth Pact). 
96 Examples include "PT Multimedia ", "PT Multimedia. Com ", ".lI.'ovabase ", "/mpresa" and 
"Sonae.Com" k t nderwent a series of 
97 Our presentation in this section suggests that the Portuguese mar t! U . rfl 
. d th b ve to bear some In uence upon booms and busts during our sample perzod an we expect e a 0 
the empirical part (i. e. institutional herding results) of this chapter. 
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5.4.2 The Portuguese funds' industry 
The evolution of the Portuguese mutual funds' industry can be traced back 
to the mid-1980s, in the aftermath of the country's accession to the European 
Union. During the 1990s, the sector experienced rapid levels of gro\\th that 
culminated during the "boom-bust" period between 1995 and 1999 into a large 
increase both in terms of the number of funds that were launched as well as in 
tenns of the amounts of capital under their manaaement. The instability reinino b ~ ~ 
the market after 1999 and the concomitant market crises (local and global) created 
uncertainty in the market environment that led to changes in the mutual fund 
industry, which underwent a certain consolidation between 2000 and 2002 (Leite 
and Cortez, 2006). Table 5.2 provides us with the picture of the evolution of the 
mutual funds' industry in Portugal since its inception98. 
A fundamental feature of the Portuguese funds' industry is its high levels 
of concentration as Leite and Cortez (2006)99 and Lobao and Serra (2006)100 note. 
Since the Portuguese funds' sector is mostly under the management of a few large 
universal banking groups (Alves and Mendes, 2004; Leite and Cortez, 2006; 
Alves and Mendes, 2006), it is reasonable to expect that the fortunes of the latter 
bear a knock-on effect upon the development of the funds' industry. An example 
here relates to the mergers between mutual funds during the 2000-2002 period 
which followed the concentration of the banking sector during the same period. 
By May 2006, there existed 251 mutual funds managed by 15 asset management 
98 Source: CNfVM, 2002 . .' d 
99 According to Leite and Cortez (2006), the five largest asset management compames mamJume' 
approximately 91% of the total net asset value offunds in the market by year-end 200·1. . 
1M A~cording to Lobao and Serra (2006), the three largest asset management '~mpames 
I I '''funds in the market or mld-_OOi. maintained approximately 69% of the tota net asset va ue OJ. . 
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companies; the total value of their assets equalled approximately 28 1/;: billion 
euros
101 
Table 5.2: Evolution of the Portuguese mutual funds' industrv 
Year Number of funds Net Asset Value (million €) 
June 1986 1 51 
Dec 1987 5 251 
Dec 1988 7 205 
Dec 1989 24 1.003 
Dec 1990 51 1,895 
Dec 1991 82 4.305 
Dec 1992 98 5.791 
Dec 1993 109 8,260 
Dec 1994 126 10,260 
Dec 1995 150 10,639 
Dec 1996 182 13.208 
Dec 1997 204 19,615 
Dec 1998 246 23,955 
Dec 1999 272 24,087 
Dec 2000 260 21,558 
Dec 2001 262 21,266 
Dec 2002 228 20,377 
Dec 2003 215 22,850 
Dec 2004 224 24,415 
Dec 2005 242 28,290 
May 2006 251 28,469 
,JOT SOllrce. Ov/V}! 
5.5 Hypotheses 
We will now present our hypotheses on the basis of our prevIOUS 
discussion in Section 5.2.2. 
101 Source: http://'W'A-w.cmvm.pt 
102 Securities' Exchange Commision of Portugal. 
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Hypothesis 1: Different levels of market-wide herding bear 
signijicant(v 
different effects upon institutional herding at the index level 
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of market-turnover bear a significantly different 
effect upon institutional herding at the index level compared to lower ones 
Hypothesis 3: Different levels of market-volatility bear significantly different 
effects upon institutional herding at the index level 
Hypothesis 4: Differential market-directions bear significantly different effects 
upon institutional herding at the index level 
5.6 Data and Methodology 
5.6.1 Data 
We utilize a database of institutional portfolio-holdings obtained from the 
Portuguese Stock Exchange (Euronext Lisbon). The database includes the 
monthly portfolio-structures of all funds investing in the Portuguese market 
between October 1995 and March 2006 and provides us with the following 
information: a code corresponding to each fund, a code corresponding to the 
managing company of each fund, date (month), a code corresponding to the fund-
type (i.e. equity, fixed-income et al), a code corresponding to the type of the asset 
included in a fund's portfolio (i.e. stock, bond et al), a code for each asset, the 
name of each asset, the currency into which the position of the fund in an asset is 
expressed (Portuguese Escudo prior to 11111999, Euro afterwards), the currency 
exchange-rate (Euro-Escudo, for conversion purposes). the turnover in shares. the 
market in which the asset is traded (in case a fund holds stocks listed outside 
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Portugal) and the turnover-value. Due to the absence of data for several months 
during 1995-96 as well as 2006, we chose the January 1997 - December 2005 
period in order to measure institutional herding. 
We estimate index-wide institutional herding on the premISeS of the 
PSI20-index, which includes the twenty most liquid stocks in the Portuguese Main 
market. The latter also maintains the PSIGeral-index, which accommodates all 
stocks meeting the criteria to qualify for listing on the Main market. The choice of 
measuring herding on the basis of the PSI20 and not the PSIGeral is founded upon 
the availability of historical lists of the constituent stocks of those indices. We did 
not manage to obtain historical constituents' lists for the PSIGeral during th~ 
1997 -2005 period; we, therefore, used the historical constituent lists of the PSI20-
index. PSI20-lists are available online 103 for the period beginning from the 
inception of the index (1/1/1993) up to year-end 2001, while the lists for the 2002-
2005 period were obtained from the Euronext Lisbon. Given the limited numrer 
of stocks traded on the Portuguese Main Market (the PSIGeral has included 
around 50 stocks 104 in its ranks during the past decade or so) and the proportion of 
total market capitalization it represents (close to 900/0, according to Balbina and 
Martins (2002)), we contend that the choice of the PSI20 provides us with a good 
benchmark of the market's activity. 
To estimate index-wide market-herding (Hypothesis 1). \Ve use the daily 
closing prices of both the PSI20-index as well as its historical constituent stocks 
during the January 1997 - December 2005 period. \vhile to proxy for the risk-free 
rate (to estimate excess returns-see next subsection on Methodology) we utilize 
103 hill' ~'~~~JI2I' t'11f~}/)l',rl. (J! />\'/r s!ur/. jsp ') /,/11'.; =en& or =mL'rcados 
104 ()n thl' _'./,' of July 2006, the total number o(stocks included in the PSI Gerul equaled 53. 
') .., 1 
--' 
the 3-month deposit-rate (up to 3111211998) and the 3-month Euribor (after 
11111999). All data were obtained from DataStream. Finally, to test for the 
association between index-wide institutional herding and trading volume 
(Hypothesis 2), we use data on the turnover-value of the PSI20 obtained from the 
Euronext Lisbon. 
5.6.2 Methodology 
We measure institutional herding in the Portuguese market at the lcyel of 
the PSI20-index ("index-wide institutional herding") using the Lakonishok et al 
(1992) measure delineated in Section 5.3. Each month, we calculate the number of 
"buyers" and "sellers" for each of the constituent stocks of the PSI20 index and 
then calculate the p, (average proportion of "buyers") and the adjustment factor. 
The measure for institutional herding for each month is given by averaging the 
herding measures across all stocks included in the index in that month. 
An important issue here concerns the minimum number of funds required 
to be active in a stock in order to measure funds' herding upon it. This threshold 
varies across institutional herding studies contingent upon the sample-properties 
and upon certain predilections as to what minimum number of active funds 
constitutes a "herd". Here we test for the significance of institutional herding at 
the level of the PSI20-index, which maintains exact constituent lists and it is on 
the basis of those lists that herding is estimated. If we imposc arbitrary stock-
selection criteria for herd-estimation (e.g. take into consideration only those 
stocks traded by, say, five, ten or twenty ftmds in each month), \Vc run thc risk of 
biasing our results. This is because the anticipated exclusion nf some stocks \\ill 
..,.,,, 
--'-
essentially imply that the stocks used to estimate herding each month will be a 
fraction of the actual constituents of the index. Thus, instead of estimating 
institutional herding at the level of the PSI20-index, we would probably be g~tting 
a herding-estimate for a subset of PSI20-stocks. 
We choose to work each month with those constituent stocks of the PSI20 
that are traded by, at least, two funds. As a result, anv stock traded in a month bv a 
. . 
single fund or no funds will be erased from the estimations of herding for that 
month. Even though two active funds may not produce a notabl~ "herd", we use 
this minimum threshold in order to account even for the most extreme case of 
herding (two funds, one potentially following the other). 
To estimate index-wide market-herding (Hypothesis 1), \ye employ the 
model developed by Hwang and Salmon (2004) which we delineated in the 
previous chapter. Regarding the volume of trade used to test for Hypothesis 2, it is 
calculated at the monthly level using the monthly aggregate of the daily data of 
the turnover-value of the PSI20. Regarding the market volatility used to test for 
Hypothesis 3 (i.e. the impact of volatility of the market-index upon the 
significance of index-wide institutional herding) it is calculated using squared 
daily returns of the PSI20 at the monthly level according to the methodology 
proposed by Schwert (1989). Regarding, finally, the index returns (Hypothesis -+) 
these are estimated at the monthly level using the average of the daily returns of 
the PSI20-index for each month. To calculate these daily returns, we assume the 
percentage difference of the natural logarithms of the PSI20 closing prices. 
5.6.3 Descriptive Statistics 
5.6.3.a Index-wide institutional herding 
Our sample includes all historical constituent stocks of the PSI~O-index 
during the January 1997 - December 2005 period. Although the name of the index 
implies that the number of stocks each month is equal to n.venty. this number does 
not necessarily hold for each month in our herding estimations. This is due to the 
cut-off threshold requiring at least two funds trading in a stock each month: a 
stock may not be satisfying this threshold as it may be traded by one fund-or none. 
Note also, that we only take into account the "active" funds, namely those whose 
position in a stock has changed (upwards or downwards) during a month. 
Given the aforementioned sample-window, we estimate index-\vide 
institutional herding using the Lakonishok et al (1992) model for 108 months (9 
years times 12 months each). Table 5.3 presents some descriptive statistics 
regarding the monthly portfolio-holdings for our database. For 64 out of those 108 
months, the herding measure is estimated on the basis of all twenty stocks of the 
PSI20, while for 39 months for nineteen stocks. As a result, for 95% of the sample 
(103 out of 108 months) the estimations are conducted on the basis of, at least 
950/0 of the historical constituent stocks of the index. This, in tum implies that the 
data at hand are providing us with the opportunity of measuring institutional 
herding on the premises of the exact historical composition of the PSI20. 
The estimation of institutional herding on the premises of the historical 
constituent stocks of the PSI20-index yielded a total number of sixty mutual funds 
(Portuguese. in their supreme majority) active in the PSI20-stocks during the 
1997-2005 period with the average number of funds trading (i.e. buying or 
selling) a stock in a given month being equal to 23.4. 
5.6.3.b Index-wide market-herding 
Table 5.4 presents some statistics related to the estimated logarithmic 
cross-sectional standard deviation of the betas of the PSI20-portfolio. :\s indicated 
by the table, the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the betas 
exhibits insignificant values of both skewness and kurtosis, while the Jarque-Bera 
statistic does not indicate departures from normality. Therefore, the state-space 
model of Hwang and Salmon (2004) described previously can be legitimately 
estimated using the Kalman filter on the premises of the PSI20-index for our 
sample-period. 
5.7 Results-Discussion 
5.7.1 Results 
Table 5.5 presents our main results from the herding estimations. The 
mean index-wide institutional herding measure is computed as follows: first \ve 
average the herding measures of all constituent stocks of the PSI20 for each 
month in order to obtain the monthly measures of herding and then \ve average , . 
Table 5.3: Descriptive properties of the 1997-2005 portfolio-holdings database 
a) PSI20-composition and Euronext-database coveraoe 
b 
Number of PSI20-constituent stocks with two or more Number of months 
funds trading 
20 64 
19 39 
18 2 
17 2 
16 1 
b) Funds' properties 
Total number 60 
Average number of active funds per stock per month 23.42553 
Median number of active funds per stock per month 22.2 
Table 5.4: Properties of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the betas for the 
Hwang and Salmon (2004) measure 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera 
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Logarithmic cross-sectional standard 
deviation of OLS betas 
-0.2187103178 
0.1281628386 
-0.38838 
0.00549 
2.71527 
, 
i 
I 
I 
, 
the latter to get the full-period, mean index-wide institutional herding measure, 
which, as our results indicate, is found to equal 0.1282 (or 12.82%) with a median 
of 0.13. These results imply that if 100 funds were active in an average stock of 
the PSI20, about 13 more of them trade on the same side (buy/sell) than would 
otherwise be expected under the null hypothesis of no-herding. In other words, 
about 63% (50% under the null of no-herding plus the extra 12.82% mean herding 
measure from our results) of the active institutional investors in PSI20-stocks 
traded in one direction in any single month, on average, and the remaining 37% in 
the opposite one. These results are in line with similar results documented in other 
markets, as indicated by Table 5.1; in most cases, the mean institutional herding 
measure was found to be between 0.01 and 0.2. 
Having presented the overall index-wide institutional herding picture for 
our full sample-period, we now turn to the results regarding our hypotheses. 
Table 5.5: Overall herding 
Herding statistics for all stock-months (full sample period: 11111997-31112.'2005). The 
herding statistic for a given stock in a given month is defmed as: H,.I =[ I Bi,1 / (Bi,1 + S"I) -
P I] - AF· where B· is the number of funds that increased their positions in stock i in period I 1,1 , 1,1 
t ("buyers"), Si,1 is the number of funds that decreased their positions in stock i in period t 
("sellers"), PI is the expected proportion of "buyers" in a period (t) relative to the total number of 
active funds and AF· is an adjustment factor designed to capture the random variations of the [ 1,1 
1 B / (B· + S ) -P I] around P . The herding measure is calculated for each stock in each 1,1 1,1 1,1 I I 
month, averaO'ed across each month and then averaged across all months. Standard errors are in 
brackets. No~ that: * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = 
significance at the 1 % level. 
Mean herding measure for full-sample j1/1/1997-31112/20051 
Mean 0.128] 
(0.0047)··· 
Median 0.13 
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5.7.1.a Index-wide institutional herding and index-wide market-
herding 
In hypothesis 1 we stated that different levels of market-herding \\·ould be 
expected to bear significantly different effects over institutional herdina at the 
o 
index-level. Table 5.6 presents the results from the Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
estimations regarding index-wide market-herding. Accordina to these results o , 
there appears to exist significant index-wide market-herding at the PSI20-level as 
both rpm and (J"m,'l (the standard deviation of TJmt) are statistically significant (5 0 0 
level). The bottom row of Table 5.6 provides us with the signal-proportion value, 
which according to Hwang and Salmon (2004) indicates what proportion of the 
variability of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard deviation of the betas is 
explained by herding. The signal-proportion is estimated by dividing the (J" m,,, by 
the time series standard deviation of the logarithmic cross-sectional standard 
deviation of the betas and, as Hwang and Salmon (2004) showed empirically in 
their paper, the bigger the value of the signal-to-noise ratio, the less smooth the 
evolution of herding over time. Our results show us that the signal-proportion 
value equals approximately 20%, a figure relatively small (much smaller than the 
corresponding ones in Hwang and Salmon (2004))105, thus suggesting a smooth 
evolution of herding towards the PSI20 during the 1997-2005 period. To illustrate 
the herding course, we first extract the hmt as described in chapter Four 
(according to equation (6) there, hmt = 1 - exp (H mt)) and then plot it in Figure 
5.1. 
105 Around -10% for both tht! LS and South Korean markets. 
""'8 
-.) 
Figure 5.1 provides us with a graph of the course of herding (thin line) as 
well as the PSI20 index (thick line). As the graph indicates, herding towards the 
PSI20 was on the ascending from the beginning of our sample period (January 
1997) until November 1998 and then started dwindling towards lower levels. 
Given our discussion of the recent historical evolution of the Portuguese market, 
we can argue that herding appears to be rising as the market rallied throughout 
1997 and continued to rise in the aftermath of its drop (April 1998) until it hit a 
bottom (November 1998). Following that point, herding exhibited a free-fall that 
lasted until 200 I and then presented itself with a mUltiplicity of fluctuations until 
year-end 2005. 
To test whether index-wide institutional herding is higher or lower during 
periods of higher/lower index-wide market-herding, we first calculate index-wide 
institutional herding for periods of rising and for periods of declining index-wide 
market-herding. The rises/declines of index-wide market-herding are estimated 
here on a month-to-month basis using the hmt -series. 
Table 5.6: Herding results from the Hwang and Salmon (2004) measure 
log [Stdc(fJ~mt)] = Pm + H mt + Umt, Umt - iid (0, CT~,u) 
H mt = ¢m H m,t-i + 1]mt' 1]mt - iid (0, CT~,q) 
Variable Estimates 
-0.241053538 
Pm (0.040827366)*** 
¢m 
0.963013736 
10.0319515601*" 
0.025643225 
CTm,u (0.000326467)* * 
0.097473648 
CT m,q (0.001434830)"* 
0.200083156 
CT m,q / S.D. (Iog-CXB) 
(. = 10% sign. Level, .. = 5% sign. Level, ... = 1% sign. Lev.,el). Parentheses include the 
standard errors of the estimates; sample period: 11111997-3111 ~/200). 
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Figure 5.1: Market-wide herding hm ants the PSI20 during the 1997-2005 period 
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Table 5.7 shows us that index-wide institutional herdin~ is significant (1 % 
level) irrespective of the state of index-wide market-herding. The mean index-
wide institutional herding measure for periods of rising index-\yide market-
herding (0.1218) is lower compared to the one during periods of declining index-
wide market- herding (0.1351) indicating that funds tend to herd less \\-hen there 
is a rise in herding in the market towards the PSI20. The le\-els of index-\\ide 
institutional herding between periods of rising and periods of declining index-
wide market-herding were found to be significantly different (10% level); Table 
5.7 presents the results from the relevant Wald-tests. 
We then partitioned index-wide market-herding into three subgroups based 
upon its level ("high", "mid", "low") and calculated index-\yide institutional 
herding for each subgroupl06. Results in Table 5.7 indicate that index-wide 
institutional herding was found again to be significant (1 % level) irrespective of 
the state of index-wide market-herding, although index-wide institutional herding 
assumes its lowest value when index-wide market-herding at the PSI20-level is 
high. However, the levels of index-wide institutional herding across these three 
subgroups were found to be insignificantly different from each other (see the 
Wald-tests' results in Table 5.7). 
Thus, these results seem to suggest that index-wide institutional herding 
appears to be statistically significant irrespective of the state of index-wide 
market-herding. Ho\yever. index-\yide institutional herding is found to be higher 
at decreasing as opposed to increasing index-wide market herding leyels; haying 
said that, though, the difference of the size of index-\\ide institutional herding 
106 All three subgroups are o(equa/ si::t!. i. t.' upper, mid- and /UHW third ulindc!..x-wide l7I<.1rkCI 
hading. 
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between those levels is not always found to be significant. As a result, these 
results appear to provide insufficient support for our first hypothesis, namely, that 
different levels of market-herding bear significantly different effects oYC'r 
institutional herding at the index-level. 
5.7.1.b Index-wide institutional herding and index-\vide trading 
volume 
In hypothesis 2 we proposed that higher trading volume would be 
expected to bear a significantly different effect over institutional herding at the 
index-level compared to lower trading volume. We calculate the volume of trade 
using the turnover-value at the monthly frequency in line with what we mentioned 
in Section 5.6.2. To test our hypothesis, we first measured index-wide institutional 
herding for periods of rising and for periods of declining tumover-yalue. The 
rises/declines are estimated here on a month-to-month basis. Table 5.8 shows us 
that index-wide institutional herding is significant (1 % levd) irrespecti\'t~ of the 
state of index-wide trading volume. The mean index-'.Vide institutional herding 
measure for periods of rising index-wide trading volume is 100\er compared to 
periods of declining index-wide trading volume. thus indicating that funds tend to 
herd less when there is a rise in the trading activity towards the PSI20-stocks. 
The difference between the levels of index-wide institutional herding 
between periods of rising and periods of declining index-wide trading \'C)lume was 
found to be insignificant, as the results from the releyant \\'ald-tests in Table 5.8 
indicak. 
We then partitioned index-wide trading volume into three subgroups based 
upon its level ("high", "mid", "low,,)107 and calculated index-wide institutional 
herding for each subgroup. Results in Table 5.8 indicate that index-\\ide 
institutional herding assumes its lowest value when index-wide trading volume is 
high, thus indicating that funds tend to herd less when the PSI20 experiences high 
trading activity. Again here, index-wide institutional herding was found to be 
significant (1 % level) irrespective of the levels of the PSI20-volume. To assess 
the difference between the levels of index-wide institutional herding among the 
three subgroups we performed Wald-tests; results demonstrated that this 
difference was insignificant, as Table 5.8 indicates. Thus, these results seem to 
suggest that index-wide institutional herding appears to be statistically significant 
irrespective of the state of index-wide trading. 
Thus, these results seem to suggest that index-wide institutional herding 
appears to be statistically significant irrespective of the state of index-wide trading 
volume, with its levels declining during periods of increasing trading activity. 
However the difference in the size of index-wide institutional herding between , 
periods of increasing and decreasing index-wide trading volume appears to be 
insignificant. Consequently, these results seem to reject our second hypothesis, 
namely that higher trading volume bears a significantly different effect over 
institutional herding at the index-level compared to lower trading volume. 
107 All three subgroups are of equal size, i. e. upper, mid- and lower third of index-wide trading 
volume. 
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Table 5.7: Index-wide institutional herding and index-wide market-herding 
lIerding statistics for ull stock-months (full sample period: 11111997-3111212005). The herding statistic for a given stock ill a given 11I0llth is dl!jllled as: ll;,t = r 
I 1l1,l / (ill,l + SI,t) - PI I] - AFI,t , where Bi,t is the number offimds that increased their positions in stock i in period t ("huyers"), Si,l is the lIumber (!l 
jimds thaI decreased their positi()ns in stock i in period t ("sellers ,,), PI is the expected proportion of "buyers" in a period (t) relative to the tota/number (~l(/{'/ivc 
fitl](/\· and A F\I is an adjustment factor designed to capture the random variations of the [ 1 BI,I / (Bl,t + SI,I) - PI I] around PI' The herding measure is 
calculated for each stock in each month, averaged across each month and then averaged across all months, according to the grouping for each test. Standard errors 
(lrc in brackets. Note that: * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = signijicance at the 1% /evel. 
a) Index-wide institutional herdi,!g duringp_eriods ofjising and declining index-wide market-herding 
Rising Declining Difference 
(rising - declining) 
Mean index-wide institutional O. 1218 O. 1351 -0.0163 
e-------
_l!~,=-di!!g measure (0.0076) *** (0.0059) *** (0.0094)* 
-
- ----
b)_ Index-wide institutiollal herding across different levels of illdex-wide market-herding 
High Mid Low Difference Difference DifTl'rcnce 
(high -low) 
__ (high_- mil!t_ 
-----
(lo)'V -_mid) 
Ml'an index-wide institutional 0.1 I 78 0. 1322 O. 1346 -0.0/68 -0.0/44 0. (}()] 4 
I hl'rding m~asure (0.0085) *** (0.0082) *** (0.008)*** (0.0/51) (0. () /25) - (0.03) 
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Table 5.8: Index-wide institutional herding and index-wide trading volume 
lIerding statistics for 0/1 stock-lIIrmths (fu// sample period: 11111997-3111212005). The herding statistic for a given stock il1 a given month is dcjilled as: IIII c= I 
I n", / ( BI,t + '~\I ) - Pill - AF /,1' where BiJ is the number offunds that increased their positions in stock i in period t ("buyers "), S"I is the nllmber ofjill/ds 
Ihat decreased their positions in stock i in period t ("sellers"), PI is the expected proportion of "buyers" in a period (t) relative to the total nllmber ofacti\'c jill/tis 
and AFI,I is an adjustment factor designed to capture the random variations of the [ I Bi,l / (Bi" + Si,f) - PI I] around PI' The herding measlire is caiclilutl'd 
for each stock in each month, averaged across each month and then averaged across all months, according to the grouping for each test. Standard errors arc ill 
hrackets. Note that: * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% level. 
a) Index-wide institutional herding during periods of rising and declining index-wide trading volunle 
Rising Declining Difference 
(rising - declining) 
Mean index-wide institutional 0.1289 0.129/ -0.0002 
~~rding m~asure (0.0071) *** (0.0064) *** (0.0/) 
-----
- -----
b) Index-wide institutional berdinK across different levels oLindex-wide trading volume 
--
---
-
--
-
-
High Mid Low Difference Difference Diffen.'nce 
(high -low) ~_(h_igh - !!lid) ____ 
_ __ ~Iow - m_i~D r----- ------- - --
Mean index-wide institutional 0.1255 0.1295 0.1296 -0. 00-11 -() 00-1 0. ()()() I 
he_~d_il!g measure (0.0084) * * * (0. O()81) *** (0.0084) *** (0.12) (0.117) (()() I) L--- __ 
-
'----- ------ - ---~ --_._---
-
-
2.+) 
~----
-----
5.7.1.c Index-wide institutional herding and index-volatility 
In hypothesis 3 we stated that different levels of market \'olatility would 
be expected to bear significantly different effects over institutional herdina at the ;:, 
index-level. To test whether this is the case, we first measured index-\vide 
institutional herding for periods of rising and for periods of declining index-
volatility, the latter calculated at the monthly frequency in line \vith \vhat we 
mentioned in Section 5.6.2. The rises/declines of index-volatility are estimated 
here on a month-to-month basis. Table 5.9 shows us that index-\\ide institutional 
herding is significant (l % level) irrespective of the state of index-volatility. The 
mean index-wide institutional herding measure for periods of rising index-
volatility (0.1126) is lower compared to periods of declining index-volatility 
(0.1424) indicating that funds tend to herd less when there is a rise in the 
volatility of the PSI20. The difference between the levels of index-wide 
institutional herding between periods of rising and periods of declining index-
volatility was found to be significant at the 1 % leveL as the results from the 
Wald-tests in Table 5.9 show. 
We then partitioned index-volatility into three subgroups on the basis of 
its level ("high", "mid", "10W,,)108 and re-calculated index-wide institutional 
herding for each subgroup. Results in Table 5.9 indicate that index-wide 
institutional herding assumes its highest value (0.1492) \vhen index-volatilit) is 
low. Again here, index-\vide institutional herding \vas found to be significant 
(l % level) irrespective of the state of index-volatility. 
108 All three subgroups are of equal si::e, i, e, upper, mid- and lower third oj inde."C \'r !idtility, 
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Using Wald-tests we found the difference between the levels of index-
wide institutional herding during periods of ·'lov.:" index-volatility and durina 
. ::-
periods of "high"l"mid" index-volatility to be significant at the 5° ° le\'el. thus 
indicating that index-wide institutional herding is significantly higher when the 
PSI20 is least volatile. 
A number of studies (Christie and Huang, 1995; Gleason et al 2003: 
Gleason et aI, 2004; Hwang and Salmon, 2004; Caparelli et aI, 200-L Demirer 
and Kutan, 2005) have unveiled the absence of herding towards the market-index 
during periods of ~xtreme market returns, the latter defined as lying oyer a single 
standard deviation from the average return of the index during a period. Since 
extreme returns tend to increase a market's volatility (Brooks, 2002), \\"e also 
tested whether index-wide institutional herding exhibits any differences between 
periods of "extreme" and "non-extreme" PSI20-retums. To that end, we 
partitioned PSI20-returns into two subgroups, namely "extreme" (lying over a 
single positive/negative standard deviation from the period's average) and "non-
extreme" (lying within a single positive/negative standard deviation from the 
period's average) returns and calculated institutional herding on their basis. 
Table 5.9: Index-wide institutional herding and index-volatility 
!lerding statisticsj(Jr all stock-months (full sample period: /1/11997-31/1212005). The herding statisticfor a given stock ill a givel1monlh is defilled as: 110 = [ 
1/]1,1 / ( BI,I + 5,'i,l) - PI I] - AF 1,1' where Bi,l is Ihe number offunds that increased their positions in stock i in period t ("OI(l'Crs"), Si,l is Ihe I1lllnbl.!r olfi111 d,' 
thaI decreascd their positions in stock i in period I ("sellers "), PI is the expected proportion of "buyers" in a period (I) relative to the tolalnllmber of aclivl.! jimd\' 
and AFI,I is an w/jllsllllcntfactor designed to capture the random variations of the [ I BI,I / (Bi,1 + Si,l) - PI I] around PI. The herding measure is calclliated 
fur each slack in each month, averaged across each month and then ffiJeraged across all months, according to the grouping fur each tesl. Stalldard errors arl.! ill 
hrackets. Null' 117 a I." * = significance al the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% level 
a) Index-wide institutional herding during periods ofrising and declining index-l10latility 
Rising Declining Difference 
(rising - declining) 
- ------------I-----------t---------------t-----------~----~-----"-'-'---------------l 
i\lean index-wide institutional 
henli,!g measure 
0.1126 
(0.0069) *** 
0.142-1 0.0298 
(0.006) *** (0. ()()() 1) *** 
----~-~------j~---------------~---
- -------------------- ---------------------------------------------.----------1 
_____ ~ __ ____ _b) Itu~l!x-wide ill.fiititlltiolla/ herdillg across different/eve/s of illdex-vo/alil_i_t-,,-J_' -------r~------------------
High Mid Low Difference Bifference Difference 
__ __ __ _ ___ _____- (high -low) __ <_high - mil_I.<) ____ --+--______ (loW--=-_l!lid) ____ _ 
l\lean index-wide institutional 0.1211 0.114-1 0.1-191 -0. 028 0. {)067 0. 03-17 
IllTtling mea'~llr~ ________ -,--_io. (~088) *** (()~{)!)(~ l) *** (0.0067) *** _ (0.0111) ** (0.0119) 
c) Illdex-wide illstitlltiollal "l!,"-~/~~IK tilirillK period5 of "e~·I,"-e~ILe" }'erSIiS "IlYIl-extreme" ill dex-relII rll.\' 
-- ---~~--l "F.xtreme" "Non-extreme" I ~----I)iffe;:-~~l~~- ------- .---
'h'an indl'\,-\\ ide institution •• 1 
hl'nling IIIl'aSUI"l' 
. I C'l'\.treme"-"non-extn'll1e") 
. - ~- ----.- ~--- I -- -- -------- ~ 
'UO()()I O.I.J15 I 0.051-1 
. (0. O~ ~ )_* ___ *_* ___ -'- ______ (_(_).r_~{)_.J __ 7)_*_*_* ________ 1 (0.0107)*** 
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As Table 5.9 indicates, index-wide institutional herdina 
/:) re::1ams 
significantly (1 % level) higher during "mild" periods compared to "extreme" 
ones; note also that it is statistically significant irrespective of whether returns are 
"extreme" or not. 
Thus, these results seem to suggest that index-wide institutional herdina e 
appears to be statistically significant irrespective of the state of index-volatility, 
with its levels appearing significantly higher during periods of lower as opposed 
to periods of higher index-volatility. Moreover, in line with the above relevant 
findings from herding research, it assumes significantly higher values during 
periods of non-extreme versus periods of extreme market returns. These results 
appear to confirm our third hypothesis, namely that different levels of volatility 
are expected to bear significantly different effects over institutional herding at 
the index-level. One could interpret these results as the byproduct of a possible 
"rational" approach on behalf of fund managers, who may choose to trade on the 
basis of a widening public pool of information, rather than herd. if higher 
volatility is the outcome of a rise in the flow of information in the market 
(Mayhew, 2000). Alternatively, it might well be the case that less volatile periods 
promote institutional herding, since they may: a) be associated with a more 
definitive market direction upon which fund managers can herd and b) render the 
relative performance-benchmark for their evaluation less ambiguous, thus easier 
to follow. 
S.7.1.d Index-\\'ide institutional herding and index-direction 
In hypothesis ~ we stated that different market-directions \\'ould be expected to 
bear significantly diffaent effects upon institutional herding at the index-Ievd. 
2~9 
To test whether this is the case, we first measured index-wide institutional 
herding for periods of rises and for periods of declines in the PSI20-index. The 
rises/declines of the PSI20-index are estimated here on a month-to-month basis. 
Table 5.10 shows us that index-wide institutional herding is significant (l % 
level) irrespective of the state of the index-direction. The mean index-wide 
institutional herding measure for periods of rises in the PSI20 (0.1362) is :lighcr 
compared to periods of declines in the PSI20 (0.1196) indicating that funds tend 
to herd more when there is a rise in the PSI20. The difference between the levels 
of index-wide institutional herding between periods of rises and during periods 
of declines in the PSI20 was found to be significant at the 10% }eyel, as the 
results from the Wald-tests in Table 5.10 indicate. 
In light of the previous discussion regarding "extreme" versus '"non-
extreme" returns, we decided to test whether our results are subject to the 
influence of extreme returns. Thus, we partitioned PSI20-retums, into "extreme" 
positive/negative (lying over one positive/negative standard deviation from the 
period's mean) and "non-extreme" positive/negative (lying between one 
positive/negative standard deviation from the period's mean and the mean itself) 
ones. Results are reported in Table 5.1 0 and suggest that: a) "extreme" negatiye 
PSI20-retums are associated with insignificantly more index-wide institutional 
herding (0.0938) as opposed to "extreme" positive PSI20-retums (0.0852) and b) 
"non-extreme" positive PSI20-returns are associated \vith significantly (5 0 0 
level) more index-wide institutional herding (0.1501) as opposed to "nOIl-
~xtreme" negative PSI20-returns (0.1311). 
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Similar results were obtained (Table 5.10) when we partitioned the 
PSI20-returns into three subgroupsl09 based upon their level ("high", ""mid", 
"low"), where index-wide institutional herding was found to be significantly 
higher (10% level) in the "mid"-subgroup (when the PSI20-returns are neither 
too high nor too low) compared to periods of "high"l"low" PSI20-returns. Note 
that index-wide institutional herding was found to be statistically significant 
irrespective of the subgroup tested upon. 
Thus, these results seem to suggest that index-wide institutional herding 
appears to be statistically significant irrespective of the state of the PSI20-returns 
in general, with its levels appearing significantly higher when the PSI20-returns 
are positive, yet not extreme (as defined above). These results appear to accept 
our fourth hypothesis (namely that different market-directions bear significantly 
different effects over institutional herding at the index-level) and seem to favour 
the arguments put forward by herding theories regarding the role of 
agency/reputational concerns as a motive underlying the herding decision of less 
skilled/reputed fund-managers, in line with what has been mentioned in Section 
5.2.2.d. 
5.7.2 Discussion 
The above presentation of our results regarding index-wide institutional 
herding at the level of the PSI20-index for the 1997-2005 period provid~s us with 
interesting insights into the herding tendencies of mutual funds. First of all, as is 
evident from what has been delineated thus far, institutional traders exhibit 
109 All three subgroups are of equal size, i. e. upper, mid- and lower third of index returns. 
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Table 5.10: Index-wide institutional herding and index-direction 
Herding statistics for all stock-months (full sample period: 111/1997-3111212005). The herding statistic for a given stock in a given month is defined as: HI,I = [ 
1 Bi,l / (Bi,l + Si,/) - PI I] -AF i,l' where Bi,l is the number offunds that increased their positions in stock i in period t ("buyers ''), Si,l is the number offonds 
that decreased their positions in stock i in period t ("sellers ''), PI is the expected proportion of "buyers" in a period (t) relative to the total number of active fonds 
and AFi,1 is an adjustment factor designed to capture the random variations of the [ 1 Bi,l / (Bi,1 + Si,/) - PIll around PI. The herding measure is calculated 
for each stock in each month, averaged across each month and then averaged across all months, according to the grouping for each test. Standard errors are in 
brackets. Note that: * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% level. 
aJ Index-wide institutional herding during periods of positive and negative index-returns 
Positive Negative Difference (positive - negative) 
Mean index-wide institutional 0.1362 0.1196 0.0166 
herding measure (0.0067)*** (0.0066) *** (0.0095)* 
b) Index-wide institutional herding across different levels of index-returns 
High Mid Low Difference Difference Difference 
(high -low) (high - mid) (low - mid) 
Mean index-wide institutional 0.1260 0.1452 0.1135 0.0125 -0.0192 -0.0317 
herdin~ measure (0.0087)*** (0.0074)*** (0.008)*** (0.0119) (0.0114)* (0.0109)*** 
c) Index-wide institutional herding during periods of "extreme" positive versus negative and "non-extreme"positive versus negative index-reluTilS 
"Extreme" "N on-extreme" Difference 
"extreme" positive - "non-extreme" positive 
Positive Negative Positive Negative "extreme" negative 
- "non-extreme" 
negative 
Mean index-wide institutional 0.0852 0.0938 0.1501 0.1311 -0.0086 O.OlYO 
herding measure (0.0156) *** (0.012-1) *** (0.0059) *** (0.0072)*** (0.02) (0. OOY4) ** 
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significant herding tendencies at the level of the PSI20-constituents irrespective of 
the market conditions upon which their herding is tested. 
This significant propensity towards institutional herding on PSI20-stocks 
may be attributed to factors related to the market itself that could be conducive to 
fund-herding. First of all, one should bear in mind that the Portuguese Stock 
Exchange accommodates a rather limited number of listed stocks; its Main market 
includes about fifty stocks, while the Alternative market about thirty. What is 
more, the market is highly concentrated, since as Vieira and Viera (2002) note, the 
five most liquid stocks on the Lisbon market represent roughly two-thirds of its 
total market activity. This, in turn, as Ho et al (2002) argue, implies the potential 
for relative illiquidity in the market with several stocks being thinly traded, a fact 
confirmed by Vieira and Vieira (2002) and Soares and Serra (2005). On the other 
hand, the Portuguese fund-industry maintains a rather highly concentrated 
structure, as we noted in Section 5.4.2. As a result, the Portuguese market is 
characterized by a limited number of stocks as well as a limited number of funds. 
In such a setting (and given that institutional - mostly indigenous - traders 
I 110) h d' . . '1 account for over two-thirds of the market-vo ume ,er mg mstmcts may eaSI y 
arise, since stock-screening on behalf of fund managers is alleviated, as they have 
a limited number of stocks to monitor. However, given the small population of 
funds, peer-screening will also be facilitated. Thus, there exists the potential of 
enhanced uniformity in the professional conduct across fund managers, more so in 
view of the agency-based concerns mentioned before with regards to herding. 
Herding on the performance-benchmark is alleviated in a highly concentrated 
110 According to the January 2006 report on the composition of trade issued by the Portugut!se 
Securities' Exchange Commission (Source: CMVM). 
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professional community, since any deviation from the latter is likely to confer a 
more personal stigma onto the deviants (Bikhchandani et a1. 1992). 
notwithstanding the possible professional and reputational implications accruing 
in the aftermath of a potential negative performance. Therefore such hi ah , :;, 
concentration tends to magnify the impacts of the homogeneity (De Bondt and 
Teh, 1997) within the ranks of fund managers analyzed in Section 5.:2. 1, since 
peer-mimicking is greatly facilitated, thus allowing and, indirectly prompting. 
managers to monitor each other. 
Our results allow us interesting insight into the trading pattern of funds, in 
general and in Portugal, in particular. First of all, although as we have said above 
there exists significant (l % level) index-wide institutional herding irrespective of 
the parameters upon which the latter is tested, it appears that institutional traders 
herd more when the PSI20 undergoes through relatively less intense conditions. 
Institutional herding on the premises of the PSI20-index constituents assumes its 
highest values when: a) index-wide market-herding levels are low/declining, b) 
index-wide trading volume levels are low/average or declining, c) index-volatility 
is low/declining and d) index-returns are non-extreme (and positive). 
Why funds may behave in such a fashion is not directly obvious. Non-
intense market conditions reflect less uncertainty and may point towards a clearer 
market-direction (Hwang and Salmon, 2004), upon \vhich funds may herd. A 
relevant explanation for this may be that the reference-benchmark of the 
performance-evaluation of fund-managers may be less ambiguous during less 
intense market periods compared to turbulent ones and, as a result. easier to 
follow. It is possible that less volatile market conditions may generat~ kss 
infom1ational signals (Mayhew, 2000) upon which funds can trade, thus pro\'iding 
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less possible options for them to choose; the latter may facilitate the development 
of cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et aI, 1992). Finally, empirical 
findings (Choe et aI, 1999; Lobao and Serra, 2006) also provide some evidence in 
support of lower institutional herding levels during more intense market 
conditions. Thus, our results indicate the presence of significant institutional 
herding in the Portuguese market which can be interpreted through existing 
theoretical tenets of herding research. 
5.8 Conclusion 
A substantial portion of existing Finance research (Bikhchandani and 
Sharma, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) has demonstrated that there exists both 
theoretical, as well as empirical evidence in support of the case of institutional 
herding. The latter has been tested in various market settings and upon various 
parameters in an attempt to assess its significance. \Ve contribute to this literature 
by testing for the impact upon institutional herding of various market conditions 
(market-wide herding, volume, volatility and market-direction), the association of 
which with institutional herding has received rather scant attention in the relevant 
literature. For consistency reasons, we base the enumeration of both the 
institutional herding as well as the aforementioned market-conditions upon a 
specific market-index. To the best of our knowledge, institutional herding has 
nevcr been tested on the basis of those premises. 
Our tests are conducted on the basis of a unique institutional holdings' 
database from the PortuQuese Stock Exchange and aim at mcasuring institutional 
~ ~ 
herding on the premises of the historical constituents of the PSI20-index during 
the 1997-2005 period. Results indicate the presence of statistically significant 
herding on behalf of fund managers irrespective of the state of the market and 
whose levels are higher during periods of less intense market conditions. ~lore 
specifically, we found higher institutional herding levels during periods \\-hen: a) 
index-wide market-herding levels are low/declining, b) index-\vide trading 
volume levels are low/average or declining, c) index-yolatility is low/declining 
and d) index-returns are non-extreme (and positive). We also showed that, 
although differences in the direction and volatility of the market can lead to 
significantly different effects over institutional herding, this is not the case with 
market-herding and the volume of trade. 
We have illustrated how these results can be interpreted through existing 
herding theories, mostly related to agency-related considerations on behalf of fund 
managers and we also demonstrated how the market's environment itself may 
tacitly promote these considerations. 
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Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks 
The thesis present aimed at delineating the role of a variety of market-
features and conditions over herding and feedback trading over time within as 
well as across markets. We consider the research undertaken here as contributino 
t::) 
towards the better understanding as to which factors promote or inhibit the 
manifestation of trading strategies, in general and herding with feedback trading, 
in particular. As the impact of herding and fe~dback trading in securities' markets 
has been widely documented in the Finance literature in both analytical as well as 
empirical terms, our research attempts to reverse the argument: in other words, 
instead of focusing on the impact of those strategies on the market, we examine 
the impact of the market upon them. This is an element that has been rather 
scarcely investigated in the relevant research and, as a result, our work produces 
useful evidence towards that direction. Concurrently, our thesis extends the debate 
over these two trading patterns by suggesting an alternative approach towards 
their study. 
Following the review of the literature in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 delves into 
the world of heterogeneous agents' models in order to assess the presence of 
feedback trading in various market settings. We employ an existing such model, 
where rational traders interact with their feedback peers and expand it by adding 
an extra trader-type, whose feedback trading is conditioned upon the violation of a 
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threshold. Given the feedback nature of that trader-type. we tested for its 
significance in several markets with differences in their heterogeneity levels, as 
reflected through the participation-levels of various investor-types. The idea here 
was the following: the more heterogeneous a market is the more investor-types it 
is capable of attracting and, thus, the more investment strategies it may have the 
potential of accommodating. Our results pointed towards that direction, thus 
confirming that more heterogeneous markets have the potential of accommodating 
a larger array of trading strategies; a second reading of those results would also 
suggest that various feedback strategies have the potential of materializing more 
significantly in more open market environments. 
Our work in Chapter 3 does not only contrioute to the debate surrounding 
feedback trading by exploring its presence in different market settings. We have 
(perhaps, persistently) noted in this thesis that feedback trading is an umbrclla-
term and as such bears no single trading-expression. Given that. our novel trader-
type constitutes an extra possible type of feedback trading, thus further adding to 
the modeling of that mode of trading. 
In Chapter 4 we explore herding across various markets on the premises of 
several market-specific features, whose relevance to herding we theoretically 
establish in the outset. Our results confirm that herding is higher in markets with 
capital gains' taxes, yet fail to provide any support for the conjectured impact of 
the introduction of short-sales and index-futures upon it. Although based upon a 
relatively small sample of markets. our evidence contributes to the e\.isting 
literature on herd behaviour by conditioning the presence of the latter upon 
specific elements of a market's structure capable of affecti ng it. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 we focus on the herding of a specific subset of 
investors, namely fund-managers. We investigated institutional herding in the 
Portuguese market on the premises of the constituent-stocks of the market-index 
(PSI20), thus enabling ourselves to gain an accurate picture of its presence at the 
index-level. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that institutional 
herding has been measured exclusively at the level of a market's index. What is 
more, in view of that, we also tested for the impact upon the presence of funds' 
herding of certain index-properties reflective of market-conditions capable of 
affecting herding and found that the significance of the latter remained unchanged 
irrespective of the market conditions tested upon. We also illustrated how the high 
concentration levels of both the Portuguese market as well as the Portuguese 
funds' industry could be considered as contributing to the significant institutional 
herding levels observed. Interestingly enough, we found that Portuguese fund 
managers tended to exhibit higher herding tendencies during periods typified by 
relatively non-intense market-conditions and we demonstrated how this could be 
ascribed to herd-related, agency concerns. 
The results of our research have the potential of being of certain interest to 
both market participants as well as policymakers alike. With regards to the 
former, our evidence demonstrates whether the presence or absence of specific 
market features is capable of affecting the manifestation of herding and feedback 
trading. This is useful both in case one intends to adhere to those patterns as well 
as in case one wishes to formulate a strategy to take advantage of them. Also, our 
evidence on high levels of significant institutional herding in a highly 
concentrated market environment might also constitute a useful input in the 
decision-making of market participants who trade in markets with similar 
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structures. What is more, the preoccupation in Chapters 4 and 5 with herding at 
the level of the top-capitalization indices of various markets raises interestino 
e 
issues per se in terms of trading, as all of these indices are the underlying subjects 
of index-futures' contracts; consequently, the evidence produced in this thesis is 
expected to be of some interest to that part of the investment spectrum. 
From a policymaking point of view, our research provides evidence for the 
first time of the impact of the regulatory environment over herding and feedback 
trading. Given the treatment of those two by the popular literature as the culprits 
underlying abnormal market phenomena, their research on these premises helps 
delineate whether it is the market environment itself that may tacitly "grandfather" 
their manifestation. In Chapter 3 we show how the expression of an hypothetical 
feedback trading pattern is found to be more significant in relatively liberal 
market settings, while the findings of Chapter 4 indicating reduced herding in 
markets with zero capital gains' taxes may also be reflective of the potential link 
between capital gains' taxes and herding. What is more, our results from Chapter 
5 should provide a clear indication of the effects of high market concentration 
over the presence of herding in the market on behalf of mutual funds. As a result, 
our findings seem to suggest that the significant manifestation or not of specific 
trading patterns may actually be the outcome of the market environment and its 
relevant regulatory structures. 
We now tum to the implications of our work for future research by 
beginning from the issues dealt with in Chapter 3. As we also suggested there, the 
possible avenues for research as regards various feedback trading patterns are hard 
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to enumerate, gIven the multiple possible facets of the latter. In terms of 
"threshold trading", it is our understanding that it constitutes a conditional 
feedback trading pattern that can be tested on the premises of a large array of 
conditioning factors. As a result, future research on threshold-trading could resort 
.... 
to the testing of many more indicators, both volume- as well as non-volume-
based. What is more, the inclusion of a larger variety of markets would provide us 
with wider evidence over the presence of threshold- trading across \'arious 
market-settings. Research regarding herding could be expanded in a similar 
fashion, i.e. through testing for herding in more markets; in addition to that, 
herding could be tested on the premises of other market features and conditions 
capable of bearing an effect over it. What is more, research on the impact of 
market-factors over investors' behaviour could well be expanded to include other 
expressions of behavioural trading beyond herding and feedback trading, such as, 
for example, the disposition-effect. 
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